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Soviet Education —  Summary
The research for this thesis originally sought to develop the 
perspective that the Khrushchev reforms of 1958 were phenomena of 
the post war period. During the course of the work, it soon emerged 
that links existed among education, social, and economic priorities 
which would not be explained outside the context of earlier exper­
iences and decisions. Soviet educators of the 1920s had relied on 
experimentation for solutions to education theory and organization.
In the 1930s, however, Stalin separated education policy from the 
administration of the system, largely pre-empting the process of 
taking decisions on the basis of experiments. The evolution of 
education and training systems in the Soviet Union (including that 
envisaged in the 1958 reforms) can be traced against the develop­
ment of sectoral priorities.
In the early period after the Revolution, Soviet educators set 
a framework for education which has lasted through the years. The 
basic principles were equal access to nonsectarian, polytechnic 
education, and a system of free education through higher levels.
These were utopian in the context of the early period of Soviet rule. 
The principles were each sacrificed at one or other period of econo­
mic or .political difficulty, but reinstated as opportunity allowed.
Factors precluding early implementation of a uniform, universal 
Soviet education system were extreme economic difficulties, coupled 
with the temporary displacement of governmental institutions and 
delays in relaying decisions to decentralized groups due to such 
factors as the poor communications network. Moreover, the Soviet
-2-
leadership needed to gain experience as a bureaucracy, and it had 
inherited a country characterized by illiteracy and an uneven educa­
tion infrastructure.
The overriding challenge was in creating an integrated social 
and economic system. From the 1920s, the integration of education 
into the planning for development of the country established the pace 
for expanding education, particularly as leaders linked levels of 
education in the workforce with industrial labor needs. The demand 
for compulsory and universal education should have created a massive 
drive in the education sector, but this did not occur. By the mid- 
1920s, it was clear that industrial development could be achieved 
only by an infusion of large numbers of educated managers and a 
technically skilled, literate workforce. Generally, the 1930s was 
a period of competing priorities, but the needs of industry for 
trainable workers were foremost. This was not always compatible with 
the longer-term needs of the country for educating youth through 
higher education.
Education theory did not keep pace with the rapid implementation 
of universal and compulsory education after the Stalin reforms of the 
early 1930s. Uneasy links were established among general education 
as it had been practiced before the Revolution, the new ideology 
(itself not fully absorbed into the school program), and the pressing 
needs of the economy for skilled workers. During the 1930s, educa­
tors failed in their attempts to integrate labor training and theory 
into general education, so that industry established parallel systems 
of part-time and technical education which relied on the economic 
unit for material support and for its faculties. Development of the
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part-time programs depended significantly on the attitudes of 
industrial management toward non-productive investment, and as a 
result there were uneven training standards throughout the economy. 
Generally, the programs involved short-term training for new workers 
and re-training for labor faced with changed employment conditions.
It was supposed that a national training system for new 
entrants to the labor force would relieve industry of a major drain 
on financial and personnel resources and would enhance economic 
performance by providing a uniformly trained workforce. It was also 
pointed out that many economic managers and other leaders in Soviet 
society did not have sufficient theoretical grounding in their work 
disciplines. As a result of the perceived gap in the education 
system, the State Labor Reserve system was created in 1940, and 
offered training to school-aged youth prior to industrial employment. 
The system was predicated on a combination of condensed general 
education and specific skills training. Advanced courses for managers 
were offered through part-time systems of technical and higher 
education. The programs were designed to bring educators, industrial 
managers, and others to standards established for their employment. 
Both systems were particularly important in the post-war period.
War created a special burden on the Soviet economic and educa­
tion systems. In the first place, population losses were massive 
and disruptive, and combined with physical destruction of the indus­
trial, economic, and social fabrics of the Soviet Union, served to 
retard development of the country for nearly a decade. Compensation 
for war-generated losses had to be found in the post-war period. In 
the second place, the economic programs of the post-war leadership
I
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made industrial rehabilitation the first priority, and only then 
turned to social and cultural issues. The economic policies were 
complicated by changes in government leadership and programs which 
focussed on regional expansion.
Rehabilitation of Soviet education was largely due to the 
momentum sustained from the rapid expansion during the pre-war years. 
Soviet educators desired to bring into the system individuals whose 
educations were delayed by war, and they expanded the systems of 
part-time education for this purpose. Numerous reasons for expanding 
education were given, but it is clear that the immediate goal was 
in compensating for losses of educated cadres in the economy. However, 
expanding education lasted far beyond the period of reconstruction 
and was accompanied by renewed questions concerning theory and 
organization of education.
Leninist' principles of Soviet education sought to develop a 
concept of education which was "polytechnics/labor training and 
general studies". This broad concept of education was never satis­
factorily defined, and attempts to introduce labor training into 
the schools were abandoned in the 1930s. Reinvestigation of the 
concept assisted de-Stalinization efforts, as it was declared that 
separate systems of education and technical training might eventually 
result in class and social inequalities unjustifiable in the Soviet 
state. Moreover, it was argued that polytechnics!education would 
enhance economic development in the Soviet Union in a period of labor 
constraints and rapid technological progress. Changes in textbooks 
and curricula were part of experiments carried out in the mid-1950s 
introducing various forms of labor training and polytechnic^ studies
i
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in the schools. The efforts were complemented by requirements for 
summer employment of older students and admissions policies to 
higher education institutions biased in favor of worker-students.
The economy was reorganized several times during the 1950s. The 
first reorganizations concerned investment in consumer goods produc­
tion and agriculture. Other efforts decentralized economic planning 
and management. As a result of the changes, strong demands for 
trained personnel were heard consistently through the decade. Reforms 
in economic organization were also coupled with changes in labor and 
social security laws, and in particular revisions were made to laws 
governing wages, pensions, and labor turnover. The changes had 
special implications for the availability of labor to industry. At 
first, decentralization was accomplished by requirements that many 
personnel from former central authorities relocate into the regions. 
This could not be sustained for reasons of the sheer magnitude of 
workers required in the regions, poor social/cultural conditions in 
the new development areas, and the pace of economic growth. These 
factors generated an objective need for changes in Soviet education, 
but raised important questions about Soviet nationality policies, dis­
tinctions between rural and urban standards of living, and principles 
of Soviet education concerning equal access. These issues, clearly 
important, are so substantial in themselves, they are only acknow­
ledged rather than developed as themes in this thesis.
Khrushchev1 s program for economic development and socio­
economic reform was undertaken partly to effect de-Stalinization, 
but also to accomplish a transition from socialism to communism.
He inherited a commitment to education which specifically included
i
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aceess to higher secondary studies. Khrushchev’s problems were 
balancing the needs of industry for manpower against his own commit­
ment for improving social and cultural conditions in the country.
Through the 1950s, labor was drawn from a variety of conventional 
resources including increased participation by women and pensionable 
workers, demobilization of the military, and continued stress on 
labor productivity increments through technological innovations, 
adaptation, and hard work. By the end of the decade, however, the 
majority of working^age youth were involved in the education system 
and new increments to the labor force were complicated by the reduced 
numbers of youth above the age of 16 caused by low war-time birth 
rates. This presented a problem to industry, since manpower options 
exercised during the previous years were no longer as advantageous, 
with the exception of increased labor productivity through technolo­
gical advances. Other options, such as redistribution of the labor 
force according to rational criteria for its utilization, could not 
be accomplished since the information required for such decisions 
was not available* Unwilling to sacrifice the goals for economic 
growth, the government was forced to turn to youth as the remaining 
manpower reserve.
Khrushchev promoted the return to polytechnics/education as a 
way to balance expectations for increased labor productivity of 
new workers against the needs for continued expansion of education.
It was argued that economic growth might be achieved if new workers 
(even if they were fewer in number) had the skills and knowledge of 
more experienced employees. Reforms stressed the role of the worker- 
student, decentralization of education and
-7-
regional development, and competition for the full-time spaces in 
programs based on academic performance. Students were obliged to 
work between, during, and after their studies. In addition, laws 
governing social parasites (e.g., the able-bodied unemployed) created 
an incentive for complying with work requirements.
Despite the various experiments in the 1950s which incorporated 
labor training into education, Khrushchev's reforms were based largely 
on political and economic judgements rather than on complete assess­
ments of the effectiveness of proposed measures for raising labor 
productivity. The reforms bought time for developing information 
required for reorganizing the labor force according to objective 
criteria for its use and distribution. The reforms were ideologically 
acceptable in that the decentralized system increased access for all 
students and reiterated a commitment to the work ethic which would 
arguably assist a transition to communism. Again, issues of ideology 
are of such scope and importance that they are generally only acknow­
ledged in text.
Expansion took place in the forms of an additional year of junior 
secondary education and part-time and correspondence programs at the 
secondary and higher education levels. The reforms responded to 
regional and local needs for educated cadres in decentralized economic 
activities, including industry and agriculture. Problems with 
Khrushchev's program were anticipated. For example, some industrial 
managers resisted employing youth since student-aged workers commanded 
a short work-day at full pay-rates, and there were higher failure and 
dropout rates among worker-students. Additionally, the education 
system was inadequately prepared to offer studies of comparable
I
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standard to the full-time programs. Moreover, in the period of con­
tinuous economic reorganization and inadequate planning for manpower 
and education, dependence on the regional and local authorities for 
financial support of massive development in education confronted pre­
dictable obstacles. Investment in education by the localities might 
be lost in the process of redirecting personnel to projects of nation­
al priority, and..there were few guarantees that educated manpower 
would remain in the regions in the absence of restructions on labor 
turnover or substantial investment in social infrastructure. Exhorta­
tions for avoiding such complications were included in the presentation 




Soviet Education Between 1917 and 1929
Introduction
During the 1920s, Soviet education was characterized by experi­
ments and adaptation to revolutionary values. Pressures emerged for 
standardizing concepts and methods in education and for developing 
specific labor resources for the economy* The unique characteristic 
of the Soviet experience was the extent to which, in times of profound 
social and political upheaval, the Soviet government linked the 
development of education to the economy.
Many promises were made to the Soviet citizenry concerning access 
to education. Guarantees in the 1924 Constitution were expressed in 
terms of State responsibilities and needs. Opportunities for educa­
tion became available to an increasingly broad spectrum of the Soviet 
population from the mid-1920s, although by no means was there equal 
access to education from either social or geographic perspectives. On 
the contrary, political concerns surrounding the creation of a new 
intelligentsia frequently abrogated Constitutional guarantees for some 
sectors of the population. The 1936 Constitution, which recognized 
rights of individuals to education, clearly did not intend academic 
training to become an open-ended bargain for all. Social factors 
(rural and urban opportunities and class distinctions, in general, 
and _de facto preferential treatment of Russians and Ukrainians, in 
particular) implicitly influenced access to and structure of education.
It is possible that diversity in school programs in the post­
revolutionary period reflected not so much a desire on the part of the 
new government to encourage experimentation, as the disorganization
-10-
of an inexperienced leadership and bureaucracy. Just as the economy, 
for instance, was in a precarious condition, other aspects of Soviet 
life were subjected to a period of instability prior to consolidation 
of governmental power, policies, and objectives. The desire for 
education, of course, was realized for the first time by many citizens, 
but massive economic and extreme degrees of social and political 
change were also envisaged.
It was in the links between education and economic development 
that Soviet educators found great difficulty, for in no country was 
there a model for an education system which coulci accommodate the 
aims of the Soviet state. Thus, Narkompros initiated a process during 
the 1920s which was unsuccessful in expanding opportunities for educa­
tion or for general literacy. It was, however, in these years that 
the idea of linking education and manpower needs in the economy 
became the imperative of Soviet education.
This chapter addresses the evolution of education, its organiza­
tion and related infrastructure, connections between education and 
labor, and problems which remained outstanding at the end of the 1920s. 
Of necessity, the presentation skirts over much which could stand a 
more vigorous investigation. The emphasis is placed on progress 
toward universal education in the Soviet Union.
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Soviet Education After the Revolution
Soviet education policies were adopted gradually, beginning the 
day after the Bolshevik Revolution, with the decree, "On the Formation 
of the Government of People's Commissars".^ The decree established 
the organizational framework of the Soviet government and named the 
principle leaders of its administrations. A.V. Lunacharsky was en­
trusted with directing the Commissariat of Education (Narodnyi 
kommissariat prosveshcheniya, Narkompros). The establishment of the 
Commissariat was regarded as an improvement over pre-revolutionary 
administration of education, when programs and policies were developed
and implemented on a semi-coordinated basis by central authorities,
2localities, private groups, and religious organizations.
Several tasks awaited action by the Commissariat: identification
of Soviet education goals, promotion of an organizational infrastructure 
through which Communist ideals and the education system would be 
mutually sustaining, and selection of education techniques and 
syllabuses for accomplishing tasks of educating citizens and workers.
Three goals were adopted: creating a Soviet intelligentsia and manage­
ment cadres; providing mass opportunities for education; and 
abolishing illiteracy. These goals, in turn, encompassed elements of 
political indoctrination, academic studies, and preparation for employment. 
Major principles of Soviet education were stated in 1917 and 1918,
when it was decided that the Commissar's roles were limited to policy
3
formulation and finance. Schools were removed from religious 
4
auspices, and a United Labor School (stressing general education 
alongside labor theory and work of major economic sectors) emerged as 
the prototype of the desired Soviet school.^ In 1918, the All-Russian
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Congress of Soviets adopted a policy which set the tone for post­
revolutionary education: "To the end of ensuring genuine access to
knowledge on behalf of toilers, the RSFSR, sets itself the task of
furnishing workers and the poorest peasants (without cost to them)
£
an education complete and comprehensive." Additional pronounce­
ments on education were published in 1918:
Free, compulsory, general and technical education would 
encompass the theory and practice of main branches of 
production.
Children would attend school between the ages of 8 and 17 
in programs which would be both coeducational and secular.
Corporal punishment was declared illegal; compulsory home­
work was abolished; and examinations and grading of per­
formance were proscribed.
Classes would be taught in native languages, and teachers 
would create a climate which would reinforce Communist 
ideals.
Self-education and educational opportunities generally 
would be enhanced by the State in the forms of student 
stipends, clothing, and food.
Post-secondary technical training or higher education would 
be available to all students regardless of citizenship or 
sex from the age of 16. Entrance to higher education no g
longer included certification of completed secondary schooling.
Efforts to combat illiteracy would be undertaken through 
Narkompros and other economic and political organizations.
On December 26, 1919, a special decree was issued requiring 
all persons between the ages of 8 and 50 to learn to read 
and write in Russian (or other native language). An Extra­
ordinary Commission for the Liquidation of Illiteracy was 
created in July 1920 to facilitate literacy studies by adults 
and others not required to participate in the general education 
system.^
These principles constituted a broad, somewhat unrealistic, "wish
list" for educational policymakers.
Important tasks for Narkompros were in creating a viable education
infrastructure and selecting appropriate education methodologies.
i
There were obstacles to overcome. For example, it was necessary to 
decide which goals would take primary importance, to garner sufficient 
funding and influence to realize central coordination over education, 
and to set the pace at which a truly Soviet education process would 
be established. Through the 1920s, lack of resolution to such basic 
considerations seriously impeded the progress of Soviet education and 
the newly adopted "principles" were each eventually abandoned in 
moments of political and economic difficulty.
There were numerous groups claiming legitimate authority as the 
arbitors of the methods, contents, and structure of education, as 
well as over the rules governing access thereto. Three factions 
(roughly grouped as industry, the Komsomol, and the Communist Party 
leadership) variously influenced the direction not only of Narkompros 
policies, but of actual programs for training and education. Each of 
these groups was represented within the Narkompros leadership, but 
each also generated external pressures for influencing policy choices.
The education commissariat was established with an advisory
council, the State Education Council (Gosudarstvennyi uchenyi sovet,
GUS). In 1921, the Council of People's Commissars instructed GUS
to advise Narkompros on the formulation of policies.^ The Council
consisted of central government, trade and teacher's unions, cultural
organizations, the Bureau of Labor, and educators. The Council's
membership included such notables as N.K. Krupskaya, A.N. Pokrovsky,
12
andE.E. Preobrazhensky. Nonetheless, Lunacharsky is often regarded 
as the embodiment of objectives in Narkompros policies during the 1920 
On the contrary, he represented only one perspective 'not always 
consistently) within the agency. His recommendations established the
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general framework for early post-revolutionary education, and he
was particularly influential regarding ancillary cultural policies 
13
until the 1930s.
Struggles for Policy Influence
As the Soviet Union moved from the aftermath of war and revolu­
tion, Narkompros was continuously criticised for administrative
disorganization and for slow progress toward eradicating illiteracy
14
and expanding the general school system. To some extent, the pace 
of Narkompros programs reflected the stress of general economic con­
ditions and lack of financial resources to support programs. Luna­
charsky observed, for example, "that without a change in the position 
of education in the purely economic sense, no internal measures can in 
any way move us from the miserable conditions in which we find 
ourselves".^  However, Lunacharsky and members of the State Education 
Council also recognized that massive problems with Soviet education 
and the lack of progress stemmed from an inappropriate strategy which 
they had hoped would encourage "self education", rather than progression 
through an organized education system.^
In the period of the civil war, Lenin supported the notion that 
education would be spread through literacy classes to the military 
and factory workers. Indeed, it has been shown that these were impor­
tant, albeit inefficient, mechanisms, since the level of enthusiasm 
for education was very strong. Connections per se between labor laws 
and opportunities for education were made in several ways —  largely 
in restrictions on child labor, general hours for work each day,




opportunities for education were negated in face of labor conscription 
which singled out former gentry and bourgeois classes. These require­
ments were abolished in the 1922 Labor Code which began the process 
of standardizing working conditions. Child labor protections, on the 
other hand, were of limited value given the economic circumstances of 
the early 1920s.^
Management clearly was not Lunacharsky's particular strength 
and from 1920 a series of special commissions reorganized various 
aspects of Narkompros' administration. An early review was led by 
E. Litkens, a member of GUS who had ties to industry. The reviewers 
recommended that a two-tiered management structure (technical and 
higher education, general education, and political/cultural activities) 
replace the multiplicity of Narkompros departments and committees.
Upper management would consist of the Commissar and a newly created 
post of Assistant Commission, through whom all management decisions
i j 18would pass.
The recommendations prompted immediate controversy. Lenin, for 
one, agreed with the creation of the post of Assistant Commissar for 
Organization, but apparently wished to align Narkompros into a greater 
number of education/administrative units. He proposed merging technical 
and secondary education, a new impetus within GUS for developing 
curricula, and establishing separate organizational units for pre­
school, primary, secondary and technical studies, extra-mural
19
activities, higher education, and art.
Controversy evolved around questions of administration and general 
rather than technical studies. In January 1921, the Central Committee 




led by Lenin. At Lenin's request, the new Committee was granted
authority to issue orders in the name of the Central Committee to
Narkompros. Lenin used this opportunity for restating his commitment
to an education program based on general and polytechnic studies.
However, the Soviet economy was particularly unstable in 1921, and
industry and the Komsomol pushed for technical rather than general
education in the upper grades. A new policy was announced by Lenin,
who indicated that the upper age for school graduates was lowered
to 15 from 17, as "a temporary measure called for by the poverty and
21
ruin of the country”* Child protection laws, it is noted, limited
hours of work only for children under the age of 14, a factor which
probably undermined opportunities for secondary schooling.
Litkens' role as Assistant Commissar was not well defined,
although apparently for a time, policy decisions within Narkompros
did require his approval. The arrangement eroded the authority of
the Commissar for Education. Lenin, for example, did not intend the
appointment to challenge Lunacharsky's role as central leader for
policy (much less to neutralize GUS on which Krupskaya sat) and
pushed Litkens toward administration rather than education policy 
22determinations. The United Labor School program was de-emphasized
as previously conceived, but the nature of polytechnic education
remained undefined, and Narkompros itself was not exempted from
23
economic pressures due to the national financial crisis.
The continuing attacks on Narkompros administration and on 
Lunacharsky's leadership were serious and only with Litken's death 
in 1923 was Lunacharsky's authority partially assured. By then, 
Pokrovsky had emerged as leader within Narkompros for political
I
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education, and Krupskaya for pedagogical work. Simplistically viewed, 
Lunacharsky was concerned with establishing a viable education net­
work, Pokrovsky with promoting political awareness through general 
education, and Krupskaya with demonstrating a method of education 
through which the Soviet state would be enhanced. Priorities which 
stemmed from these different policy orientations were not immediately 
reconcilable.^3
The organizations.outside Narkompros also played important 
roles in education. The Communist Youth League (Kommunisticheskii 
soiuz molodezhi, Komsomol) institutionalized a cultural/political 
movement for activist youth. The group, officially established in
1919, greatly influenced post-revolutionary education by promoting
24
rapid growth of a leadership consisting primarily of workers. The
Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vysshi S sovet narodnogo
khozyaistva, VSNKh), on the other hand, was mainly concerned with
expanding the industrial base. Insofar as industry was concerned
with education at the outset of the Soviet state, VSNKh promoted
education complementary to a sustained flow of literate and trained 
25
labor. Consequently, this additional split in their purposes 
caused the goals of Soviet education (already confused within 
Narkompros) to become increasingly blurred.
Despite the turmoil of the period, Lunacharsky's views were 
influential, even though they did not dominate. Lunacharsky proposed 
that the school reflect society's organization. That is, as there 
was planned a classless society, there would be one system of educa­
tion without allowances for special privileges. The system would 
consist .of an education ladder, divided into grades 1-4 for primary
i
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school, grades 5-7 for junior (incomplete) secondary, and grades 8-9 
for complete (upper) secondary education. Successful completion of 
one level assured eligibility for the next stage. Early specialization 
was not included; schooling would be followed by job training, employ­
ment, specialized or higher education. Lunacharsky originally suggested 
a tenth year at the upper secondary level, but that was not widely 
introduced in the 1920s.
Narkompros implemented its mandate by opening all Soviet schools 
and higher education programs to children of all social backgrounds, 
taking the long view that a different education would result in the 
desired orientations among Soviet cadres. During NEP (1921-1927), 
there were no compulsory, centrally-defined, teaching programs. There 
were a variety of educational practices purporting to be polytechnic*^ 
in nature which formed the universe of experiments leading to an 
officially-approved methodology.
While Narkompros was established as the governmental agency for 
promoting mass education and training, practical considerations 
precluded the abilities of central authorities to realize their goals. 
For example, an early decree placed schools in the hands of local and 
regional authorities, while Narkompros' role was limited to policy 
guidance, funding, and program oversight. Since funding from central 
revenues was constrained by poor performance in the Soviet economy, 
assuring wider access to education was left to decentralized authorities 
(e.g., the local soviets). Thus, it may be expected that central
26
influence over education in practice lost some of its effectiveness.
Irregular distribution of teachers and schools inherited from 
Taarist days reduced the availability of schools. Thus, some groups
i
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advocated discriminatory admissions policies, particularly at upper
27
levels where there were few programs, anyway. It is commonly
reported that school teachers and university academics did not alter
28
their programs substantively. Lacking adequate replacements for
such faculties, or an opportunity for extensive retraining, Narkompros
was unable to change immediately the composition of the teaching corps
29
or the content of instruction.
Under pressure from the Party leadership for regulation of the
education system, in 1924 Narkompros began promoting through GUS a
single method of instruction for the schools. The technique was
called the "complex method"; it was a dismal failure. From a practical
point of view, there were few opportunities for systematic -b^aoirve,-
retraining and it is commonly reported that new teaching manuals were
not widely available. As a result, the method which combined all
subjects into themes (nature, labor, and society) was compromised from 
30
the outset.
A further reality imposed itself on the Narkompros agenda. Trans­
ition between levels of schooling and opportunities for a complete 
general education were restricted by differences in rural/urban 
education availability, purposes of existing schools, composition of 
the student cadres, and pressures from economic organizations for 
addressing their specific manpower needs. Many urban schools, 
financed by local soviets, limited schooling to seven years. Teachers, 
frequently supported by the local education authorities, used 
traditional instructional methods (involving subjects, homework, and 
strict classroom discipline). In addition, while Narkompros 
theoretically embraced all but the military schools, attempts to
I
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eliminate specialized secondary and training programs were met with
31
broad-based opposition.
Principles of Soviet education developed in the early years
were soon eroded. By 1923, fees were reinstated for all levels of
32
education. Narkompros was ordered to incorporate technical studies
into the higher secondary school, and to reduce the emphasis on
33
academics."' Workers' faculties (rabochii facultet, rabfak) and the
Schools for Peasant Youth, established in early post-revolutionary
days as an educational alternative for working youth, formed the basis
for parallel education systems. The rabfaks were supported by the
Komsomol as the foundation of the future university, and offered a
two-year course of general studies and technical training necessary
34for following the higher education program. Schools for Peasant 
Youth, located in rural areas, were designed to provide agricultural 
training alongside general studies. Also promoted by the Komsomol 
the schools served as vehicles'into higher technical programs —  
and fostered, it was thought, proletarian consciousness among its 
student cadres.^
During the 1920s, bands of orphaned waifs (bezprizornye) were a 
major public concern. The youth, numbering as many as several million, 
sometimes were placed in communes or orphanages, but just as frequently 
were ignored by the authorities. While attempts to bring these 
children into mainstream education were largely failures, at least 
one educator, A.S. Makarenko, had success with the waifs. His 
experiments in labor communes for youth contributed to Stalinist-era 
educational psychology and social ethic concerning child-rearing. 
Makarenko's work was not significant in its numerical implications
i
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for expanding education, but during the post-war period much attention
was given to his methods combining labor training and general studies.'
His work corresponded to the prevailing ideological tenets of the
period in which the ideal school was a self-governing body of teachers
and students who provided their own upkeep.
With disagreement within Narkompros about the suitability of the
complex method, external pressures for changing the system grew in
strength. Schooling was not simply for orienting the student toward
his/her role as a member of a socialist collective. Alternative
techniques, seen in practice, ranged from a combination of subject
teaching (supplemented by practical work at the school or industrial/
agricultural setting) to child labor in its undisguised forms with
37
little connection to academic life. Political agitation against
conservative techniques (such as subject teaching and classroom
discipline seemed to represent to the Komsomol) caused some Narkompros
programs to be restructured. In particular, in some schools teachers
shared responsibility for routine decisions with students, parents,
Party and Komsomol representatives. The changes were promoted as
ways for acquainting students with principles and practices associated
38
with self-government.
Links Between Education and the Economy
It is clear that opportunities in education were constrained in 
the 1920s due to the lack of education infrastructure (schools, 
trained teachers, equipment, materials, and funding). Given these 
factors, the pressures built up momentum for linking education with 
economic priorities. The Komsomol argued that a policy of social
i
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selection favoring workers and peasants should be broadly implemented
in admissions decisions, and that prior employment should be a
39
criteriaafor higher education. The Komsomol argued that higher
secondary education should be transformed into specialized voca- 
40
tional training. VSNKh, on the other hand, proposed that higher
technical training should be under the authority of the economic
. _ 41commissariats.
Suggestions by the Komsomol and VSNKh were not immediately 
implemented, but their continuous pressuring brought about certain 
deviations from early education policies. Several purges of higher 
education took place during these years. There were also efforts 
to promote political agitators, Communists, and workers into slots 
for students and onto faculties. Importantly, Komsomol and 
VSNKh objections were translated into actual school systems. The 
Komsomol promoted part-time study —  through rabfaks, Factory
 ^2
Apprenticeship School^ (fabrichno zavodskoe uchilishche, FZU.) and
Schools for Peasant Youth. VSNKh, for its part, encouraged enrollments
in job training and secondary technical programs by providing students
43
with financial and other incentives. VSNKh's approaches were, of
course, traditional ways for promoting connections between education
and economic goals.
A common criticism of alternatives to the Narkompros general
44
school was that academic standards were frequently inadequate. 
Narkompros discouraged expansion of alternative programs on the 
grounds that socially restrictive admissions policies obviously 
conflicted with legal and philosophical tenets. However, while it 
could have been suggested that low standards would also undermine the
I
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goal of social equality, such discussions did not stem the movement
toward alternative education schemes. Indeed, by having sanctioned
decentralized education authorities, Lunacharsky himself had set the
stage for a period of inadequacies which were exacerbated by the
revolutionary mood of the period.
Higher education was subjected to a variety of pressures. During
the first part of the 1920s, universities were under Narkompros 
45
jurisdiction, and reforms were few. Increased numbers of admissions
of Komsomol members accompanied gradual politization of administrative
and faculty appointments. Major impact on faculty and curricula was
in the area of social sciences, where Party leaders desired the new
46
ideology to be incorporated. Faculties, however, remained short
of Communist academics, with the influence of pre-revolutionary
faculties continuing their domination through the 1920s. Importantly,
most social science faculties were abolished in 1922, after repeated
47
complaints of extreme academic insufficiency. Pedagogical faculties 
and law programs, part of the social science umbrella, were soon 
re-established.
In 1925, the RSFSR Academy of Sciences was designated as the
48
highest Soviet scientific research institution. In response to the 
pressing demands of the movement toward a planned economy, industrial 
research was added to the Academy duties. This was not a traditional 
area for scientific research, but signalled the priority given to 
streamlining management practices and developing appropriate staffing 
patterns.
Two purges boded ill for the long-term composition of higher 
education faculties. These took place between 1922 and 1923 (associated
I
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wit h expulsion of non-Soviet scientist, philosophers, and writers),
and again following the 1928 Shakhty trials and purges of specialists
(spetsy) perceived to be in opposition to the Stalinist political
49
and economic programs. The purges initiated a period of policy 
struggles in education which paralleled consolidation of power by 
Stalin. They were a serious blow to industry.
Economic goals of the first plan period (1928-1932) included 
expansion of transportation, modernization and expansion of industry, 
increased industrial and agricultural production, and collectivization 
of agriculture. But at the outset of the planned economy, economists 
believed that industrial capacity and skilled manpower resources were 
nearly exhausted. There was some unemployment (by 1930, this was 
largely unskilled labor who had migrated from rural into urban 
centers), but the program for industry was especially hampered by 
extremely high levels of labor turnover. Levels of education attained 
by industrial workers was extremely low, and authorities stressed the 
need for a new initiative to eradicate illiteracy.
The Komsomol gained in influence in this period and took on the 
drive against illiteracy. With the slogan, "Down with Illiteracy", 
one Komsomol-sponsored effort assumed the overtones of a political 
p u r g e . T h e  expansion of rural education, with the emphasis on 
adult literacy and universal primary education, were promoted 
specifically in connection with collectivization. Theoretically, at 
least, children would attend literacy classes and technical training 
programs designed to support the development of Machine Tractor 
Stations (MTS) and other collective farm activities
I
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The volatility of the period, coupled with the need to meet
manpower demands for rapid industrialization, led perhaps unexpectedly
to a de-emphasis on secondary education. This was paralleled by a
renewed encouragement^toward technical education. The Party
pushed for expanded enrollments in FZU, and several kinds of job
52
readiness programs also emerged. The latter were frequently with 
little relation to academic studies. Programs similar to the American 
industrial training methods developed by F. Winslow Taylor were among 
the job readiness techniques. These were important, especially when 
measured by the numbers who passed through the time-and-motion training.'*'
To counter some of these pressures, Narkompros returned to a 
conservative education program which recommended restoration of the 
classroom, traditional instructional techniques, and student discipline.^ 
While some of the frustrations leading to the move from experimental 
techniques found a sympathetic hearing among the Party leadership, 
momentum toward the conventional program was not sustained. The 
general secondary school network experienced a decline in enrollments 
and in physical plant by the late 1920s. There was simultaneous 
growth in rabfak enrollments which provided some access to higher 
education.
Within the framework established by the Five Year Plan, Narkompros 
policies still incorporated a variety of pedagogical theories. GUS 
and Komsomol momentum was toward programs which tied education to job 
skills. In response to criticism that the school programs were un­
related to "real life", Narkompros concentrated on fostering practical 
experiences on the parts of students. To do so, schools were associated 
with an enterprise or a farm. A general instructional technique, called
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the project method, was adopted. The method was based on an ill-defined
program of individual study and group activities, supplemented by actual
labor. The nominal success of a group (or brigade, as they were later
known) depended significantly on the quality of the brigade leader, who
was also a student.
From 1928, Communist Party and industrial leaders complained that
there was insufficient attention to the requirements for scientists
and engineers. K.E. Bailes, an American historian, observed the
following: "The level of education attained by industrial managers
was very low, and a 1928 survey of 770 industrial managers indicated
that over 70% had only elementary schooling. The percentage of
managers with higher education had declined from 11% in 1926 to 9% in 
55
1928." Stalin believed that science and engineering studies should
55a
be the top priority in education. With industrial support for this
perspective, the discussions turned to whether engineers should be
highly specialized or broadly educated. VSNKh's perspective was that
a small number of scientists and engineers, supplemented by a greater
number of technicians and semi-skilled workers, would meet the
5 6
country's labor needs during the industrialization drive.
Early VSNKh claims that specialized higher education should be 
under the auspices of economic agencies gained support in the late 
1920s, as the terms of the Five Year Plan were clarified. Some 
technical schools were transferred to VSNKh, over Lunacharsky's 
objections, as an " e x p e r i m e n t " T h a t  year, objections to Narkompros 
policies intensified in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
By 1929, efforts to discredit Narkompros included personal attacks 
on Lunacharsky's leadership, and the economic commissariats assumed
I
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nearly full responsibility for technical education.
Through 1928-1929, the Komsomol campaigned for restructuring the 
entire education system. Their recommendations included seven years 
of general education (with a bias toward practical experience), followed 
by job training. If students desired either a complete secondary or 
higher education, their eligibility would depend on interim employ­
ment of several years duration. The Komsomol was consistent in their
opposition to the idea that education should be uninterrupted for
58
nonacademic purposes. Their arguments were made very strongly, but 
there was no resolution to the issue of work requirements until the 
mid-1930s.
Discussions over priorities in secondary and higher education
involved Party leadership. Efforts to plan the numbers of slots in
programs were linked to the anticipated requirements for skilled
workers and managers, and the role of central economic planners was
59
extended to education. The involvement of political and economic 
entities outside Narkompros in matters of policy formulation were 
particularly important, and Narkompros faced serious challenges to 
its continued autonomy during the 1930s.
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Conelusions
When we look at the 1920s in the context of the new Soviet 
state, we see a country with a strong drive toward education, but 
one which had not acieved popular literacy. We can easily 
recognize the characteristics of an underdeveloped economy and the 
ravages of war on the political and economic leadership. We also 
see efforts to superimpose an entirely new ideology and ethic onto 
a society which was ill-prepared for massive social and economic 
change.
Education was a top priority of the new government, but the 
period was sufficiently unstable to preclude transformation of the 
existing system. It is a valid question whether the new political 
leadership regarded education as an essential goal in its own right. 
The perspective that education was a support "service" to economic 
priorities clearly was present by the end of the decade. The links 
between education and the economy were not always foremost, as 
ideological and political actions (e.g., through purges) sometimes 
overrode more rational policy alternatives.
Lack of resolution to the status education would take in the new 
society was a major weakness of the Narkompros leadership. Issues 
which also ultimately eroded the agency's influence were the low level 
of education (if not simple literacy) within the industrial workforce 
and the failure to achieve a systematic program for public education. 
Thus, even as the decade ended there were moves in the political 
leadership toward changing not only the nominal leadership of the 
education commissariat but taking over the basic role of policy 
development.
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Soviet Education Under Stalin
Introduction
If the 1920s may be pictured as a tumultuous period in which all 
manner of approaches to education were considered, its legacies to 
policymakers in the 1930s were lack of resolution of any major policy 
concerns. The 1930s initiated a movement toward rationalization of 
education. Change from diversity to common practices in education 
was an important undertaking. The period embraced the notion that a 
single objective view of social conditions and industrial manpower 
needs (issues which separately preoccupied politicians and education­
alists) could be superimposed on education.
Common education practice may be regarded in several ways. First, 
it may constitute an attempted reduction of pressure points on a 
leadership engrossed with a full spectrum of governmental and economic 
concerns. Adoption of a "commonality principle" would neutralize 
momentum toward experimentation and would focus policy discussions 
on the breadth of the system. Secondly, it may be said that while 
commonality was achieved partly through suppressing opposing groups, 
it was also partly the result of evolving concepts based on the 
successes and failures of post-revolutionary experiments in responding 
to industrial manpower needs.
Inasmuch as the Soviet education system was entrenched as an 
important mechanism for social mobility, and since education theory and 
practice were clearly linked to economic and ideological priorities, 
education policy changes in the 1930s indicate shifting political 
and economic priorities. For example, widened access to education was
i
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heralded as broadening the base of participatory democracy. And, indeed, 
it did as the working class expanded and increased numbers outside the 
bourgeois class entered policymaking and management positions. Generally, 
however, opportunities for education were implemented by means of dead­
end programs so that the labor needs of enterprises would be met. In 
such instances, social and economic mobility were less dependent on 
education than on individual performance, or on political and ideolo­
gical factors. Nonetheless, obvious connections may be seen between 
education and industrial goals.
Thus, education, which was a major issue on the revolutionary agenda, 
was not a primary objective of the Stalinist government as such. It was 
a way in which social and economic transformations might be enhanced.
As this purpose of mass education became firmly fixed, the methods and 
structure of the education process were tied to the economy. From an 
early concept of general ten-year education, during which the student was 
exposed to labor concepts, parallel education and labor training systems 
evolved. The inadequacies of these systems in meeting the needs of 
industrial development for skilled and "flexible” workers pushed 
Soviet leaders in the 1930s toward radically restructuring education. 
Given these broad considerations, a look —  however brief —  at the 
education system in the 1930s facilitates an understanding of post-war, 
education.
The chapter continues the discussion of Soviet education and points 
to problems which remained outstanding-.at the end of the pre-war period. 
The presentation focusses mainly on legal changes, as the structure 
and philosophy of education which emerged in the 1930s are most 
easily illustrated in this manner.
I
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Motivations for Education Reform
While bits and pieces of the education system were developed 
during the first ten years of Soviet power, it may be argued, in 
retrospect, that political survival and economic viability —  not 
education —  were the first priorities of government. By the late 
1920s, however, the condition of the Soviet economy had improved and 
centralized economic planning emphasized specialist training and 
education. However, lack of attention to social infrastructure left 
economic planners with the fear that requirements for a larger labor 
force, with improved skills, could not be met.
Beginning with the Five Year Plan, Central Committee interest
in education policies grew, prompted by the poor quality of new
graduates and Lhe failures by secondary programs to equip students
for employment. Criticisms by the Party leadership were specific.
They targeted:
poor quality of instruction, particularly in science;
poorly trained teachers and questionable methods;
inadequate school networks (reportedly encompassing only 
20% of student-age population); and
. poor student discipline."^
In response to the situation, the Five Year Plan called for 
universal primary education, connection between schools and practical 
work, and stepped-up efforts for adult literacy. There were also 
great pressures for providing training to migrants who sought pre­
employment training. Compulsory seven-year education was mandatory in 
2
industrial areas. While the plan established the development goals of 
various economic sectors, it remained for the legal and practical
-32-
frameworks for these programs to be worked out.
3
Lunacharsky was replaced in the fall of 1929 by A. Bubnov. Bubnov
has been described as having a predeliction for administrative discipline
gained during his tenure as political organizer for the military. He
has also been described as an ardent supporter of polytechnic education,
although his allegience to a given definition seems to have fluctuated
4
with pressures brought to bear at the time. Bubnov's major responsi­
bility was sheparding through the implementation of universal primary 
and junior secondary education, while providing administrative supports 
for expansion at other levels of education.
Bubnov's reputation is belied by his failures in coping with 
entrenched forces promoting policies in education which clearly were 
not reconciled with rapid economic expansion. Three factors precluded
the implementation of consistent policies: lack of control over GUS
4a
policymakers; the heightened role played by VSNKh after 1928; 
and lack of influence over the Komsomol. Further, a "wild card" in 
the situation was the way in which Stalin meant to implement the 
five year economic program and those implications for education and 
social policies.
Between 1930 and 1935, the mood toward continuous expansion of 
higher education and recruitment of workers onto faculties reversed. 
Industry began to resist erosion of their professional cadres and 
skilled labor for purposes of general education. Resistence to educa­
tion was seen from 1927 when the general secondary school was abolished 
in favor of technical training. The resistence was generated by 
pressures which arose from the program for economic development and 
a concept of management accountability.^ Another reason was that
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unemployment was eliminated as a legal concept/status in 1930 as an
5a
encouragement of unemployed persons into the factories. Since 
goals were established in the first plan which carried weight of 
law for industrial production and expansion, transfers of the more 
skilled workers into education lessened the potential for compliance
g
with the economic program.
To a certain extent, industrial resistence for expanding education 
at the secondary level (by drawing'students from the workforce), coupled 
with perceptions of impending manpower shortages, forced changes in 
laws governing the labor force. Efforts were undertaken, for example, 
for identifying and classifying employment categories and related 
academic/technical qualifications.^ It was not possible to fill all 
posts with specifically qualified personnel, but regulations adopted 
in the 1930s created formal links among opportunities for education, 
labor supplies, and future hiring practices.
Concurrent with more restrictive controls over labor mobility 
and working conditions, the Party began purging militants from in-
g
fluence over school policies, and undertook a series of resolutions 
and directives restoring academic standards and central controls 
over the education system. These legal controls were enacted at a 
rapid-fire pace, although widespread implementation was not 
accomplished for several years. The following sections discuss reforms 
in education between 1930 and 1939. Despite the political and 
economic considerations motivating some of the actions, a checkerboard 
of infrastructure emerged in this period which has lasted in many 
respects until the present.
I
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Questions confronting policymakers at the beginning of the post­
revolutionary period pertained ten years later. What should be the 
structure of Soviet education? Who should establish the priorities 
and policies? What should be the primary purpose of schooling? Who 
should have access to education, particularly at upper levels of the 
system where few could be immediately accommodated?
Standardization of the Education Mandate
In 1930, against a background of massive internal migration and 
in the midst of collectivization, the 19th meeting of the Communist 
Party produced a resolution which made primary education compulsory 
for all children between eight and ten years of age. With the base 
of three years of schooling established, a fourth year of compulsory 
education was the national target for 1931. Further, the Central 
Committee decreed that there would be compulsory education to the 
seventh grade for all children (8-15 years of age) in specific 
workers’ settlements and in industrial areas. U-t-^ mocy '
classes for youth between the ages of 11 and 15 years who had not
9
attended classes for the requisite number of years also mandatory.
In higher education, the diverging policy choices of Stalinist 
forces and more conservative elements can be seen. The motivation was 
in streamlining education for meeting critical demands for technical 
personnel. Plans for supplying the national economy with specialists 
were developed by mid-1930. The recommendation was based on a formula 
which calculated from "typical staffing" for certain industrial sectors 
and extrapolated to the whole economy.^ The program called for nearly
I
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300,000 university graduates and over 800,000 higher technical school
graduates by the end of the 1932/33 academic year.^ Approximately
12507o of such cadres were produced. Institutes were separated from
the universities and assigned to economic commissariats, and some
programs were reduced in scope and duration.
The issue was not simply graduating enough specialists, but in
assuring the quality of those completing the programs. Stalin's
view6 were made clear in 1931:
We don't need just any kind of commanding and engineering- 
technical personnel. We need construction-engineering- 
technical personnel capable of understanding the policies 
of the working class ... and capable of mastering those 
policies, and prepared to carry them out... It means our 
country has entered the phase of development when the
working class must create its own productive-technical
intelligentsia.
In this way, Stalin encouraged not only promotion policies which
favored working class origins, but also seemed to say that programs
offering training at lower standards than preferred must be tolerated
for a period. This approach to education had uneven results. One
observer of the period remarked:
The USSR's scientists are generally young and without 
experience. They lack a profound scientific knowledge 
acquired with years. We have professors 30 years of age 
who previously worked in mines, factories, and in fields.
These were promoted to such status. Their major 
characteristic is energy and dedication.^
Reorganization of higher levels of education were intended to 
bring education into closer contact with industrial labor needs. In 
practice, the organizational arrangements meant that substantial 
costs of education became industrial responsibilities and that 
policymaking concerning curricula was decentralized. The result was 
in exacerbating problems with academic standards, as industry was
I
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possibly equipped for managing production, but not also education. 
Depending on the perspective (preferences for uniform, national 
standards and practices or for experimentation and decentraliza­
tion), it is clear that strength temporarily was held by those 
who would decentralize policy formulation and practice.
By 1931, the Central Committee published directives concerned 
with courses in the primary and secondary schools, reintroduced 
academic subjects which had been eliminated by the complex method 
as the basis for courses, and discredited experimental schools 
generally. The orders signalled the end of the project method and 
the demise of theories as the one which argued that schools and 
governmental institutions would soon be redundant in the wake of 
establishing socialism.^
Following a Central Committee moratorium on the promotion of 
skilled workers into administrative work, the use of worker's 
regular employment hours for education was also forbidden. Indeed, 
such was the stringency of these regulations that many workers
16
returned from management and school assignments to the shop floor.
The matter of equal access in qualitative terms was not addressed.
A directive issued in 1932 established a scheduled study
program for all levels of education.^ Another formally re-established
18
the higher secondary school (including the tenth year of study), 
thus reducing the need for factory training courses and rabfak to 
offer general education. Several problems remained which concerned 
quality of academic programs and teaching cadres, and employment 
readiness of graduates. Counterpressures to growing investments 
in education continued as tightened labor markets and an economic
i
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slump from the reaction to collectivization took hold. Some actions
taken by the Central Committee in regard to education appear to have
been compromises with economic problems in the balance.
The Central Committee established a Committee on Higher Technical
19Schools (under the auspices of the CPSU Central Executive Committee),
declaring that the Committee would provide central direction over
university-level faculties. Continuing the 1930-1931 drives to lower
the attrition rates of skilled labor (from employment into education),
the Central Committee explicitly objected to the age-gap between
20
secondary and higher education student cadres. The statement has 
been interpreted as a reiteration of the principle of the continuous 
education ladder which had been discarded in the late 1920s. Improve­
ments in standards of student qualifications for higher education 
were seen. Special status for university admissions (e.g., tied to 
political or proletarian status) were controversial over the years
21
and now were discontinued. Extrance examinations were substituted.
. ( c p e c i f / ' c  Cfu q l i f t Q /l-H O AjJ
Importantly, appointments of unqualified workers or Communists^to
faculties were disapproved as common practice. Academic criteria
(including specific degrees for various types of appointments) were
22
established for faculty hiring.
Improvements in the qualitative aspects of Soviet education
from 1933 focussed more on content than on structure. Textbooks,
the lack of which was a sore topic of long standing, became a point
for official interest. A reportedly Stalin-initiated decree prompted
23
use of revised curricula and texts for classroom instruction. The 
more sensitive aspects of these changes concerned the integration 
of labor training into general education and the abilities of teachers
I
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for initiating sufficient practical work into the schools. Here the
creation of the Higher Communist Institute on Education offered the
possibility for pedagogical research into methods of teacher training
24
in polytechnic techniques. Criticisms about the contents of school
books continued and there were efforts undertaken for revision of
books away from "negative" presentations of Soviet history and rote
memorization. While begun in this period, a number of years passed
25
before the changes were implemented.
With the push for implementation of seven-year education in both
urban and rural areas, the education system absorbed an extraordinary
expansion while attempting to provide the majority of children with
sufficient readiness skills for immediate employment or short-term job
training on leaving school. In its relation to training of semi-skilled
workers, the FZU was restructured into purely technical studies, and
curricula for the FZU were downgraded (e.g., general education courses
26
were simply excluded). This caused a substantial drop in FZU
enrollments, as the turn from academic study decreased the possibility
for further education. In this way, separation of education from
industrial training and strengthened reliance on general education
for basic literacy were reinforced. However, another decree allowed
workers attempting FZU and technical programs to study without
working during their final year of training, and provisions were
27
made for providing some with financial assistance. It appears that
this decree sought to establish a balance among pressures toward
employment, job training, and general education.
In 1933, higher education curricula emphasized the need for an
28
improvement in scientific and technical training. The attempt to
i
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bring students closer to industrial manpower needs was reflected in
a heayy concentration of "practical work" within the courses, as-well
29as a mandatory period of employment prior to the thesis stage.
Further, an offset to benefits granted to students in higher education
was the requirement for graduates of such institutions to accept job
30assignments for periods up to five years.
From 1934, efforts were continued for strengthening the secondary
and higher education programs. In higher education, restrictive
admissions policies (e.g., qualifications by achievement testing)
31were employed to upgrade student cadres. At the insistence of 
industry, academic degrees were reinstated, universities added post­
graduate courses, and academic criteria for faculty appointments were 
32
implemented. Many of the part-time higher education programs were
eliminated on the grounds that they were of insufficient standard 
33or were redundant.
Two decrees pertained to coursework and structure of secondary
education. The first formally re-established the ten-year school
34and instituted polytechnic studies from the fifth year. The second
formally criticised previous courses in civics, history, and geography,
and required schools to use standard texts which would acquaint students
35
with principles from the Revolution. With these actions, the key 
questions concerned the accessibility to general education (as opposed 
to job training or technical schools) beyond the early years. But 
accessibility was complicated by the matter of the relevance of gen­
eral education to employment. The second £ive year plan, for example,
put special emphasis on expanding,secondary technical schooling and
36
related teacher training programs.
i
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During this period, a formal national system of examinations,
37grading for performance, and awards for excellence was instituted, 
and some awards exempted students from competitive examinations. 
Efforts for creating order from irregularity were seen; teachers
38
were evaluated, for instance, on the basis of student performance.
Not only was the teacher's tenure at risk, but remuneration for
services hinged on the numbers of students who successfully completed
a given year of schooling. Unfortunately, while this was an effort
for extracting more stringent performances from both teachers and
students, it is likely that lack of effective oversight allowed
subjective evaluations of student performances to continue.
Reforms did not stop with purely educational issues. Objections
were made over the use of student time for socio-political purposes,
39
and limits were placed on extra-curricula activities. An early
version of a code for student behavior was developed in reiteration
40
of official preferences for youth discipline. It also signalled
that the Komsomol would turn away from independent political agitation
to activities complementary to CPSU priorities.
In 1935, the pace of reforms did not ease, although the focus was
on improved specialist training. Early activities in this direction
would be seen from 1932; but in 1935, a reduction in the numbers of
specializations resolved some of the negative effects of the transfer
of university training to industrial auspices. From nearly 1,000
specializations, there were left only 175 broad programs with modified
teaching programs and curricula. Significantly, education authorities
41
within the Party apparatus were the forces behind these changes.
I
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Most of the revisions from 1930 were subsequently incorporated
into the 1936 Constitution. The new Soviet Constitution changed a
fundamental view of education —  m oving from a paternalist view of
State responsibility toward a recognition of the rights and duties of
individuals for an education.
The right to education is ensured by universal and compulsory 
elementary education, by free education ap to and including 
the seventh year, by a system of State stipends for students 
of higher education... who excel in their studies, by instruc­
tion in the schools... conducted in native languages, and by 
the organization... (in the workplace) ... of free, vocational, 
technical and agronomic training for the working people.
Thus, early moves by Lunacharsky toward establishing a continuous
education process supplemented by job training, apprenticeships, and
technical or higher education found its basis in law and increasingly
in fact.
Narkompros jurisdiction was again challenged in 1936. This
time, the Committee on Higher Technical Schools (under Narkompros
auspices) was replaced by an All-Union Committee for Higher
Educational Affairs, under the auspices of the USSR Council of
43
People's Commissars. The new Committee governed policies con­
cerning all higher education, regardless where the programs were 
actually housed.
Despite the successes of the 1930s in stabilizing education, 
problems were not resolved. Rapid industrialization created a 
growing demand for professionals, while the purges of the mid-1930s 
depleted management cadres. Conformity with employment criteria 
established in law was not realized. Rural education and education 
for non-Russian nationalities was uneven. Political and ideological 
content of instruction created additional instability, and the quality
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of instruction still remained inadequate —  pointing to problems
with recruiting, training, and sustaining employment among the 
44
teacher corps.
To a certain extent, the 1936 decree on pedalogical perversions,
which was followed by purges of leading educationalists, sounded a
deathknell for experimental education having implications lasting
into the 1950s. Confirmation of the Party's essential role in
establishing the values to be imparted through the education process
was the key point. It assured the Party of a legal basis from which
to take punative action against educators believed to be wreckers of
Stalinist approaches to organizing education and it addressed the
45
form of and discipline within the profession.
Attention to the quality and size of the teaching profession
grew from the mid-1950s. Major factors which had reduced the
attractions of the field were low levels of remuneration (except in
universities), political/ideological pressures, and potentials for
46
personal harm resulting from activities of some militant youth.
A survey showed, for instance, that over 50% of primary teachers
did not have secondary pedagogical training, and that 75% of secondary
47teachers were without higher education. This situation was common
in all professions. By 1940, of the 904,000 mid-level and senior
specialist jobs created between 1928 and 1940, 70%, were held by
praktiki (e.g., individuals promoted on the basis of experience
48
rather than academic qualifications).
During the 1927 reforms, teachers had been granted salary 
increases and had been promised regular salary reviews. Later in 
the process of formulating the five year plan, teachers were designated
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a top priority for increments and for food distributions. Real wage
increases did not occur, however, even though the nominal rates for
wages went up, as the general cost-of-living increased more than
wage increments. In 1936, another decree sought to raise the salaries
49
of teachers "to the levels of engineers". Teachers were then con­
fronted with the first systematic definitions of job qualifications 
and were required to achieve the standards within a specific period
4= 50of time.
By 1937, the Soviet Union was confronted with a changing world
—  one which promised prosperity but in which the threat of war loomed
near. One observer of the period remarked:
All legislative and organizational measures during the three 
years preceding the Hitlerite attack were dictated by the 
need to make the USSR ready for war. In this they found 
their real justification. The phraseology sometimes applied 
in order to confuse them with long-term communist aims, 
however, (has) its own implication which fitted the concepts 
of one-sided managerial interest.
Insofar as education was concerned, efforts to strengthen polytechnic
and labor training were significantly, tied to war production during
the late 1930s. Wider opportunities for women, frequently heralded
as a major advance, occurred as males were subjected to military
conscription.
Education mandates in the third five year plan seemed clear. It
stressed two items: continued expansion of all education (with
emphasis on secondary schooling) and qualitative improvements. It
seemed .that Stalin recognized the need for generalists, but he also
sanctioned intensified efforts concerning the technical competence
52
of management cadres. These were polar-opposite investment
priorities, given the dual systems of general and technical education.
i
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More over, since the general secondary schools had not successfully 
integrated labor training into the academic settings, it was elimin­
ated from the general school program altogether. This left
53
unresolved the matter of labor-oriented general education.
By 1938, the critical needs for industry was securing a labor
force with an appropriate distribution of junior and secondary-
level educations combined with technical training. But general
education and organized recruitment of labor had reduced the incentives
for youth to attend the FZU and factory training programs, which were
regarded as essential inputs to improvements in labor productivity.
For example, between 1938 and 1940, factory and on-site job training
programs were completed by fewer than one-third of the planned 1.7 
54million. An observer remarked that of 600,000 Party members, 15%
were specialists with higher or secondary education and that many
persons in management or similar positions of responsibility did
not have such e d u c a t i o n . S u c h  a low standard of education within
the Party and management cadres must have generated enormous pressures
for expanded education at these levels. The increased pace of pre-war
mobilization worked against this option.
As a temporary solution to labor shortages, restrictions
were enacted on labor mobility. Increased working days,and reduced
leave privileges were seen alongside efforts to reduce the numbers
56
of officials and managers who were purged for political reasons.
To encourage students toward employment, correspondence centers for
higher education were created. The law provided for two types of
programs: independent correspondence centers and part-time evening
programs attached to full-time institutions.^ These programs were
I
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seen alongside efforts to reduce the numbers of officials and managers
5 6
who were purged for political reasons. To encourage students to­
ward employment, carrespondence centers for higher education were 
created. The law provided for two types of programs: independent 
correspondence centers and part-time evening programs attached to 
full-time institutions.^ These programs were especially important 
to teachers with obligations to upgrade their credentials. Still, 
a labor draft was discussed for the first time in the period since 
the early post-revolutionary period.
It seems clear that from 1939 the USSR would enter the war an d 
that existing manpower problems were complicated by the urgency felt 
by government to produce military goods and to expand the size of the 
armed forces. Labor laws and military conscription regulations, for 
example, became increasingly severe as they pertained to age-eligible 
candidates for education programs. In particular, students were 
liable for draft into military service at age 18 (or 19p if deferred).
This pushed the age forward approximately one year and reduced the
58
pool of male applicants to education programs.
Reforms in education came to a halt in this year, although the 
activities to expand secondary education, in particular, were increas­
ingly successful. Some efforts to establish the appropriate direction 
of technical programs and labor training were continued. A Soviet 
writer indicated,
By the end of the 1930s, the impossibility of maintaining 
a unified national approach to the organization and content 
of vocational/technical education, as well as the long-term 
planning for the training of skilled workers, became apparent.
Factories subordinated... training to current production 
needs. The FZU courses were cut drastically, workers were
I
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trained mainly in mass occupations, and new fields of work. 
Enterprises which did not operate schools were virtually 
denied any influx of skilled manpower.
Internally organized factory forms of training such as 
advanced training schools for skilled workers, Stakhanovite 
schools, socialist worker courses, and technical-minimum 
classes also failed to meet the requirements of developing 
socialist industry.
Resolution of... these tasks required better forms of worker 
training with a solid, planned basis which took into account, 
national interests, the growing need for.workers in various 
sectors of the economy, and the longer-term prospects for 
their development. A state system of training and place­
ment of skilled workers became an objective problem and 
certainly a pressing one. "
This situation led to the creation of the State Labor Reserve, which
is treated in the following chapters.
Finally, Bubnov was replaced in 1940 by V. Potemkin, a former
60
diplomat and a historian. The replacement of Bubnov was not parti­
cularly significant given that the important decisions in education 
were not based on Bubnov's leadership, but reflected momentum from 
Party leadership and organizations. The significance in the choice 
of Potemkin for Commissar of Education in the Russian Republic may 
be in hi3 own credentials as a recognized academic. It is possible 
that his assignment signalled the continued stress on qualitative 
(as opposed to political) changes in education. These factors, too, 




It was from the 1930s that the Soviet Union systematically 
sought universal literacy for the adult population and the standard 
of elementary schooling for children.. These were reasonable goals, 
as audiences for literacy classes and children were easily mobilized 
for such purposes, especially in urban areas. The Soviet Union 
sought a system °f education which could compete with those in 
western countries operating at far higher standard than simply pri­
mary schooling.
A first step in creating the system, as we.have seen, was in 
clarifying the goals of Soviet education, in promulgating legisla­
tion, and in developing the necessary infrastructure supporting the 
system. It may be expected that since the basic work on Soviet 
education relative to both legislation and infrastructure took place 
in the 1930s, the general standard was insufficient. The fact 
remains, however, that accomplishing universal primary schooling and 
expansion of educational opportunities at the upper grades strengthen­
ed the hitherto fragile commitment to public education and generated 
a lasting momentum for this sector of the economy.
Having made these observations, it must be said that enormous 
pressures were generated by the political climate, specific indus­
trial and agricultural production goals, and the lack of the educa­
tional infrastructure. Thus, while pressures were toward an integrated 
general academic and labor training system, the Soviet system could 
not reconcile the rate of educational and economic expansion with 
qualitative factors. As a result, the Soviet educatioa which 
emerged relied more on academic than rhetorical tributes to poly-
I
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tochmicsloducatioo. would first iadicato. Iadood, tho rhetorical limks 
betwee* labor training and general education were dropped in the mid- 
1930s, as discussions moved toward methods of streamlining existing 
technical education opportunities and creating a separate labor 
training system for skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers.
Thus, the Soviet authorities accomplished mucl^hut left unresolved 
the issues of polytechnics!training.
-48a- „
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Soviet Education During the War
Introduction
There is little detailed information from Soviet sources about 
their education system during the period of the second world war. 
Treatments of the period by Soviet authorities stress that efforts 
were made to maintain access to education in areas not subject to 
German occupation. The lack of information on the subject (beyond 
disaster-related acknowledgements) probably resulted from Soviet 
perceptions of post-war national security and lack of data on which 
to base analyses.. The Soviet government in post-war years did not 
wish to advertise their vulnerabilities, the economic implications 
of war-generated destruction, or their methods of coping with pro­
blems of economic and social reconstruction.
It has been stated that the effects of war on the USSR were 
especially severe, causing the loss of millions of lives, lowered 
rates of births, redirection of academic personnel to the war effort, 
and a refocussed education experience. We do not know the extent to 
which population changes brought about by the Stalin purges of the 
1930s are obscured by war losses. It is certain only that additional 
millions died, not just from purges but by famine in the Ukraine and 
the Volga areas in the early part of the decade. These additional 
deaths caused exaggerated disproportion in the balance of males an d 
females in the population. The population shifts were important to 
developments in Soviet education in the 1950s.
Insofar as education was regarded as a priority during the
critical war years (say, up to 1943), and it is obvious that military
i
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and economic survival were far more important, there are three distinct 
areas of interest:
changes in the structure, standards, and curricula for tech­
nical training;
changes in peripheral laws concerning general education; and 
dysfunction of the education system due to war.
The over-riding common thread among these factors was the orientation of 
education and training to war preparation and production.
This chapter discusses the implications of war for the education 
system in the Soviet Union. Addressed are changes in technical training 
and general education policies and organization shortly before and 
during the war; evacuation of individuals and materiel to unoccupied 
areas and those implications for education; and heightened awareness 
of mutual dependence of education and economic sophistication. The 




Changes in Technical Education Policies
By the late 1930s, the major remaining unresolved organizational 
question in education concerned technical training. General education 
had not efficiently integrated job skills into the daily school 
routine. Manpower shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labor pre­
ssured industrialists and government toward creating a coordinated 
system of job training, recruitment, and placement. Problems with 
financing the expansion of education, teacher preparedness, and 
equipping training facilities reduced the effectiveness of school 
workshops. The majority of youth entering industrial and agricultural 
employment relied on the factory, MTS, or farm for on-the-job training.
Shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labor were the result of 
several factors. First, laws governing the labor force were designed to 
restrict and reduce the level of migration from rural to urban areas. 
Secondly, the urban workforce was over-extended numerically relative 
to the anticipated rates of industrial development, while insufficient' 
efforts were made for drawing marginal categories of persons into 
employment. Thirdly, the fear of and mobilization for war reduced 
the numbers of youth entering industrial employment, and also drew 
on those already in the labor force. Previous efforts for training 
workers prior to industrial employment had not equipped graduates 
for ready adaptation to new technologies, and many consequently 
required interim re-training at the factory. Finally, education 
absorbed excess time for an impressive number of urban workers, but 
reduced time available for over-time or second jobs.
Restrictions on Rural Mobility. In the early 1930s, industry 
had access to relatively unlimited numbers of unskilled workers, as
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movement from rural to urban areas was not especially controlled.
After 1932, rural youth were obliged to work on farms from the age 
of 12, were eligible for entrace to the kolkhoz labor force from the 
age of 16, and did not have the right to quit agricultural employ­
ment once membership in the kolkhoz had been granted.^ Requirements 
for labor-day contributions by rural youth were an impediment to
mobility, .and from 1940 this was compounded by criminal law provisions 
2
if unfulfilled. Importantly, internal mobility was further restricted 
by a requirement for an internal passport, to which rural youth did not
3
have an automatic right. Obtaining a passport required permission
from the local Soviet, but actually taking legal residence in the
city required a permit from urban authorities who also required proof
4
of available housing. During the war period, internal passports 
were discontinued, but terms of war mobilization of the workforce 
were almost as restrictive
Formation of the Industrial Labor Force. It has been shown 
elsewhere that the anticipated rate of industrial development 
envisaged in the Third Five Year Plan would have required a substan­
tial rate of growth in the urban labor force. One Soviet estimate 
indicated that an increase of 27% (or about six million over 1937 
non-agricultural employment levels) would be required, presuming
also improved per capita productivity and mechanization of indus- 
£
trial processes. In 1939, Stalin said that kolkhozy would be 
requested to release 1.5 million youth each year for industrial 
employment.^
Conditions in the late 1930s worked against forming a substan­
tially larger labor force. While numbers of urban youth engaged in
I
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pre-employment training, education, and military service were notably 
increased in comparison with the 1920s, job training programs in the 
late 1^30s had not achieved targeted levels of enrollments. Potential 
replacements of these losses of skilled labor by encouraging women 
into the workforce were moderately successful, but women moved into
g
less skilled industrial jobs or into education. Replacing the loss 
of male youth in the labor force brought about intensified efforts to 
increase the flow from rural to urban areas. One method seen in use 
in the 1930s was the organized recruitment of rural youth for indus­
trial training and' employment. But the competency levels of rural 
youth were well below those of their urban contemporaries, and ex­
tensive preparatory programs were required as levels of technology 
advanced. Moreover, it has been shown that official efforts to
9
recruit labor were not well coordinated.
Organized and extra-legal transfers of rural population to the 
urban centers caused a substantial expansion of urban population 
between 1930 and 1940. If it is presumed that the majority of such 
individuals sought education or employment, the migration pattern 
generated extraordinary pressures on urban education facilities 
for accommodation of the influx of students. M. Feshbach stated 
that three million individuals shifted each year from rural to urban 
centers during the 1930s, legal restrictions notwithstanding.^
Another analyst countered that between 1930 and 1940 forced move­
ments of workers to the east were between 2 and 10 million.^ None­
theless, the shortfall in new industrial labor increments between
12
1937 and 1940 was an estimated 3.8 million.
i
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War Mobilization. The numbers of youth in active military service
increased from nearly 1.4 million in 1937 to approximately 2.5 million
in 1940 (see appendix 1). Industry could not have ignored in its
planning the need for replacing mobilized workers, for shifting types
of assignments in accommodating restrictions on type and hours of
work for women and juveniles, and for job training of replacement
personnel. It would have been anticipated that in the event of actual
conflict, mobilization would rise precipitously, as indeed it did.
By the war's end, 11.4 million were serving in the armed forces,
while millions of military and civilian personnel were either killed 
13
or transported. Moreover, redirection of youth to development 
schemes in the east increased constraints on industries in western 
parts of the Soviet Union in securing its own labor supplies.
Job Training Programs. During the 1930s, several kinds of 
employment readiness schemes were available. First, there were 
the technical schools of the secondary and higher education levels. 
These were designed to provide industry with managers and technicians 
of varying, but skilled, capabilities. Then, there were the Central 
Institute of Labor schemes which were abandoned since the extremely 
narrow focus of the training, did not prove an acceptable preparation 
even of semi-skilled workers. The inability of workers to cope 
with industrial change without additional training was extremely 
serious in the midst of an industrial modernization and expansion 
campaign. There were also rabfaks and the FZU schools which were 
reduced in numbers of programs and potential graduates by the end 
of the 1930s. The schools were also criticised for their low 
standards. Consequently, industry trained most of its new lahor
i
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in factory-based settings. Educationalists and industrialists alike 
were concerned that instructional capacity (drawn as it was from the 
workforce)'would reduce production shortfalls, and would offer inadequate 
theoretical backgrounds to workers. Factory training remained an impor­
tant element in the educational spectrum during the war, when over 11
14
million workers were trained in such settings between 1941 and 1945.
Education Opportunities for Working Youth. From the mid-1930s,
several programs increased participation of urban youth in education.
The spread of general ten-year education was a top priority, but
availability was both uneven and highly competitive. It is perhaps
significant that the numbers of youth in full-time secondary and
higher education appear to correlate with the estimated shortfall in
labor force entrants. In 1940, there were approximately 2.4 million
general education students, 1.0 specialized secondary education
students, and .6 million higher education students.^ This sacrifice
to the economy worked against broader application of full-time
education opportunities to working youth, whom it was believed could
not be spared for full-time study. The expansion of correspondence,
part-time specialized and higher education absorbed the time of
approximately 155,000 secondary students and 254,000 higher education 
16
students by 1940. It may be anticipated that the majority were 
young adults.
Thus, we find in the late 1930s a combination of factors pushing 
government toward developing a national training scheme with incentives 
for attracting and sustaining necessary enrollments. Perhaps it is 
due to the proximity of war that the form this training system took 
was the State Labor Reserve. The system offered job training to youth
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with primary schooling, was regarded as a route for youth mobiliza­
tion, and the terms of involvement were both voluntary and compulsory.
The Labor Reserve.
An alternative to general secondary education was established in
1940, when the government created the State Labor Reserve. ^  The new
program was introduced with the statement, "The State is confronted
with the task of ensuring organized training of new workers from
urban and collective farm youth and the formation of necessary labor
reserves for industry." The programs were under the authority of the
Central Administration for Labor Reserves (which was itself subject
to the authority of the Council of People’s Commissars). The Central
Administration was established to elaborate training curricula, control
the work of training, organize placements of Labor Reserve graduates,
and train technical education teachers. Thus, for the first time,
efforts for coordinating intake of job training programs, planning
types of training in relation to industrial expectations of demand
and government expansion efforts, and assigning workers to employment
were under the same authority.
Types of Labor Reserve Programs. The Labor Reserve offered
specialised job preparation programs ranging from 6 months to 2
years in duration. The programs were offered through an extended
network of industrial txaining schools (fabrichno zavodnoe obuchenie,
FZO) and through extended programs for work in mines, railroads,
communications, construction and other trades (remeslennye uchilishcha.
or simply uchilishcha) . In 1941, the network of FZU schools was
18
integrated into the Labor Reserve system. Since the FZU schools
i
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were fairly widely available, this type of program dominated the
original Labor Reserve offerings. The FZO produced the greatest
number of workers, if only because the courses were much shorter,
FZO produced 1.8 million workers between 1941 and 1945, against
19
.7 million by other Labor Reserve schools. In 1943, the Labor
Reserve added the Nakhimov and Suvorov schools, which provided
military boarding arrangements for children of military killed
during the war and for other orphaned children whose parents died
20
in service of country. Additionally, three to twelve month
courses were developed from 1943 to provide trained agricultural
21
workers for areas devastated by war. In 1944, agricultural
studies were offered in programs of one and two years duration.
Graduates of these programs were relatively few —  7,400 in 1944
and 34,700 in 1945.22
Eligibility for Labor Reserve Training. The Labor Reserve had
the authority for inducting up to one million students each year.
During the first five years of its existence, the quota was not
met, although recourse to mandatory conscription in addition to
23
voluntary enrollments was allowed under law and was practiced. 
Appendix 2 presents data on graduations from Labor Reserve programs 
through 1945.
From the inception of the program, intake was limited to boys
aged 14 to 17. In the war period, this apparently was extended to
girls, presumably absorbing some of the orphaned children and
taking an organized approach toward building labor supplies for 
24
reconstruction. The formula for intake was different for rural 
and urban youth. In the former case, the legal quota was two youth
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per hundred able-bodied kolkhoz members between the ages of 14 and
55. In the latter case, the total enrollments were set by local 
soviets according to local industrial requirements and plans developed 
by central authorities„ Given the sensitive nature of any organized 
recruitment process, much less conscription, the Labor Reserve quotas 
were subjected to Council of Minister's approval.
Eligibility for programs included different standards of prior 
education. As noted above, Nakhimov and Suvorov schools usually 
accepted students from a restricted universe of candidates. The 
Nakhimov schools, further, accepted students only for grades 6-10.
It is thought that such schools were not widespread. Their signifi­
cance is in the fact that they existed and reserved a portion of 
youth for military careers. For FZU and extended programs of more 
than a year, requirements varied between fourth and seventh grade 
attainments. However, the schools had particularly heavy enroll­
ments from urban areas, which leads to the supposition that the 
programs were not simply designed for drawing rural youth into 
industrial employment. The Labor Reserve programs of the uchilishcha 
type attracted voluntary enrollments because the graduates (on 
completion of compulsory work assignments) then became eligible 
for further technical studies, were devised for offering significant 
theoretical content, and provided a legal means for rural youth to 
leave the kolkhoz. During the war, however, the academic portion of 
the uchilishcha programs was de-emphasized in the interests of rapid 
training.
Labor Reserve Graduates. As it is expected, the Labor Reserve 
trained students for work in specific industrial settings. The
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students only supplemented new labor intakes who received on-the-job
training. Obviously, the majority of students were in short-term
courses which related to industry and construction.
It has been shown elsewhere that the majority of Labor Reserve
graduates were assigned to employment in factories or other settings
25
in which they received their initial practical training. However,
the Labor Reserve itself was devised for accommodating new development
projects promoted by central authorities. By the war's end, some
managers indicated that significant percentages of their staffing
26
were assigned through the Labor Reserve. Given the war-generated 
disruptions in the labor supply, this was not surprising. The Labor 
Reserve cadres were the most easily mobilized of the manpower base 
and had specialized skills, theoretically those desired by industrial 
managers. Appendix 3 offers data on the fields of specialization of 
these graduates. Through the text, schools and students in programs 
run by the Labor Reserve are referred to as Labor Reserve schools 
or graduates, unless otherwise noted.
Changes in General Education Policies
It is within the context of the need for additional trained 
labor, the opening of the Labor Reserve system, and the desire for 
resolving systemic manpower shortages that alterations in general 
education policies between 1939 and 1945 seem to have a purpose.
The circumstances of war prompted peripheral policy changes which 
may have more significance in ideological terms than to the goal 
of mass education. The significant dominant theme of the period, 
however, was the emphasis on accommodation to the war less through
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forma 1 policy adjustments than through simple practical expediency.
Introduction of Fee Payments. Between 1939 and 1940, students
in higher and secondary education were confronted with a new fee 
27
requirement. Some analysts have stated that such fees would not
have caused many to lose access to education, judging the level of
28
fees against the typical urban worker's annual income. On the 
contrary, there is much room to believe that rural students, in 
particular, whose families had lower cash income levels, would be 
forced to seek education and employment alternatives. Moreover, 
urban workers’ salaries were on the average insufficient to sustain 
the loss of tuition grants which previously had been available.
In the early 1940s, there was a precipitous drop in enrollments —  
due to a combination of military conscriptions, loss of education 
facilities, and the tuition charges. In 1043, a system of scholar­
ships was created. The limited availability of scholarships and 
stipends were differentiated according to the field of study, and
the amounts did not cover tuition and living expenses for students
29
in all fields of study. Official explanations for the fees (which
ranged between 300 and 500 rubles annually for higher education and
150 and 200 rubles for secondary education) stated that there was a
desire for offsetting a portion of state expenditures on education,
observing that such costs had grown rapidly in the recent past.
This is only a partial justification for the tuition payments.
The Soviet system of taxation had been adjusted to rechannel as much
"surplus” income and revenues as possible from all economic sectors
and from individuals. The fees represented a form of taxation which
would bring into the defense coffers additional, albeit marginal,
I
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revenues. Receipts from tuition might have generated as much as 
300 million rubles from higher education and 500 million rubles 
from secondary programs in 1940 alone, but declining enrollments
30
during the war rapidly reduced the significance of such receipts.
It must be pointed out that introduction of tuition payments in 
secondary and higher education was not matched by similar measures 
in most technical education/training settings. The lack of such fee 
requirements served to reiterate official concerns that the labor 
supply was the critical issue of the day.
Changes in Curricula. Early accommodation to war-time condi­
tions are seen in a series of curricula changes for general education 
and the purposes of university research. In 1942, syllabuses in the 
general education programs added compulsory physical and military
training. This requirement absorbed an estimated 6-11% of program
31time, depending on the level of the class. Compulsory military
training, however, did not signify automatic induction into the
service. Further, all students were required to devote extra-curricula
hours to "socially useful work" -- frequently mentioned are students'
32
efforts in hospitals and in garden plots associated with schools.
However, it is recalled that unofficial accommodations also occurred.
In some areas under occupation, and even in unoccupied regions, food
supplies were short. Students' time was spent searching for supplies.
This was probably not an insignificant loss of academic time.
Between 1941 and 1942, Soviet officials complained that insufficient
attention was accorded to "moral instruction" in the schools. This
referred to civics training and the inculcation of nationalist, anti- 
33fascist spirit. The complaints
I
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came in the wake of reported wide-scale defections of Soviet citizens 
to the German cause. A. Werth provided some insight into the new 
instructional climate. In particular, he mentioned that the period 
prior to the invasion was characterized by efforts to play.down the 
threat posed by the German military presence in Eastern Europe. The 
non-aggression pact was in place and the Soviets had moved to build 
territorial insulation by annexations. Werth interpreted the pre-war 
exhaltations in the Soviet press of the benefits of neutrality as the 
cause of general psychological ambivalence among the Soviet populations
3 /
which continued even after the invasion had begun. The situation 
was complicated by mixed loyalties among the annexed Baltic popula­
tions and by nationalist groups in the Ukraine, for instance, which 
were openly hostile to the Soviet regime. There was substantial 
migration to the West from these jara.s after the German invasion. 
Nonetheless, the Soviet schools were instructed to include value- 
loaded instruction in efforts to raise public resistance to German 
influence.
Changes in Organization. There were major policy changes
undertaken during the war which had implications for post-war
education. These were not entirely accommodation to war conditions,
but the timing was probably related. Of major importance to Soviet
education was the creation in 1943 of the RSFSR Academy of Peda- 
35
gogical Sciences. The new Academy replaced Narkompros leadership
in the area of general pedagogical research. It will be recalled
that Narkompros duties concerning higher education had been
removed during the late 1920s, and the 1940 legislation absorbed
similar functions for technical training. Narkompros retained only
I
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administration of general education and this authority was dispersed 
among the republics.
Original guidelines for the RSFSR Academy, significantly 
designated as the highest educational research institution in the 
Soviet Union, were promotion of public education, dissemination of 
pedagogical information, conducting scientific work on general and 
special psychological and pedagogical issues, teacher training for 
higher education and research, and promoting scientific pedagogy.
The instructions ended hopes for a single governmental authority 
for education policy and administration. An essential element 
of general education —  formulation of guiding principles -- was 
removed from Narkompros jurisdiction. Policy formulation was reserved 
as a Party function and administration of education divided laterally 
among several agencies within a single republic.
Primary Education. An early recommendation of the RSFSR 
Academy adopted by the Russian Republic concerned a lowered age for 
compulsory school attendance. In the 1944/45 academic year, stat­
istics indicate that several million seven-year-olds entered the first
36
grade along with previously scheduled eight-year-olds. The rule 
took longer than a single academic year to fully implement.
Secondary Education. Junior and senior secondary education 
was generally sacrificed during the war, although from 1943 efforts 
were made to restore access. A policy was adopted encouraging 
development of education programs for students whose academic 
progress had been interrupted by war. This was paralleled by lower 
rates of military inductions. Created, or effectively re-created, 
were Schools for Working Youth, designed to offer on a part-time
-64-
37
basis a condensed version of the general secondary program. A
38
year later, Schools for Rural Youth were established. However,
unlike the urban program which was usually junior secondary through
higher secondary levels, the rural schools offered studies from
primary through junior secondary levels.
Segregation in the Schools. In addition to the policies and
organizational changes mentioned above, several peripheral decrees
were adopted in 1943. Separation of urban school enrollments after
the seventh grade according to sex was a policy adopted to facilitate
military training of boys. Official explanations declared that for
reasons of differences in physical development and hygiene, girls
would be "provided separate but equal" educations, substituting
39
home economics for military studies. A later explanation was
offered in 1954 by E. Medynsky, who wrote that:
...separate schools were economically feasible; equality 
among the sexes was an established fact; the time was 
present that enabled government to prepare the children 
for different roles in life; and experiments during the 
1942/43 academic year in Moscow secondary schools had been 
well debated by the Council of Ministers.. .4-0
This smacks of latter-day justifications of a policy which was ill-
timed relative to the massive problems encountered by education
authorities simply to cope with war-time conditions, and it was clearly
invalid in relation to the strong anti-sexist stance of revolutionary
ideology. According to Soviet sources, segregated education was
implemented in 76 cities in 1943, expanded to 194 cities in 1944,
41
and to 197 cities by 1945, affecting nearly a million pupils.
Student Conduct. A code of student behavior was made compulsory
/ 2
in 1943. It is likely that the adoption of the code was meaningful 
if viewed as fostering attitudes toward military readiness, but also
- 65-
countering recurrent problems with bezprizornye. The code is
reminiscent of Makarenko's theories that students function best if
they are treated with respect, are expected to behave within the
bounds of articulated discipline, and have their roles and goals 
43
stated in advance. Modern observers might find such a perspective 
somewhat utopian.
Academic Standards. A reader might ask what constitutes 
academic standards, while a suggested response might be the contents,
c)ncL
structure,^relevance ofacourse, and performances, of teachers and 
students. Changes which took place for improving Soviet academic 
standards may be understood also as a reaction to Soviet experiences 
in the 1930s, during which the methodology of education underwent 
radical change, while large numbers of out-of-age-group students 
paralleled a lower academic standard and problems of competency in 
the resultant labor supply.
In an analysis of the reconstruction of the Ukraine, the issue 
was ensuring the quality of education in the face of (a) adult 
students, (b) students who were employed, and (c) students who con­
stantly were drawn from school responsibilities for work on basic 
reconstruction (e.g., housing, schools, and other essential facilities). 
Attention was given to academic performances after 1943. Annual 
competency examinations for grades 4 to 7 and 10 were mandatory. From 
1943/44, all students from grade 4 were faced with annual promotional 
or competency tests which determined their eligibility for the next 
level of schooling. The examinations and the attestat (certification 
of academic competency at the secondary level) offered assurances 
to hiring authorities that what was needed to be taught was in fact
I
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44presented to and absorbed by the students.
Reconstruction of education was aided by a peculiar war-time
situation existing in areas under occupation or those which were
newly liberated. At various stages, three school systems existed
in the Ukraine and the Baltic states: German-run schools, Soviet-
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model schools, and schools run by partisans. The partisan schools 
were operated in the most primitive conditions and supposedly used 
a modified Soviet-type program —  but had shorter courses, mandatory 
labor training (usually agricultural in nature), and catch-as-catch 
can materials, supplies, and teachers. Some of the schools were 
later integrated into the Schools for Working or Peasant Youth.
Teacher Qualifications and Remuneration. Teachers* salaries are 
a controversial issue in any country. To some extent, the problem 
is in the immediate need for talented manpower versus the long-term 
investment in tomorrow's leaders. Both demands must be met. The 
Soviets addressed the issue by providing separate educational 
processes for teacher training which removed such persons from the 
prospective industrial manpower base. However, attracting the best 
students into education training was strongly influenced by the 
salary packages and upward mobility which often was more attractive 
within industrial employment.
In the early post-revolutionary days, erratic payments to 
teachers encouraged many to seek alternative employment. Salary 
schedules per se were not universally applied until 1937, and assoc­
iated benefits were not available until 1939. The bulk of wages in 
the early period came from in-kind contributions (food, clothing, 
and housing). The 1936 legislation established a system which
I
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created salary differentials according to the level of education 
taught and urban/rural classifications. In the latter part of the 
1930s, special categories were added to the schedule to award out­
standing contributions in education. In 1943, the basic 1936 
schedule was revised, narrowing the differentials in earnings between 
the highest and lowest paid teachers and taking into account infla­
tionary pressures. The 1943 law adjusted primary and secondary
46teachers’ salaries about one-third above the previous level.
Teachers' qualifications were an increasingly sensitive issue
for the war period. The problem was that war-time civilian and
military casualties depleted the teacher corps. In Gorki oblast, for
example, it was reported that 144 of 280 directors of secondary
47
schools went into the army. The numbers of teachers in 1941 were
48
1.2 million, but declined to .8 million in 1943, and one may
suppose that the decline was worse than the numerical loss due to
shifts in the credentials held by personnel. In reducing teacher
shortages, many areas in the Ukraine, for instance, which were
particularly hard hit by German occupation, recruited students from
49upper grades to act as primary school instructors.
Lack of teacher qualifications emerged as a serious problem. The
standards, reissued in 1943, complicated the situation.^
For grades 1 to 4, normal or technical school training,
with qualifications to be met by 1947.
For grades 5 to 7, pedagogical institutes or higher
education, with qualifications to be met by 1947.
For grades 8 to 10, pedagogical institutes within higher
education institutions, with qualifications to be met by 1948.
I
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On paper, these sound reasonable. Practically, however, achieving 
the qualifications by the dates indicated was another matter indeed. 
Such training programs were not widely available after the war and 
the vast majority of new teachers remained without academic qualifi­
cations. In countering some of the difficulties, the government 
established pedagogical correspondence courses and mutual assistance 
learning.^ On the one hand, it may be said that correspondence 
courses are not an entirely inappropriate approach (although not 
optimal) for improving teacher qualifications. It must be noted also 
that the pedagogical working groups were not overly successful. The
continued poor standard of teaching, even after participation in the
52
groups, was sufficient reason to quickly eliminate that route.
Higher Education. Accommodation to war was made by all the
higher education faculties. Research was refocussed on problems
of military organization and industrial production and reportedly
significant contributions were made by academics in developing
technologies which competed with those of the advanced German 
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military. Bereday has shown that attrition rates in higher
education were very high. During the war, admissions were allowed
year round. In 1941, students could be drafted and few exceptions
were allowed. In 1942, drafts were relaxed for third and fourth
year students, while some were demobilized to continue studies.
54
Admissions requirements were also relaxed. A 1943 decree listed
faculties whose students were exempted from military service. The
decree included students of aviation, military supplies, shipbuilding,
chemistry, metals industries, energy, transportation, communications,
and semi-professional technical studies.^
4
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These arrangements were not surprising in war-time. It is inter­
esting to note from DeWitt's research that admissions into higher 
education were heavily in such fields as education rather than in 
engineering, as had been the case during the 1930s. While this may 
be explained by the fact that women could more easily continue their 
studies in the war period, it is also probably a factor which led 
to the 1943 instruction to the Committee on Higher Education for
t ( \  Q -i 'Yi P  G.hJT'
pursuing placement^of higher education graduates. Appendix 4 illus­
trates the point.
War-Time Adjustments and Implications for Education
It was perhaps jumping ahead to have discussed policy changes 
before providing information on the adjustments of the Soviet system 
to the war. We have seen that the military draft was a serious 
impediment to university-level training. We have seen that the Labor 
Reserve program was regarded as extremely important for mobilization 
of youth for production. We have also seen that various adjustments 
in school policies were made to establish academic standards. Each 
of the points illustrated the Soviet commitment toward balancing 
pressures in youth toward education, labor training, and employment.
This section returns to the beginning of the war period to look 
at industrial and population demographics insofar as they related 
to education. The issues of education demography and related policy 
changes are treated both in this and the subsequent chapter. Such 
issues are brought forward here primarily because interest in 
regional economic expansion within the Soviet Union (with its ob­
vious connections to expanding education resources) is well illustrated
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by decisions taken during the war. Of course, longer-term effects 
of population changes caused by the war were felt only gradually, 
and these (coupled with issues generated by the program for regional 
expansion) are the basis for changes in education during the 1950s.
Structure of the Soviet Population. There is some uncertainty 
about official Soviet population data for the pre-war period. These 
concerns are not addressed here. Specific benchmarks, regarded as 
estimates only, offer some insight into official expectations for growth 
of the labor force and for development of education. More discrete 
indicators, necessary to a discussion of the connections among 
education, labor, and demography are incomplete. Aggregate data, 
for example, concerning the age, sex, and geographic distribution 
of population are important backgrounds for policies which address 
the availability of cadres. Data are not available for particular 
sectors combining several characteristics (for example, age and 
sex, plus geographic combinations). Data are also required for
the numbers of births and infant mortalities, as well as for general
'planned
death rates, as these are the basis for the^expansion of the labor 
supply and for education/training programs.
Base Population and Pre-War Annexations. Appendix 5 provides 
data on the total Soviet population from the pre-revolutionary period 
to the beginning of the World War. From these, we can see that the 
USSR went from 137.5 million in 1917 to an estimated 170.6 million 
in 1939. Then, with the annexations discussed below, the population 
of the Soviet Union was an estimated 194.1 million in 1940.
In 1939, the USSR annexed territory from eastern Poland and in 
1940 took in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania, as well
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as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. ^  During the war, additional areas 
were annexed, including the Sakhalin Islands, the Kuriles, Tannu Tuva, 
and the northern part of German East Prussia. Minor territorial 
adjustments (involving territory from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 
cessation of a small strip from Moldavia back to Poland at the end 
of the war) completed the Soviet expansion. Two annexations from 
Poland and Rumania were particularly important, bringing the USSR
575,000 square kilometers and more than 20 million population.
Sex Composition of the Soviet Population. From appendix 6, we 
see that in 1939, the Soviet population had a malerfemale ratio of 
82:89, respectively. In the working-age group (e.g., 16-59), 67% 
of the population were available for work, at least theoretically, 
but the ratio of men to women was probably slightly more skewed due 
to the effects of purges, war, and collectivization. Unfortunately, 
this imbalance would be carried forward in the younger generations, 
which in turn had implications for labor force formation and, in the 
face of 1943 regulations for separate educations by sex, some implica­
tions for school planning. Specific data are not available for 
determining the extent of sex imbalance in the younger age groups, 
although it is believed not to have been very significant. The 
desirable situation would be parity or slightly more men than women.
By 1945, sex distribution of population aged 20 or older was reported 
as 60:100, respectively. If the data are correct, they indicate 
a tremendous burden on authorities for identifying compensatory labor 
resources. In its turn, pressures for pulling together labor cadres 
for industrial and agricultural purposes created a disincentive for 
expanding education and, indeed, tested the Soviet Union’s commitment
I
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to equal education in urban and rural settings.
Geographic Distribution. Analysis of the geographic distribution 
of Soviet population should take into account population estimates for 
various jurisdictions (republics, krai, oblasts), urban and rural 
designations, and in economic planning area. From appendix 7, we can 
readily see that the 1939 population of the Soviet Union was concentra­
ted in the RSESR and the Ukraine, and that there was a strong trend 
toward urbanization. The fact that the urban population had more than 
doubled by the late 1930s placed a great burden on authorities to pro­
vide municipal faculities (housing, medical services, food, transport­
ation, and education). We may surmise that as an estimated 687, of 
the Soviet population were classified as rural, there was potential -fora, 
growth of industrial manpower from that resource. Agriculture, it 
has been shown elsewhere, required substantial mechanization before 
shifting such workers could be accomplished without causing disruption 
in the agricultural economy.
For education, the geographical distribution of population meant 
that substantial investment in infrastructure would continue for the 
foreseeable future, especially if universal secondary education were 
to be achieved. It must be .recalled that migration to urban from 
rural areas concentrated largely on labor recruitment for heavy 
industry and construction, and thus, mainly on males. Therefore, 
we have reason for presuming that the rural population was particularly 
skewed by age and sex distribution. This would have its own implica­
tions to the types of education offered and for labor force migration.
Birth Rates. For purposes of planning education, the rates of
births and infant mortalities are of particular interest. Data in
I
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appendix 8 are not especially reliable, but serve as illustrations 
that? prior to the war, birth rates were erratic for the whole of 
the Soviet period. The effects of the First World War, civil war, 
and famine due to displacement of agricultural workers, were followed 
by several years of economic recovery in the mid-1920s. These years 
allowed the USSR to show a modest population increase by the end of 
the decade. The period of the 1930s was'tumultuous —  collectivization, 
de-kulakization, purges, famine, preparation for war, and the general 
age-sex imbalance caused the birth rates to be uneven.. The births 
which occurred, it is thought, were offset by high rates of infant 
mortalities, but estimated infant births were exceeded by total mor­
talities by as much as 19 million between 1941 and 1945.
The Labor Fprce. There is little information about the labor 
force in the pre-war period, although aggregate data and some scattered 
references allow some general observations. In 1940, the Soviet 
population was an estimated 194.1 million. The country was admin­
istered in 14 economic regions —  9 within the RSFSR and 5 covering
the rest of the country. That year, over 80% (or 25 million of the 
approximately 31 million) of the industrial work.force were located 
in western parts of the USSR. Approximately 50% of employed persons 
in the USSR worked in agriculture. Four regions (central, south
Ukraine, the northwest, and the Urals) contained 70% of Soviet
58
manufacturing and the bulk of Soviet agriculture. Concentrations 
of industry and agriculture in these areas rendered the country 
especially vulnerable when aggresive action from Germany commenced 
in June 1941.
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We know that many women were involved in the labor force, with
their greatest concentrations in agriculture, low skills industrial
59
occupations, and in education. There is also some evidence that 
youth (e.g., under 23) were nearly 40% of some critical areas of 
industrial employment (for example, in coal mining, tractor build­
ing, and some defense industries). Trud v SSSR in 1936 indicated 
that in 1934 youth aged 16-17 years were especially important to
Serf
the labor force in heavy industry (at 348,000 workers), V. Voznes­
ensky indicated that in 1939, 6% of industrial workers were under 
60
the age of 18. Participation rates of women and youth were
accelerated during the war in response to labor law changes requiring
all persons to become engaged in socially useful activities. M. Matthews
indicated that youth under the age of 23 years were up to 55% of some
61
war-related industrial employment.
Effects of Occupation and War on the Labor Supply. By the end 
of 1941, the German front lines extended from Leningrad to Moscow, 
through Kharkov to Rostov, effectively occupying all the southern 
and western regions, as well as parts of the northwestern and central 
regions. Axis countries occupied Black Sea and coastal areas. Areas 
under occupation accounted for nearly 35% of the 31 million industrial 
workers who were located there in 1940. Additional territorial gains 
by the Germans in 1942/43 brought the total area under German occupa­
tion for extensive periods to that which had produced about one-third
6 2
of total Soviet industrial output for 1940. The extent to which 
the populations remained in these areas or the extent to which 
industry remained in commission are unclear.
i
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In general, it is believed that one-third of industrial workers 
migrated east in response to the relocation of industry. This indi­
cates that about 3 million relocated, leaving the others to join the
C. O
military or to remain in areas under:en^my domination. The decline 
in active labor force to an estimated 50% of the 1940s cadres was 
catastrophic. The losses were in some instances permanent (e.g., 
the death rates, as discussed earlier, were very heavy among young 
workers who were conscripted or transported to the West, as well as 
among children who were especially vulnerable to war-time deprivations).
Industrial manpower in 1945 was estimated at 27.2 million. 
Employment was nearly restored to 1940 levels in heavy industry, coal 
mining, and machine building and agriculture, but certain sectors of 
lower economic priority (textiles and agriculture, for instance) were 
significantly below pre-war employment levels. Further, skilled and 
specialized workers in industry could not be replaced in the short­
term, especially in such orders of magnitude. The implications of 
pre-war and war-time emphasis on industrial development in eastern 
zones, furthermore, implied an intention to sustain the development 
program in the post-war period.
Relocation of Education Facilities. Qualitative presentations
of the effects of war on Soviet industry, manpower, and education
have been given in Soviet texts. At the outset of the war, the
Soviet government issued orders requiring industrial complexes,
faculties of higher education, technical colleges, labor, children,
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and their teachers to be evacuated. Efforts were directed to 
wholesale removals of industry to the east. Development of industrial 
centers took place in the Urals, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan, and West
%
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Siberia. These areas were developed because they were relative close 
to energy supplies (e.g., coal and oil) which were either already 
under exploitation or readily accessible to development activities.
Paralleling the evacuation of industry, some education faculties 
were moved east on a priority basis. Included were scientific and 
polytechnia/faculties and students in metals, chemicals, and communica­
tions programs. We know, therefore, that of the 585,000 higher educa­
tion students enrolled in 1940, at least 176,800 could have been 
subject to evacuation orders. Similarly, we may presume that 234,000 
of the 819,000 full-time secondary specialized education students 
could have been subject to evacuation.^
In qualitative terms, it is believed that equipment and libraries
were rescued for about 150 universities and institutes prior to the
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German invasion. References are vague as to which institutions were
involved or the extent of coordination, much less the comprehensive
nature of the rescur efforts. One may presume that much was lost either
due to haste or in transport. In the period of reconstruction from
1943, however, the library holdings were redistributed among the
re-established education centers as ’’seed", and in fact were extremely
important to academic life. The pace of the invasion took toll on
higher education in the Baltic countries, where it was reported that
the German occupation authorities were instructed to retain only the
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faculties of dentistry, theology, and law. In these countries, 
massive library holdings were presumably destroyed or transported 
to the West.
Expansion and absorption of education programs of all types and
levels started in 1941 in zones east of the front, In particular, it
I
would be interesting to have statistics on the numbers enrolled in 
the programs and the ratios of teachers to students, as well as de­
tails of the programs themselves. Unfortunately, education authorities 
were unable to maintain statistics under war-time conditions; and 
while a 1942 law required records on unaccompanied children to the 
age of 14, the extent to which the requirement was enforced and the 
numbers involved have not been published. We may presume that there 
was a massive overall contraction in enrollments of all types, and 
that expansion of primary schools after 1942 did not approximate the 
numbers for whom it has been reported that schools were decommissioned. 
Further, significant numbers of children may have chosen to work in 
industry or agriculture; others may not have registered with the 
local authorities.
Population Estimates After the War. There are no reliable 
statistics about population losses in the USSR for the war period.
There are some calculations of military and civilian casualties, 
transported workers, emigrations, and lowered birth rates. The 
population data used here were developed by A. Sauvy, a French 
demographer. More recent discussions of the period do not substan­
tially improve these estimates. Thus, we see that by the end of 
the war period, there were as many as 10 million military casualties,
10 million civilian deaths related to military occupation and action, 
emigration of 3 million, lowered birth rates, and possibly an 
additional 3 million transported workers.^
We may hypothesize about the population losses:
. Military casualties took the greatest toll in youthful, 
working-age' population (e.g., 18-36).
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Transported workers would be working-ageJ males.
Lowered birth rates and disproportion of males and females 
in reproductive years would create a long-term imbalance in the 
general education and factory training enrollments and for employment 
thereafter.
Civilian casualties probably followed the abilities of the 
particular age-groups to protect themselves in times of deprivation 
(e.g., first children, then women, males of older years, youth, and 
men) .
Population losses were geographically concentrated in the 
Ukraine; proportionately high losses occurred in the Baltic coun­
tries, Belorussia, and Moldavia (as these were occupied for the 
longest period), and in the Russian Republic where there was 
especially heavy military action.
Conclusions
The implications of the war for education are inextricably 
linked to those for the labor supply. Military casualties and 
civilian losses reduced the numbers of persons available for 
industrial employment in the reconstruction period, depleted the 
numbers in education, lowered the average education and experience 
levels, pressured authorities toward an expanded education and 
training network in compensation for the losses, and created a 
demographic imbalance which affected long-term economic growth.
While it is a truism that the war produced devastating losses 
in Soviet education in the short-term, it may also be stated that 
the war facilitated a long-promised geographic expansion of education.
I
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Rural education and training for industrial employment were fostered 
by the relocation of Vndwsfrial and educatioral personnel beyond the reach
of the enemy. Significantly, agricultural training (neglected in the 
pre-war period in comparison with industrial training) received much 
attention during the war and contributed to post-war recovery.
Population losses and changes in the structure of the Soviet 
population were important consequences of war. The implications for 
education were not expected, possibly due to the fact that until about 
1944, the Soviet Union did not know the extent to which civilian 
populations in the occupied areas had suffered casualties.
The war caused the Soviet Union, as other countries, to take on 
new areas of scientific and technological research and development and 
to become increasingly aware of major advances in other countries. In 
particular, boosts to post-war chemicals and energy development were 
due to war-time exploration for petroleum supplies. Energy reserves 
discovered during the war and some related industrial development 
formed the basis for major post-war expansion. Engineering similarly 
received increased investment, especially in academic resources, due 
to military requirements. For example, development of aeronautics 
equipment which would compete favorably with that in the West stimu­
lated growth of an important industrial sector. Indigenous research 
and development was only one aspect of benefits to Soviet academic 
life. Post-war absorption of German industrial techniques, including 
sophisticated nuclear and synthetic.fuels research, caused the Soviet 
academics to branch into new fields.
For technical and general education, the war left great losses.
It was not only the shrinkage of personnel, but also the destruction
i
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of infrastructure which required massive new capital investment. The 
war caused Soviet educators to focus on the need for a system of 
coordinated technical training and eventual placement of graduates 
in employment. The State Labor Reserve system served as a model, 
since it was regarded as especially successful in this regard. The 
Labor Reserve regulations also reiterated a new element in Soviet 
education —  who is educated pays for the education with compulsory 
employment, fees, or both.
In general education, a combination of fees and mandatory periods 
of post-graduation employment at assigned locations were matched in 
the Labor Reserve by extended periods of mandatory employment, 
although the training itself was without cost to the student. It was 
perhaps the compulsory work requirement associated with the Labor 
Reserve which caused industry to continue training most new workers. 
Nonetheless, the relatively easy mobilization of youth into the Labor 
Reserve (even though it was achieved under war-time conditions) 
appealed to many Soviet leaders. However, the basic problems with 
labor training in qualitative and quantitative terns was not resolved 
by the existence of the Labor Reserve, while war-generated population 
losses created critical needs for post-war education reforms which 
specifically addressed job training.
I
-80a-
Footnotes to Part IV
1. W.M. Matthews, Youth Employment in the USSR, 1946-1958, Ph.D
dissertation, Oxford University, 1961, p. 23 said that after
1942, youth from the age of 12 were required to work 30 labor days,
In addition, there was a mandatory 20% overtime, as required by 
management.
2. Vedomosti verkhovnoqo soveta 55SR, 26 June 1940, no. 20 and no. 28 
(for industrial employment). Vedomosti ... hereinafter cited as 
Vedomosti, unless otherwise specified. Cited in Sbornik zakonov 
prezidiuma verkhovnoqo soveta SSSR, 1938-1952gg, Moscow 1939.
D. Zhimerin, Economy of the Soviet Union, Moscow 1958, p. 10.
A labor day is an accounting term for measuring time spent on 
tasks associated with agirculture. A labor day unit varied 
according to age, sex, and duty, and it may not equal eight hours. 
Payments to kolkhoz workers were based on such contributions to 
the total activity of the farm.
3. Sobranie postanovlenii SSSR, 1938, no. 58, art. 329 required labor 
books for all employees and workers. From 1939, urban workers 
were subjected to increasingly strict regulation, but in June 1940, 
most worker's rights were summarily terminated (Vedomosti, 1940, 
no. 20). A further decree in October 1940, mobilized industrial 
workers (Vedomosti, 1940, no. 42).
4. V. Treml, The Development of the Soviet Economy, New York: Praeger, 
1968, p. 173; and Matthews, op cit, p. 186.
5. Vedomosti, 1942, no. 2, and 1942, no. 6.
6 . Zhimerin,_op cit. pp. 33-34 said that the plan called for a 15.7%
increase in annual industrial production (heavy industry), 11.5%
in light industry, and massive industrial construction. Six million 
is calculated as 21% of 30.3 million civilian employees in non-agri- 
cultural organizations. Base data from R.H. Moorstein and R.P. Powell, 
Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1952, Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, 1966,
table Q-l.
7. J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow 1947, p. 618.
8 . R. Schlesinger, The Family in the USSR, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1949, pp. 19-22 indicated that while overall participation by 
women in the 1940 labor force was 38% of all workers and employees 
(slightly less among professionals) the trend was toward non-industrial 
occupations. The participation rate among women in full-time 
programs was very high in education, health, and social sciences.
9. Matthews, op cit, p. 125.
10. M. Feshbach, The Structure of Supply and Demand for Manpower in the
USSR, 1950-1980, Ph.D. cfclssertation, The American University, 1974, p. 174.
-80b-
11. A.S. Kahl, Labor Practice in the Soviet Union, Washington, DC:
US Department of Labor, July 1964, p. 16.
12. G. Bereday, The Changing Soviet School, Cambridge, MA: The River­
side Press, 1960, p. 157. .
13. The differences between Matthews and Moorstein and Powell’s data 
may be significant as the latter would indicate a much faster rate 
of demobilization occurred. In the next chapter, the relationship 
of demobilization to economic rehabilitation is mentioned.
14. Matthews, op cit, p. 248.
15. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1956g, Moscow 1957, pp. 246, 250-253.
16. Ibid. ■ ■ <
17. Sobranie zakonov, 1940, no. 25}, arts. 602 and 603.
18. Ocherki istorii profesionalno-&d<htvcUqskogo obrazovaniya v SSSR,
Moscow 1981, pp. 216-229.
19. A. Korol, Soviet Education for Science and Technology, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1957, p. 13; and Narodnoe khozyaistvo, op cit, p. 216.
20. V. Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Law School, 1949, p. 147. On 22 August 1943, ten Suvorov schools were
established, having an average capacity of 500 students each.
21. S.T. Stymov, Ocherki o vzaimosvyazi narodnoqo obrazovaniya v narodnom
khozyaistve v~SSSR (1917-1967), Tomsk, 1968, p. 95.
22. Matthews, op cit, p. 148A.
23. See reference 17 above.
24. S. Schwartz, Labor in the Soviet Union, London: Cresset Press, 1953,
p. 78.
25. Matthews, op cit, p. 241.
26. Ibid, p. 249.
27. S.M. Movshovich, Vysshaya shkola —  osnovnye postanovleniya, prikazy i 
instruktsii, Moscow 1948, p. 65. Note that nearly 50 pedagogical 
institutes were exempted from tuition fees. This was possibly a reason 




28. A.D. Redding, USSR Industrial Employment and its Distribution,
Washington, DC: Council for Economic and Industry Research, 1955,
has the following information on average incomes in various economic 
sectors. In the first place, the data indicate that wages in the 
education sector seemed to be competitive to those in other economic 
areas. In the second place, changes in the income levels were not 
significant in education but were for other sectors by 1941, indicating 
that pressures for sustaining labor supplies played a part in the 
wages paid once the military conscription program was underway.
1940 1941
'I




education , 4,200 4,330
state farms/MTS 3,370 3,440
public eating 2,820 2,870
1. Average annual wages in rubles.
29. Korol, op cit., p. 175. Prior to the war, 90-95?o of higher education 
students received some state support.
30. Calculated as 2.4 million times 150 rubles for secondary education
and .6 million times 300 rubles for higher education in 1940/1941
academic year.
31. Bereday, op cit, chapter 4.
32. Shtymov, op cit, p. 94.
33. A. Werth, Russia at War, London: Pan Books, 1964, chapter 1.
34. Ibid, p. 40.
35. Narodnoe obrazovanie v SSSR, sbornik dokumentov, 1917-1973gg, Moscow 
1974, p. 490.
36. Ibid, p. 120.
37. Ibid, pp. 389-391.
38. Ibid, pp. 391-393.
39. Ibid, p. 177.
40. E. Medynsky, Public Education in the USSR, Moscow 1954, p. 90.
41. Op cit, p. 178.
-80d-
42. Narodnoe obrazovanie, 1974, op cit, pp. 116-117.
43. J.E. Bowen, A. Makarenko and the Development of Soviet Education, 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1960, pp.-41< et seq.
44. Narodnoe obrazovanie, 1974, op cit, pp. 182-184.
45. Narisi istorii shkoli v ukrainskoi RSR, 1917-1965, Kiev 1966, p. 167.
46. Korol, op cit, p. 301, indicated that the salary ranges for higher
education was between 8,400 and 14,400 rubles per annum with
differentials according to rank and other factors. For teachers,
it was between 5,600 and 10,100 rubles per annum in 1944. This was 
a substantial increase from the rate of 389 rubles per year in 
1924/25, or the 3,422 rubles per annum in 1936/37, or the 4,300 
rubles in 1940/41, as per Redding, op cit.
47. Sovetskaya pedaqogika, no. 5, 1984, p. 91.
48. Narodnoe khozyaistvo 55SR v 1956q, Moscow 1957, p. 244, and the 
Yearbook of Education, 1948, London: Evans Brothers, 1948.
49. Narisi istorii, op cit, p. 169.
50. Narodnoe obrazovanie, 1974, op cit, pp. 449-463 for a history of 
legislation regarding teacher qualifications and remuneration. The 
1943 law is on p. 463.
51. Sovetskaya pedagogika,- no. 5, 1984, pp. 91-96.
52. Ibid. The article mentioned that 60?o of the group leaders were 
without higher education, implying that the programs failed due to 
this factor.
53. Yearbook of Education, op cit.
54. Bereday, op cit, p. 260.
55. Korol, op cit, p. 116, indicated that in 1943 the Committee on 
Higher Education was instructed to plan for greater numbers of 
university admissions and for placement of university graduates. 
Graduated would have two years of compulsory work in the field 
in which they studies according to the 1944 decree.
56. DeWitt, Education and Professionax Manpower ±11 the Soviet Union, 
Washington, DC: National Science• Foundatl'ohT“’1961, pp. 636-637.
57. Vedomosti, 1940, no. 28.
58. E. Stanley, Regional Distribution of Soviet Industrial Manpower,
1940-1960, New York: Praeger, 1968, chapters 1 and 2.
-80e-
59. R. Clarke, Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970, London: The MacMillan
Press, 1974, p. 23 has shown that the number of women in the Soviet
labor force was 39% in 1940 and 56% in 1945, excluding women in
agricultural work on the kolkhoz and women in private employment.
See also R. Schlesinger, The Family in the USSR, op cit, pp. 286-289.
59(a) Trud v SSSR, Moscow 1936, pp. 75-76.
60. Cited in Matthews, op cit, p. 15.
61. Ibid, pp. 16-17.
62. J. Millar, "Financing the Soviet Effort in World War II," Soviet 
Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 106-123 used slightly 
different figures. In the first six months, German forces occupied 
territory with 40% of the population, 32% of the labor force of all 
State enterprises, and 33% of fixed capital assets of state enter­
prises. Thus, by 1941, the Soviet economy was reduced by one-third. 
Data in text are from Stanley, op cit, chapter 5.
63. T. Dykrnnore, The Stalinist Command Economy, New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1980 , p. 30. F. Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union,
Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, pp. 195-197 indicated that according
to German and Soviet sources, evacuees to the East (e.g., adult workers, 
military, and the like) were estimated to be between 7 and 15 million. 
Apparently, however, this large number of evacuees did not take into 
account the women and students who were also evacuated, but was 
based on some estimate of possible passenger miles and included 
military personnel.
64. Werth, op cit, pp. 208-214.
65. DeWitt, op cit, pp. 636-638.
66. Soviet Education, vol. 24, no. 10, August 1984, p. 20.
67. Narisi istorii, op cit, p. 169.
68. Yearbook of Education, op cit, Registration of displaced persons
took place in each of the countries subjected to war. However, in 
the USSR, the 1942 law required registration only of orphans up to 
the age of 14 in efforts to allow parents and other relatives to 
find them. The 1942 law is found in Narodnoe obrazovanie, 1974, 
op cit, p. 355.
69. Narisi istorii, op cit, p. 179-180 noted problems for secondary 
education, while-ET. Medynsky, Education in the USSR, London: Soviet 
News, 1950, indicated that war damage was for 82,000 schools of thei- 
pre-war total of 171,579 and affected 15 million of the 31.5 million 
1939 enrollments. In higher education, Medynsky reported that 334 
institutions of the 750 pre-war totals were destroyed.






In the period after the Second World War, Soviet education 
authorities faced the necessary task of reconstructing the network 
of schools and education infrastructure. The war left in its wake 
a devastated country which included huge, population losses, exten­
sive industrial destruction, and great uncertainty about the order 
of social and economic priorities. The post-war educationalists 
inherited a system of Soviet education which had been developed 
over twenty years, a semi-literate population, and the drive for 
renewal of the education process.
New conditions pertained which generated a vigorous movement 
within education and from political and economic leaders for 
strengthened ties between education and economic goals. The eco­
nomic priorities of the immediate post-war period were reconstruc­
tion of heavy industry, geographically broadened development, and 
rehabilitation of agriculture and housing in western regions of 
the country. Integrating into the Soviet system populations which 
had been annexed before the war was also necessary.
Accomplishing these tasks required manpower. Population losses, 
however, were extensive in the age-groups which normally formed 
cadres. The Soviet Union built its labor force in the post-war 
period by demobilizing the armed forces and by relying on the 
continued participation of women and youth in employment. This 
manpower strategy was very important in the short-term, but had 
limitations. Only so many could be demobilized; women would
i
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participate in a limited number of employment settings and were not 
mobile; and youth required various types of education/training which 
had been suspended by war.
Manpower shortages could be handled in several ways. These 
included drawing additional persons into the labor force, raising 
the productivity of plant and labor, introducing new technology, and 
reducing the time between leaving education and training programs 
and efficiency at the work place. Implementation of these options 
was constrained by government's need to address consumer demands in 
the face of great shortages and high expectations of improved stan­
dards of living. In the Soviet context, education had emerged as 
the link among these options and as a considerable factor for con­
sumer satisfaction. Educators, as well as government and Party
leaders, returned to the notion that some combination of academic 
Jo£>
study with^skills training should form the basis of the education 
system.
The political and economic leadership within the Soviet Union 
sustained several changes during these years. Stalin initiated a 
purge in the 1940s of the economic leadership which had strongly 
supported the State Labor Reserve program and specialized technical 
studies. A new leadership coalition was formed after Stalin's 
death which might have continued these initiatives, but lost poli­
tical control before education, labor training, and manpower 
strategies were devised. Khrushchev's rise to power in the mid- 
1950s represented a commitment by the Soviet government for consid­
eration of consumer issues. Shifts in leadership and resultant




Changes in Soviet education policies were usually preceded by a 
series of legal and organizational reforms of limited scope. The 
changes resulted from experiments which were conducted in education 
and training settings. Extensive experimentation was also coupled 
with revisions to labor laws and practices. To some extent, however, 
the experiments reflected a general hesitation for disrupting the 
existing education process —  even with its obvious deficiencies.
Khrushchev used the education system and labor conditions as a 
means for consolidating his leadership, and his government was 
eventually identified with the potential for reforms to resolve man­
power difficulties. Khrushchev also pursued reforms as a part of 
the de-Stalinization program. The new leadership publicised a 
return to Leninist priorities and to revolutionary ideals, and that 
government was equally as concerned with issues of social reorgani­
zation as it was with strictly economic performance. Thus, it was 
thought that reorganizing education toward increased participation 
of the working class in the system of higher education would speed 
up the process of achieving social equality and the transition to 
communism.
This chapter discusses a series of matters preceding the reor­
ganization undertaken from 1958. The issues included manpower 
options, political-ideological factors, the concept of polytechnic*/ 
education, and development of the education networks prior to the 
reforms. The discussion briefly touches on changes in economic 
policies and organization and labor laws which influenced ultimate 
choices of education policy. The debates which immediately preceded
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the 1958 reforms are also brought out, as well as the reforms themselves.
Manpower for Industry and Agriculture
From the end of the war, it appeared that the economic priorities 
of the pre-war period would continue as the basis of the economic proT 
gram. High levels of economic performance, coupled with an emphasis on 
heavy industry and construction of new, geographically expanded, pro­
ductive capacity, were the major characteristics of the strategy. Just 
as the goals were stated, it was obvious that post-war conditions could 
only support high levels of economic performance within limited goals. 
Reconstruction of industry, agriculture, and social infrastructure were 
badly needed. In particular, concerns were expressed that the antici­
pated rates of economic performance could not be met with the existing 
labor force.
Characteristics of the Labor Force. Problems with the labor 
supply emerged in the post-war period as an objective condition, 
and received much attention during the 1950s. The set of problems 
could not be reversed: the war left a huge dent in the structure 
of the population. Massive losses had been incurred by males 
between the ages of 18 and 35 —  those normally expected to form cadres.
The total population of the Soviet Union has been calculated 
at 173 million in 1945, but there were further losses due to the 
after-effects of war and economic priorities.*- In qualitative 
terms, it is known that substantial population losses were sus­
tained between 1945 and 1947, as famine was widespread in the 
countryside. Famine meant that, in addition to delayed economic
recovery due to the loss of lives from starvation and related
i
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diseases, there were also very high levels of infant mortality and 
reduced numbers of births, with attendant implications for long-term 
labor resources. Minor territorial adjustments took place in 1946, 
returning land and 1.4 million residents to Poland. Official estimates 
of the 1950 population, including the Baltic states stand at 178.5 
million.^
Labor force participation increased steadily from the beginning 
of the Five Year Plan, from an estimated 51.6 million in 1928 to
79.6 million in 1940. While data are not available from official 
sources regarding the level of decline in the urban and rural labor 
forces during the war period, Moorstein and Powell estimated that 
by 1945, 74.6 million persons were working, or slightly under the 
number in 1940. Data tell us also that between 1945 and 1948,
the numbers employed in the economy fell precipitously, recovering 
to slightly above the 1940 levels by 1950 or to an estimated
3
80.7 million.
Who were these persons and how were they distributed in the 
economy? For industrial employment, the Moorstein and Powell series 
show that in 1945 there were 30.3 million workers and employees,
33.8 million agricultural workers, and another 10.5 million in the 
military services. The distribution of manpower shifted among these 
sectors between 1945 and 1950, reversing the pre-war claims of
the agricultural sector for the greatest number of workers. By
4
1950, 42.2 million worked in industry and 40 million in agriculture. 
Moreover, the gap widened between the two sectors, so that by 1959,
there were about 17 million more industrial workers than in agri-
5 6
culture. The military, it is noted, were rapidly demobilized.
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Soviet manpower resources are usually calculated from the numbers 
of persons aged 16 to 59 (for men) and 16-54 (for women). Variations 
in actual labor force were common through the years, as retirements 
were delayed, for instance, or as youth entered employment. Roughly- 
calculated, in 1939 approximately 50% of the population were excluded 
from labor by reason of age. If, then, there were an estimated 72 
million actively employed in that year, labor force participation 
was about 75% of the 102 million constituting the resource base.
This was a very high level of participation, indeed.^ It meant that 
in 1939 labor force participation by females was very important, but 
it may have meant also that many youth below the age of 16 were 
working. This would offset any reductions due to disability to the 
numbers-of persons eligible for employment by reason of age.
In 1959, by way of contrast., about 54% or 119.8 million of the
208.8 million population were of working age. If, then, 101.4 
million worked, labor force participation was about 83%. Such a 
participation rate compares favorably with that calculated by 
J. Newth, for instance, who indicated that 71% of persons between 
16-69 worked. Excluding the persons who were over age 59, his
g
data yielded a participation rate of nearly 80%. Again, this does 
not exclude youth and persons eligible for retirement.
How many workers did Soviet planners indicate were required 
for meeting economic goals? In the fourth plan period, of course, 
there is little indication of actual labor requirements in the 
literature. We know that a dominant concern of the period was 
improving the skills of those already employed. Labor increments 
for all sectors were achieved by demobilizing the military. The
i
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fifth plan called for a total increase to the labor force of 1.2
9
million per annum. This was about 50% of the expected rate of 
growth of the adult population. The sixth plan called for an 
increase of 1.3 million per annum.^
In the literature of the period, two approaches to forming 
labor cadres appear to dominate: increased participation in the
work force of persons of working years and increased productivity 
on a per capita basis. Greater participation in the work force 
might have been achieved by:
demobilizing the military.
reducing the size of government bureaucracy, 
increasing the rate at which women entered and remained 
in employment.
encouraging retirees or persons about to retire to remain 
in employment on a full-time or part-time basis.
encouraging rural workers to enter the urban/industrial 
labor force.
directing youth to early employment.
Demobilization of the Armed Services. Reducing the size of 
the military was the first option and it was pursued from 1945, 
when 10.5 million service personnel were reduced to slightly under
3.0 million troops by 1948. In 1950, however, the size of the Soviet 
forces was increased to 4.0 million and was maintained at slightly 
under 4.0 million.^ N. Jasny considered this level of military 
conscription in peace-time detrimental to the formation of needed 
industrial cadres, as it exacerbated problems of low birth rates
/?30s ortqi ^
from the war period. If, on the other hand,, special efforts were
A
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taken for demobilizing post-war military according to education and 
skills, and for assigning veterans to employment, the relative 
success of these efforts has not been explored.
Reducing Government Bureaucracy. As a second alternative, non­
industrial, non-agricultural state employment could have been curtailed 
to bring administrative and military employees into the industrial 
workforce. This option had long-term implications for governmental 
and economic organization. Lacking a comprehensive program for 
restructuring bureaucracy, this was not an immediately feasible option. 
It is possible that even had such a reorganization scheme been avail­
able in the fourth plan period, the numbers of workers released would 
have been unsubstantial. This option was pursued, however, as part 
of the Khrushchev program for decentralization of economic management. 
Such workers formed a high quality resource in comparison to the
general standard of industrial workers, which was 4 years of primary
13
schooling in 1952. According to a RAND report, approximately 7.4
million persons were in the category of "administrative and community
services personnel'' in 1940. That number included 2.9 million
education and 1.6 million public health porkers. Other data show
that government administration was an expanding area of employment
14
in the fourth plan period; but according to M. Feshbach, an 
American demographer, policy shifts caused the numbers to fall by
14a
over 257o (from 1.8 million to 1.3 million) between 1950 and 1958.
Women and Employment. Employment of women in industry and
agriculture assumed critical importance during the war and certain
sectors of professional employment were traditionally dominated by
women. The Soviet Union had long involved women in low-skills
I
occupations and agriculture, and in education and public health. The 
war facilitated entry of proportionately large numbers of women into 
scientific and engineering studies, creating a compensatory factor 
for war losses in a highly educated labor pool.
Labor force participation by women was over 50% for all women
aged 16-55 by 1950.^ Increased employment levels, said A. McAuley,
might have been possible, but probably not in the "prime working
and childbearing years" where his data show employment rates were
16
much higher than national averages. Raising productivity levels 
committed the Soviet leaders to a program of educating and training 
women in different types of occupations and developing a network of 
child-care facilities. Of the two problems, the provision of 
nursery schools and kindergartens received much attention during 
Khrushchev’s tenure. Lack of such programs forced women to remain 
at home 'or (conversely) lowered birth rates as women entered 
employment.
In many areas where participation of women was infrequent, E. 
Manevich observed that the situation resulted from lack of desirable 
or suitable employment.^  Lack of job opportunities was common, 
for instance, in one-industry towns. The situation was complicated 
by labor regulations which precluded hiring women for especially 
strenuous or high risk jobs. Resolving the problem came head-on 
against the investment policies of the post-war governments. During 
these years, much new industrial capacity was in areas located near 
to raw materials (e.g., in the east). To resolve the issue of 
women's employment in such circumstances, it was necessary to develop 
diversified industrial centers. Moreover, despite laws prohibiting
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hiring women -ior such settings as underground mining, nightwork, and
heavy labor, it was not an issue of simply proscribing such work, but
finding substitute workers for the women who had taken the jobs
during the war. Khrushchev noted that the problem of women and youth
in proscribed occupations still existed as late as 1957, and he
18
supported terminating such employment.
Retired Persons. A further option was in encouraging retirees or 
persons eligible for retirement to return to or to remain in the work 
force. It was an option having obvious near-term limitations. This 
was an important resource, nonetheless, as such individuals required 
no additional training and could be expected to have relatively high 
levels of productivity. Unlike other manpower sectors and in the
absence of changes to the retirement age, retention of persons---
eligible for retirement relied on incentives to work. About 2 million 
persons became eligible for retirement each year during the 1950s.
Of these, it is thought that up to one-third continued in employment. 
Pensions were low and many elected to work for financial reasons. 
Kolkhozniki did not receive pensions, so that their retirement was 
dependent on family support or that of the collective farm. Generally, 
retirement data refer to non-agricultural, civilian employees and 
wage-earners in manufacturing and government service.^
Part-Time Employment. It is possible to require or to encourage 
individuals to assume part-time work in addition to their regular 
duties. Mandatory labor is required under Soviet labor law in periods 
of national emergency. Post-war reconstruction of housing, schools, 
agriculture, and many social services depended heavily on "voluntary 
labor contributions" and redirection of personnel to such tasks.
%
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Additional labor was not a reasonable proposition for many.
While the law stipulated in 1940 that the work day was 8 hours,
6 days per week, it has been calculated that the average in the
20
post-war period was 8.5 hours per day or greater. This remained
the case until the 1950s when efforts were undertaken to ease the
employment condition with a five-day work week and fewer hours
21
of work obligation. Khrushchev's program for labor reform was
only gradually implemented. In academic life, multiple posts were
the rule at higher educational levels due to personnel shortages,
22and there was not relief in sight throughout the decade.
Transfer of Rural Workers to Industry. The economic program
2
of the post-war Stalinist period emphasized industrial investment.
Government's position was that agriculture could recover without
extensive public support, drawing on private capital accumulated
during the war years. Several factors precluded the rapid recovery
of agriculture:
famine in the countryside due to poor planting, reduced
acreage under cultivation, and increased levels of commodity
acquisition by government;
low levels of technology availability, lack of maintenance
and replacement of equipment in the pre-war period (which together
eroded the technological base for farming); and
shifts in agricultural manpower from a male-dominated
workforce to one dependent on women.
Governmental policies which drew on rural populations for
industrial workers had to compensate for these factors. Moreover,
the local soviets had the right (a) of veto over applications by
%
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kolkhozniki for visas to leave the farms and (b) for selecting those
entering the Labor Reserve.. Between 1946 and 1950, data show that
over 70% of the 3.4 million Labor Reserve intakes were drawn from
rural areas, but that fewer than .5 million were trained for MTS 
24
cadres. Central authorities allowed some increments to rural
employment until 1950 —  a temporary six million growth which was
25
offset between 1951 and 1954 by reductions totalling 3 million.
From 1955, agricultural employment was held at 40 million (or
26
approximately the 1940 level for agricultural employment). In
effect, therefore, the natural increases to adult rural population.
were siphoned away to industrial and other employment sectors.
Youth Employment. Finally, an important alternative was in
directing youth to early employment. In the period up to 1950,
it may be expected that very large numbers of youth were employed.
Government programs attempted maximizing the efficiency of employed
persons by directing them to training programs. Labor Reserve
recruitment expanded to supply cadres for projects of national
priority. However, while legal restrictions on youth employment
were relaxed during the war, these were gradually strengthened
in the fourth plan period. From 1944, youth under the age of
16 years and normally expected to attend school were allowed to
27work 4 hours per day, plus an hour of over-time. In 1956,
labor laws restricted employment of children below the age of 15
28
yeras (outside agriculture) and prohibited over-time. In the
early post-war period, national education goals required seven
years of education. However, complete secondary studies of ten




directing youth to work was confronted with considerable obstacles.
In the second instance, Labor Reserve training was regarded as
an effective way of mobilizing youth to priority industrial areas
and of offering job training to semi-skilled labor standard. The
30
fourth plan required 4.5 million youth to be trained by 1950.
The fifth plan was similarly ambitious. Throughout the 1950s, improve­
ment in courses and broadened scope bf training opportunities were 
important concerns. In particular, the standard of training for 
some programs was brought to skilled levels, while other programs 
were based on ten years of general education.
Many sought the educations and training which had been interrupted 
during the war. Keeping such persons in the labor force caused the 
authorities to offer part-time and correspondence courses, effectively 
creating parallel systems of education to the general school system.
In the period up to the mid-1950s, considerable pressures were 
generated by the sheer numbers of over-aged persons who sought 
education. However, relative to formation of cadres, war-delayed 
educations emerged as a serious issue because many youth studied 
during years normally devoted to full-time employment. The corres­
ponding expansion of education programs in these early- post-war years 
created a precedent for greater numbers of youth to continue beyond 
the secondary level. Further, J. Newth showed that from the mid-1950s,
birth rates}coupled with hi
30a
1947^ reduced the numbers of youth aged 15-16 to about 50% of normal.
The 1959 census showed a deficit of over 11 million in the age group 
§-15 years, so that the deficit in unskilled labor would continue.
Thus, no resolution to labor shortages was to be found in the population
i
c Lyi I s o\^ ?
?h 1Lnfant mortalities between 1942 and
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unless redirection of youth to employment was exercised as an option 
at the expense not only of higher education, but also secondary 
schooling.
Labor Productivity. From the 1930s, "labor productivity" was a 
key term for industrial managers and economic planners. In each of 
the pre-war five year plans and in the post-war Khrushchev program, 
substantial increments to economic growth were dependent on increased . 
per capita output. This was not a simple solution and the term masks 
a number of complex issues such as assessing the geographic distribution 
of labor and rationalizing the labor pattern, streamlining employment 
practices and applying strict qualifications for hiring personnel, 
increasing the levels of mechanization and technology, and restruc­
turing the organization of production within the enterprise.
Information on which to base many necessary decisions was not
available in the 1950s. Stalin had promoted policies which eliminated
much research from which to formulate employee-management ratios
and expansion of related training and education. In the 1930s,
the Commissariat of Labor was abolished. This eliminated research
in such areas as demography, the scientific organization of labor
and its administration, information on employment practices, and
the utilization of labor resources, and it precluded resolution
31
of the manpower issue by such manipulations. Both Stalin and 
Khrushchev preferred investment in new development schemes, so 
that prospects for rapid improvement in the general level of mech­
anization were correspondingly reduced.
In compensation, the education system was used as an 
instrument for regulating labor supplies to industry. The use
i
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of the education systems for this purpose (largely by economic minis­
tries whose responsibilities for specialized education allowed them 
access to graduates) was inefficient. Managers continued recruiting 
workers directly from universities and technical schools, while some
enterprises hoarded excessive workers in anticipation of difficulties
32
in securing adequate staff. Reportedly, recruitment of workers by
industry frequently led graduates to work outside their areas of
academic qualification.
Education programs were confronted with difficulties in responding
to employers. Placement of graduates tended to be with enterprises
which sponsored pre-employment training. Since education programs
were concentrated geographically, assignments to locations away from
the education facility were difficult. Eventually, educators joined
industrial managers in promoting regional expansion of the higher 
33
education system.
In 1948, Gosplan assumed formal responsibility for planning and
34allocating higher and specialized secondary graduates. This left 
a substantial free labor market, as only a small portion of youth 
were assigned to posts through the Labor Reserve, the other institu­
tionalized placement system. The majority of new employees received 
on-site training. During the 1950s, employment of youth was difficult 
because expanding mandatory general education to ten years reduced 
the labor pool of unskilled workers. Moreover, once industry got
hold of the secondary graduates, it was often found that the student's
35
technological acumen and technical skills were still very low.
The circumstances prompted renewed attention to the Soviet 
education system as it related to manpower formation. For higher
i
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education, concerns were voiced about the geographic distribution of
programs relative to the location of industry outside the urban cen-
terms. For general education, the issue was the link between education
and job readiness. For the Labor Reserve, the breadth of the training,
the types of programs, and the competence of the graduates were focal
points of reforms. There were also longstanding difficulties with
relevance of texts and the adequacy of teacher qualifications,
physical plant, and equipment.
Feshbach discussed motivations for reforms in education in a
slightly different way. He indicated that by the 1950s, Soviet
planners realized that labor was no longer a "free commodity" --
that is, increased numerical scarcity, regional shortages, skills
shortages, worker's preferences, and production bottlenecks had
to be taken into account. The specifics of education became more
36
important than previously had been the case.
In essence, the Soviet authorities had two choices and each
involved significant change. The first option required extensive
study of labor resources, utilization of labor, and other sensitive
indicators of the efficiency of manpower utilization in the economy.
It would involve restructuring industry according to a more detailed
understanding of labor resources, appropriate levels of mechanization,
technological modernization, and an equitable distribution of
resources on a sectoral and regional basis. However, near-term
labor constraints and production shortfalls were unlikely to be
resolved in this way.
The second option would increase both labor force participation
and per capita productivity. By turning to secondary students as the
i
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remaining, largely untapped, sector of the manpower base, the numerical 
problem might be resolved. Raising the rate of labor force participa­
tion by students required restructuring the education experience for 
accommodating production training. It meant that there must be increased 
reliance on part-time and correspondence studies, selective eligibility 
criteria for each type of education/training program, and courses at 
higher standard. Higher labor productivity among new workers meant 
authorities must turn their attention to reducing time between employ­
ment and production work, and to establishing links more dlosely to 
the skills required in the labor setting. This option constituted a 
low-cost alternative within the bounds of political and ideological 
realities, and it allowed time for constructing a general economic 
organization which could make use of long-term manpower options.
Political and Ideological Factors
Investigations of potential reforms in Soviet education had to 
cope with certain realities. First, the system had to conform to 
the prevailing notion of "collective good", which refers to the set 
of social and economic priorities promoted by the sitting government. 
Second, the concept of collective good which prevailed under Stalin's 
leadership was not the same as that which seemed to have characterized 
the transitional Malenkov government or which was promoted by Khrushr 
chev. Third, during the Khrushchev period, not only did the concept 
of collective good change, but the type of leadership which was 




The notion of collective good, as it pertained to education,
seemed to achieve under Stalin's leadership only a tenuous status.
Immediate economic priorities and goals dominated all decisionmaking,
although rudimentary literacy —  achieved with minimal investment —
added to economic potential. Even in the post-war period, Stalin
held on to the idea that all progress in the cultural, consumer,
and education spheres must be spin-offs from investment in heavy 
37industry. Under Malenkov, the pressures generated by years of 
agricultural and socio-cultural mismanagement were still coupled 
with the instability of the Party in the face of war losses, post­
war political purges, and the death of Stalin. Previous orientations 
for development of heavy industry at the expense of other sectors 
were complicated by an uneasy awareness that political stability had 
to be reinforced by attention to a broader spectrum of concerns.
Under Khrushchev, de-Stalinization and rationalization of 
economic priorities were the initial justification for precipitous 
policy changes. However, a convincing justification for later policy 
courses (including changes in education) was presented a movement
toward communism from conditions of socialism and as a return to 
38
Leninist values. Demands for expansion of the labor force and 
for development of intellectual supports for decentralized industry 
found another justification in the prevailing acceptance of revol­
utionary (as opposed to evolutionary) change.
There were certain areas of social and cultural policies which 
all three leaderships did not wish to infringe. Such policies were 
the explicit goals of universal secondary education and wider access 
to higher education. Under pressure to address economic difficulties,
i
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a link was presumed between education and economic progress, even
though the connection remained unsatisfactorily demonstrated,
especially in regard to per capita productivity at various levels
of educational attainment. Educators in the post-war period
returned to the concept of polytechniosieducation as a bridge between
intellectual development and application of knowledge. It was a
sensitive point whether polytechnic^education would itself abrogate
the rights of youth for secondary education.
The problem facing post-war leadership was that the objective
necessity for economic reform came up against the need for deciding
the form and style of future Party involvement in governmental
decisionmaking. It is believed that Malenkov's leadership would
have continued the Stalinist mechanics of government, even though
39
the policy choices were clearly different. Khrushchev, on the 
other hand, supported collective leadership of the Party, de­
centralized economic decisionmaking, identification of the Party 
with economic performance, and a whole host of concepts concerning 
personal and political responsibilities.
There were strong political and ideological overtones along 
with economic considerations in the educational and social changes 
taken during Khrushchev's tenure. He was convincing in his belief 
that the country was evolving into communism, and he was fond of
stating that no policy directive could get around the need for
40
hard work to accomplish the transition. He seemed to have 
embraced the notion that while governmental policies must address 
consumer needs, individuals had to share in the benefits, risks, 
and responsibilities associated with such priorities.
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If creating a balance among political and ideological orienta­
tions with the economic realities of the period were the corner­
stone of the Khrushchev reforms, this is well demonstrated by the 
parasite laws of the 1950s. Regional development of extractive 
industries had been athieved through the use of forced labor. Such 
labor options were not pursued during the de-Stalinization years. 
However, students, unemployed and waiting for opportunities for 
higher education in fields and locations of their choice, were
deemed anti-social, non-productive dependents of society, and were
41
made subject to state intervention. In justification for the new
law, Khrushchev pointed to demands for labor and opportunities for
42
education in regional establishments. By banning "parasitism", 
he pushed an unknown number of youth into early employment, others 
into regional development, and reiterated personal responsibilities 
to the State. Khrushchev also fostered a pool of forced labor in 
compensation for former cadres formed in this way.
Polytechnic!Education in the Post-War Era
In the reconstruction years, renewed emphasis on polytechnical
education provided an opportunity for planners and educators to
reassess the contents of general education. Until 1950, most
activities in education were devoted to reconstructing plant and
achieving the general standard of seven years schooling. Parallel
education and training systems compensated for gaps in technical
competence among existing cadres. While the Labor Reserve, schools
for working and peasant youth, special agricultural training,
correspondence courses, and part-time higher education allowed
*
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man y to study, there were qualitative uncertainties concerning new 
graduates. Given that mandates for economic development were tied 
to increased labor productivity, which was dependent on workers’ 
technical skills, such uncertainties were untenable.
Polytechnics!education was largely a rhetorical concept at the 
end of the 1930s. Various systems .purporting to be polytechnic?/in 
nature had failed or were deemed socially undesirable. For example, 
the system of school laboratories promoted in the 1930s had not 
succeeded due to cost, lack of coherent programs, and an insufficient 
number of trained instructors; and programs involving child labor 
were in conflict with child labor restrictions. Educators, under 
pressure from industry to produce graduates ready for work in 
factories, identified three areas for improvement: inculcation
of collectivist spirit and purpose; familiarity with the basic 
vocabulary of technology; and development of practical illustra­
tions of academic concepts.
The collectivist spirit and purpose of general education is also 
illustrated in discussions in the late 1940s and early 1950s of 
A.S. Makarenko’s work. Through the period, educators pointed out 
that it is during childhood that values important to industry, 
defense, and society are assimilated. Such values could be strength­
ened by connecting general education to work situations, by bringing 
individuals into an awareness of his role in the collective (e.g., 
work environment), and by instituting discipline and regulations 
complementary to the goals of the collective. It was observed 
during the early 1950s debates on the ideological content of 




satisfactorily integrated education with labor training.
Educators, even those supporters of Makarenko's technique of 
education within the modern setting, preferred an approach to 
polytechnic^education which was not disruptive to the process of 
academic learning and which would be accomplished by means of practi­
cal illustrations of basic concepts and by exposure to technological 
44
vocabulary. Some felt that academic training, based as it was on
presentation of fundamental, abstract concepts in several disciplines,
was incompatible with applied technology/labor training. From this
perspective, illustrating academic studies with practical examples
(e.g., discussions of electric power during the course on physics)
was sufficient. Extra-curriculacwork, such as summer employment
45
of senior secondary pupils, was the appropriate link to labor.
Alternative discussions of polytechnic^education ranged from
arguments for special technology courses or applied sciences to
those which simply produced skilled workers. In the first instance,
the discussion was led by M.N. Skatkin, a member of the RSFSR
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Skatkin supported the notion of
46
a separate technology course. The course would include such 
concepts as history of machine technology, technology of production, 
internal conbustion, technologies associated with particular 
industries or energy production, the economics of industry, and 
industrial organization. Skatkin acknowledged problems with 
"internal logic" of previous courses and with establishing systema­
tic progression through the grades. He claimed, however, that the 
objections to such a course would be resolved once problems of 
logic and method were resolved. ^
%
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The steps Skatkin said were preconditions for developing poly- 
technicsleducation were adopted during the 1950s. The fifth plan 
required polytechnic^concepts to be introduced in secondary schools 
and for steps to be taken for expanding the concepts to all grade 
levels In 1952, a Pravda article called for precise instructions 
on polytechnic*!education, and in 1953 Skatkin and Melnikov published
a book on polytechnics!education promoting the new approach to
48
education. In 1954 and 1955, there were changes in texts and
curricula, experimental courses in technology, and use of laboratories
and workshops within the science programs. Skatkin's concept required
general education to be supplemented with special training after
graduation. Instilling the labor ethic and teaching technological
literacy were its sole purpose. Such a course was important in a
country where the general standard of education in the workforce
49
was not at seven years of general schooling.
Specialized theoretical training had achieved a considerable 
constituency, especially among planners and within industry. For 
example, the Labor Reserve could supply labor training in a variety 
of special areas, was theoretically adaptable to industrial needs 
at demand, and could mobilize large numbers of workers within short 
periods of time Other specialized education programs (which 
were conducted on a part-time basis) did not interrupt production.
The short-coming of purely specialized training was that theoretical " 
grounding required industry to provide extensive retraining of workers 
when there were changes in technique or machinery Presumably, 




How many individuals with all-round general and technical 
educations would be absorbed in the economy, and what was the 
trade-off in economic terms with reliance on retraining rather 
than general education at the outset? Such questions, requiring 
sophisticated understanding of manpower utilization* could not 
be answered in the 1950s. The Soviet leadership took the view 
until 1957 or so that polytechnics!education (e.g , technical 
literacy) was preferable, especially from a social perspective. 
Stalin, for instance, said that polytechnics!education "would free 
workers to choose their occupations and not to remain tied to a 
single job for life".'^ This general preference was tempered by 
reality —  the fourth and fifth economic plans envisaged strength­
ening specialized secondary programs and the Labor Reserve alongside 
the expanded general school network.^
From 1954, general reforms in Soviet education took particular
care to emphasize that the polytechnics!content of course-work would
52
not reduce the academic nature of secondary education. This turned 
out not tp.tie strictly true, as the reforms marginally increased
hours in the upper grades for science and mathematics and reduced
53
those for humanities. The new curricula stressed within science
and mathematics the practical applications of concepts, and it was
largely for this reason that the feforms were justified as poly- 
54technical. Later, it was observed that rapid changes in curricula 
for polytechnics/purposes were "destabilizing and created problems 
in the corresponding abilities of teachers for cpping with the new 
m a t e r i a l s " W h i l e  changes in pedagogical training were suggested, 
and indeed later implemented, the benefits could not be immediately
I
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realized in the classroom.
Changes in the 1953 curricula for the general schools involved 
students in manual labor at the schools (grades 1-4), obligatory 
practical training in school workshops (grades 5-7), and compulsory
practical work in-;.agriculture, machine driving, and electronics
- "56 ).
(grades 8-10). .An article in Uchitelskaya gazeta said:.
All these experiences will give the pupils an opportunity 
for systematic acquisition during their secondary program 
of the habits associated with manual work It will give 
them certain technical skills useful in agriculture. It 
will acquaint the children with construction and handling 
of machine tools and the machines which are most commonly 
used in production (the lathe, the engine, the ekctric 
motor, automobiles, tractors, and the like). Additionally, 
it will teach them how to carry out simple electrical and 
radio assembly.57
In 1 9 5 5 senior pupils ware to work in industrial settings, farms
or the MIS,'’0 This was a major policy deviation from the activities
envisaged in Skatkin’s 1947 article. Thera was no theoretical
training associated with the practical work. Students were issued
labor books, worked 6 hours par day, and production was calculated
59
at adult norms reduced by 25%. Student assignments of 40 days
60
par year were common. There is some indication, however, that in 
some areas there simply ware no opportunities for placing students
in local industry, so that implementation of the requirement was
u ui ^Oaprobably uneven.
The course, "Principles of Production", recommended by Skatkin, 
was incorpora tad into the curriculum for polytach&icsl instruction from 
1954. A 1955 article in Uchitelskaya gazata, written by I.A Kairov, 




The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences took part ia working 
out the curricula for general schools within th© Ministry 
of Education. Ia examining study plans and programs for 
secondary schools, we proceeded from the fact that the aew 
curricula should be introduced gradually, without a sharp 
break ia the existing system ef training. Recently, we 
worked out a draft sf aew study plans which envisage the 
solution of a number of questions of future polytechnic**! 
training ia the general schools. The study plans include 
a course ©a principles of production.
Later ia the article, Kairov autliaed the tasks of the Academy far
the subsequent period. Among them were checking sa the new study
plans and establishing the study programs and the system of knowledge
and skills for studies ia modern industry and agriculture. He said:
The third problem the Academy is about to consider is 
the organization and methods of polytechaicaiiastructios..
This problem includes working out such questions as methods 
of familiarizing students with the principles ©f technology 
ia physic*, chemistry, natural sciences, etc., and the 
principles of industrial orgav.izatiss and methods of working 
with students in the fifth to eighth grades in shops and 
gardens, and the organization and methods of production 
practice, and the pedagogical principle af secialiy-usefui 
work by students.
If anything, th* goals of the Academy and th* introduction of summer 
employment of senior students pointed to diverging paths in education 
theory. . The Kairov article was a certain indication that basic 
problem* in determining the natura of polytechnic^instruction still 
preoccupied leading theorists. Throughout the 1956 academic year, 
experiments were conducted in the Russian and Ukrainian schools
tasting new textbooks and study programs, which ware different for
62
rural and urban contexts. Even so, experiments were decidedly 
lass than full commitment to polytechnic^oducatisa. It is aotawertay 
that the- courses mentioned by Kairsv had shifted from the broad 
introductory course envisaged by Skatkin to one esaaatially 
concerned with the acquisition ®f practical skills.
I
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At the time of the 20th Party Congress, the general instructions 
did not envisage more than "continued development" toward polytechnical 
education:
At the same time, the Congress noted serious deficiencies 
in the area of cultural programs. In the work of the 
schools, the greatest problem is the gulf between education 
and life, an the insufficient preparation of school 
graduates for practical endeavors. For the quickest 
realization of polytechnics! instruction, it is necessary to 
introduce a new course, giving basic information about 
the questions of industrial and agricultural development, 
and to associate the student with work in enterprises, 
kolkhoz, and state farms through experiments in observation 
and in school workshops.63
The ambiguity of these instructions was offset by the straight­
forwardness of Khrushchev's statement to the Congress:
The shortcoming of the school is that it is divorced 
from life. Graduates are not prepared for practical 
work. Progress toward polytechnics!education is very 
slow. There is too much talk and too little action.
We need new courses giving them fundamental knowledge 
of production and accustoming students to working.
Curricula in the secondary school must be re-drawn 
to include greater specialisation.64
Khrushchev's use of the term "greater specialisation" by secondary
students signalled the beginning of a debate which lasted until the
^1959 school reforms. Essentially, the split was between academic/
polytechnical literacy and technical specialisation/streaming in
the senior secondary grades. To follow the debates in polytechnics!
education, it is useful to turn to the reforms in general and
higher education which took place throughout the 1950s, and to
discuss their practical implications for manpower planning.
Changes in Higher and General Education Policies
Little attention was paid to the qualitative features of education
*
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in the pre-war period. The sheer magnitude of work required to create 
the legal and institutional framework for the system, build schools, 
and supply teaching materials and teachers absorbed the attention of 
policymakers. Reconstruction tasks nearly equalled the magnitude of 
pre-war efforts in constructing the syston, but educators tended to 
presume that the system had sufficient momentum to effect revitaliza­
tion. Educators and policymakers looked beyond the immediate recon­
struction tasks to compensating through qualitative improvements for 
quantitative losses in manpower.
Efforts linking education more closely to economic priorities were 
justifications for:
reorganizing the institutional frameworks for higher 
and technical education.
developing parallel systems at similar educational levels;
and
steamlining courses.
Reorganization of Higher Education. Efforts to upgrade nigher and
technical education began in 1946 with the creation of the USSR Ministry
65
of Higher Education. This was a period in which there was general 
governmental reorganization. The creation of the Ministry seemed to be 
an organizational improvement for purposes of accounting and account­
ability. In the years from 1947, there were important changes in 
higher education which seemed to be related to the fact that the 
Ministry competed with the economic ministries for resources, justifying 
its claims to financial ana personnel resources on the basis of 
tangible contributions by education to economic development.
I
Justifications by higher education to resources emerged in several 
ways. Higher education had assumed the responsibilities for-determin­
ing the numbers of places in universities, institutes and colleges,
66
and for assigning graduates to post-graduation employment. While
this was not efficient relative to manpower planning per se, much
less for allocating manpower, responding to the needs of industry
for personnel led higher education to streamline its programs into
broader disciplines, ostensibly to weed out irrelevant, duplicative,
*
and outdated courses. It led also to a re-evaluation of the distri­
bution of facilities and faculties according to a pattern of industrial 
development and to abolish tuition fees.
In relation to academic concentrations, articles appeared from 
the late 1940s whii-h illustrate the pressures which forced the link­
ages between education and economic priorities. For example, in 
1949, Z. Kaftanov, the USSR Minister of Higher Education, urged raised 
re«iu.'i*v,*v\«.inTjs in There was Mtoo much
67
theory and too littie practical usefulness of the current programs” .
In this regard, he also sought to improve economics training of 
engineering personnel, so that engineers would understand the economic 
advantages, as well as technical merits of projects under consideration.
In 1952, higher education was called on to "resolve problems of tech­
nical progress”, a theme which was to be reiterated time and again in 
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the 1950s. Reforms in education curricula were effected during
1956, and an article in Vestnik vysshei shkoly made the following
observations:
One of the basic shortcomings of the old curricula 
for a number of university fields was the fact that 
they essentially provided for the training of special-
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ists with extremely narrow qualifications. In drawing 
up the curricula, insufficient consideration was given 
to the fact that university graduates must be ready 
for work... Thus, one of the most important problems 
solved by the new curricula is the creation of objective 
conditions for turning out specialists with broad 
qualifications, who have mastered the fundamentals 
of science, and who are prepared for work...
The new fields of study are based on combined disciplines 
which generally do not have specialisations. Fields 
requiring a total of 300-500 hours of study were planned 
in specialisations such as philosophy, physics, geology, 
prospecting, and geophysical prospecting methods... The 
new curricula allows room for elective courses.70
Higher education was placed under great pressure for expanding
geographically. This was especially difficult in the post-war
period, as there were huge shortages of qualified personnel of all
types. Centers for industrial development had emerged in Siberia,
Kazakhstan, and the Urals, and these now desired the intellectual
supports which research facilities and scientists associated with
higher education offered to industry located in European parts of
the country. In his speech to the 19th Party Congress, Malenkov
observed that expansion of higher education geographically was needed
so that industry in these regions could attract permanent cadres.
These were especially cogent reasons for expanding higher
education and from ly54 efforts providing education and scientific
facilities and faculties to eastern areas were given prominent
attention in the press. At the outset of the expansion drive, course
offerings were tied to fields of economic development in the location
of the facility.^ Permanent higher education institutions appeared
after the mid-1950s, and efforts attracting qualified scientists
and researchers voluntarily away from the urban academic centers were
justifications for investments in research facilities with advanced
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technology which were also placed in outlying regions.
It was the demand for geographic expansion and the need for 
replacing war-time personnel losses which prompted the development 
of part-time and correspondence programs„ Expanding these forms 
of education was a way to intensify use of existing faculties and 
for accommodating additional students. Such programs, on the other 
hand, catered to the wishes of many academics who wanted to remain 
in major urban centers. Thus, part-time education was usually 
linked to urban students, while the correspondence courses were 
offered to the rural or regionally-based personnel. From 1956, 
Khrushchev picked up the theme of decentralising higher education, 
and in a particularly pointed statement, he suggested that agricul­
tural instituted should be relocated near to actual farms, in
73
rural areas, and linked with agricultural production. The more
compelling reason for geographic expansion, however, may have been
the need for raising academic competence of management cadres,
74
especially the praktiki. Higher education could then claim a 
significant contribution to increased productivity levels in industry, 
and to have had an important part in accomplishing economic targets.
The strength of the ties between education and economic priorities 
was strong, but the methods for accomplishing them were apparently tied 
to Khrushchev’s rise to power. The USSR Ministry of Higher Education 
was subjected not only to economic pressures, but also to political 
realignments. In 1953, the Ministry was downgraded to a Main 
Administration on Higher Education, subject to the Ministry of 
Culture. According to DeWitt, this was accomplished for purely 
political reasons, as Khrushchev had the support of the Minister of
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Culture in his bid for p o w e r . T h i s  view is supported by a similar
change in the status of the Labor Reserve, another of Khrushchev's
preferred training vehicles, and during this period it also absorbed
7 6responsibility for mechanization of agriculture schools. This 
suggests a possible motive was insulating the emphasis on technical 
training and expansion of education from other political concerns.
The higher education apparatus emerged as the All-Union Ministry of 
Higher Education in 1954, and following the decentralization program
T
was changed to the Union-Republie Ministry of Higher Education in 1955.
Khrushchev had plans for education which were clearly ideologically
motivated. In 1956, he called forj admissions- Hios-e--
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with prior production experience. The policy was adopted slowly and 
unevenly. Problems emerged immediately with high failure and dropout 
rates.^ Some programs initiated tutorials in compensation for inade­
quate preparation of worker-students, but the policy remained contro- 
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versial. In 1958, a statement reiterated the policy for preferential
treatment of workers:
As in 1957, preference will be given to persons with 
two years of favorably rated practical work in industry, 
agriculture, or other branches of the economy, culture, 
or the armed services. Military veterans will be 
admitted on a non-competitive basis... Up to 80%, of 
admissions will be on a non-competitive basis. 20% 
of positions will be reserved for new secondary graduates.
Medalists and honor students of specialised education, 
who are in the top 5% of their graduating class, qualify 
for preferential treatment.81
This brings the dis cussion of higher education reforms to the 
point just prior to the 1958 reforms. Before presenting the reform 
package itself, which was linked to changes in secondary and other 
training areas, the discussion turns to changes in secondary education 
and labor training. Changes prior to the general school reforms
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in 1958 seem to have sought to establish a balance among access to 
various career paths.
Changes in General Education. The keys to general education in 
the period 1945-1953 were expanded access and accommodation to the 
needs of the economy for manpower. Expansion of education was accom­
plished by reconstrcting schools, removal of Stalinist-era policies 
which were barriers for some, and gradually lengthening the period of 
compulsory schooling. Reconciliation with manpower needs were sought 
through provision of specialised technical training through the Labor 
Reserve and specialised secondary schools, and incorporation of 
mandatory practical work by students, summer emp1oyment, and poly- 
technical instruction in the schools.
Reconstruction. Data are well known for the progress achieved 
by the Soviet government for re-establishing education in the post­
war period. Enrollments in primary education (grades 1-4) were at 
1940 levels by 1946. This was accomplished partly by including in 
enrollments a group of children previously excluded from primary 
schooling. From 1946, seven year-olds attended first grade. In 
addition, enrollments were strengthened by accommodating over-age 
youth whose educations had been delayed during war.and by occupation. 
Rural primary education, however, never regained 1939 enrollment 
levels due to war losses, skewed sexual composition of the rural 
population, and migration toward urban centers. Junior secondary 
education (grades 5-7) reached pre-war levels by 1950, and general
seven-year enrollments embraced the universe of age-eligibles by the 
82mid-decade. Senior secondary enrollments attained the 1940 levels 
by 1951, but in so stating it must be noted that under 15% of
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children aged 15-17 could have been enrolled, and the percentage is
considerably reduced if one accounts for war-delayed educations.
Indeed, Bereday said that over-age students dominated secondary educa-
83
tion between 1952 and 1955. Students in specialised secondary 
programs attained 1940 enrollments by 1945, and exceeded enrollments 
in general secondary programs from 1946.
Reconstruction of physical plant followed a slightly different 
course than enrollments. Primary schools were provided without 
apparent difficulty. The numbers of schools accommodating grades 
1-4 were at pre-war levels by 1946. Thio did not mean, however, that 
physical conditions were satisfactory but only that buildings were 
provided for sheltering the school programs. The numbers of buildings 
for grades 1-7 were at pre-war levels by 1948, while the upper second­
ary school facilities did not reach pre-war levels until 1952. One 
may presume that physical plant kept pace with primary school 
enrollments after 1*46. DeWitt, for example, suggested that secondary
education expansion was facilitated by declining elementary school 
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enrollments. - Indeed, problems to provide physical plant were at 
first dependent on voluntary labor. Noah said that in the mid-1950s, 
the dependence on voluntary supports was complicated by relaxed 
requirements for labor-day contributions and disorganization in the 
construction industry.
Physical plant for junior levels increased rapidly after 1948, 
when the pre-war level was secured. From that point, national policy 
required compulsory seven-year education and spurred on building 
programs in urban areas, in particular. Facilities for ten-year 
education programs and upper secondary grades, specifically, presented
I
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the greatest problem. The lack of facilities necessitated multiple
86
shifts, and the situation was often mentioned in the press. Relief 
of overcrowding in the schools was the purpose of 1958 restrictions
on multiple shifts i n   schools. In rural areas, Khrushchev cited
insufficient attention by kolkhoz leaders to school construction 
responsibilities.
Quality of education is assured not only by enrollments and 
physical plant, but by the availability of teachers and their ere- 
dentials. Needless to say, it may be anticipated that there were 
great losses sustained by teaching cadres during the war. Recovery 
in numbers of teachers on the aggregate for all levels of education
was achieved by 1948, but the ratio of teachers to students improved
- a-i 87 steadily.
Generally, the standard for teacher education was established
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during the war, but the standard was not achieved as late as 1950.
The situation was complicated by changing education requirements
and the availability of different types of education programs. In
1947, for instance, the pedagogical normal school (to complete
secondary levels) was expanded to four years duration, accommodating
89
instruction in native language training. From 1948, efforts were
made for raising the standard of teacher training to 10 years of
general or specialized education, plus pedagogical training to an
90
incomplete higher education. Until 1958, the pedagogical institute
(at complete university levels) was the preferred standard of education
for primary and junior secondary teachers, while university qualifi-
91
cations were the attainment for upper secondary teaching. The 
specialized secondary program for teachers was phased out by the late
I
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1950s, so that training in pedagogical institutes (ostensibly at the
university standard) was the preferred credential for teachers of
92
grades 1-7.
Regardless, both education credentials by teachers and their
specific training was generally regarded as inadequate throughout
93
the period. This was exacerbated by introducing polytechnic^/
instruction in 1952, after which there were frequent complaints
that teachers were not adequately prepared to offer polytechnicsl
instruction. From 1946, teachers relied heavily on the relatively
weak systems of part-time and correspondence studies for upgrading
their qualifications, ana it is unclear if there were specific
requirements in polytechnics! techniques associated with their training.
De-Stalinization. There were two conditions of the Soviet school
under the Stalinist leadership \access to education. The
first was the 1540 regulation creating tuition fees in secondary and
higher education. D. Lane observed that the requirement for tuition
payments was not uniformly applied after the war, and interpreted
94
this as a move to gradually abolish the fees altogether. The fee
95requirement, in fact, was removed in 1956. On the other hand,
the student stipends were raised considerably between 1945 and 1956,
and tuition scholarships had become available so that the financial
burden for most students was significantly less than the initial
impact of the regulations. But the student stipends and other
financial supports were available in amounts differentiated by the
field of study, and for students in fields not designated as national
economic priorities, fees remained at least a partial barrier to
higher education until the 1956 changes. Further, in some cases,
I
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there were taxes levied against scholarships and state stipends, as
96
well as compulsory subscriptions to state loans.
The second factor constraining access to education was the 
continuing emphasis on expansion of urban rather than rural education. 
While this continued throughout the Khrushchev period, policy 
directives adopted at the 20th Party Congress emphasized the enforce­
ment of mandatory education in the republics and among* the minorities. 
Cultural traditions were strong barriers to education programs for 
girls, and physical distances from schools in other areas made 
voluntary compliance with law difficult. Inspections of schools, 
aimed at eradicating non-compliance, with mandatory educational 
requirements, were built into a campaign in the second half of the 
1950s. Typical observations, designed to generate pressures on local 
authorities, were such as the following editorial:
Everything has not been done to fulfill the national 
economic plan for the education of children. Many 
pupils do not attend school in Astrakhan, Ivanov, Kaluga,
Tambov, and other provinces of the RSFSR. True, as a 
result of steps by local organizations, the situation has 
been somewhat corrected.
Universal education is in an extremely unsatisfactory 
state in Uzbekhstan. The number of children enrolled 
is not much better in Azerbaidzhan... What is the 
matter? The main reason is that many school principals 
are resigned to children leaving school and are not 
sufficiently active in raising the problems of education 
before local organizations... Certain executive committees 
are incomprehensively liberal with regard to collective 
farm chairmen who refuse to send to school any child 
engaged in work on the kolkhoz.97
Khrushchev's program also proposed a system of boarding schools
98
to compensate for la«~k of secondary facilities in rural areas.
The'system was proposed in the 1956 Party Congress as a means to ensure 




burdens of supervising youth. This suggestion was greeted with 
lukewarm enthusiasm. In particular, A. Shelepin, who spoke for the 
Komsomol at the Congress, said than boarding schools which offered 
polytechnicafeducation would be important, providing they have 
sufficient, cheap, and interesting equipment, and that the manufac­
turing base in industry was sufficient for supporting continued 
material requirements.^^ Shelepin's comment went to the heart of 
the difficulty encountered by all education programs —  insufficient 
materials for the schools and a lack of willingness on the part of 
government or industry for developing necessary factories.
The Stalinist government had stressed development of urban 
education. This was partly the result of the demographic response 
to the industrial program. Investment in heavy industry was mainly 
in Western regions, and was not until the war that heavy as well as 
extractive industries were an investment priority in the east.
Prior to the war, rural populations migrated to urban centers in 
very large numbers. It was necessary to develop urban education 
to serve industry, as the first priority. At upper levels, it was 
presumed that rural students who desire'd educations would relocate. 
During the war, evacuation of facilities, faculties, and students 
caused the temporary expansion of rural education. Most returned 
west after 1945.
Industrial development priorities changed during the Khrushchev 
leadership. First, reorganization of government placed burdens on 
regional authorities to attract qualified personnel. Second, the 
balance between investing in industry and agriculture shifted some­
what, and the relative importance of trained agricultural workers
i
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increased. Third, industrial managers in outlying areas began seeking 
permanent, technically qualified cadres. The practice of relying on 
temporary personnel was no longer regarded as tenable by industry 
faced with additional productivity requirements, and it was "no longer 
in accordance with the correct placement of specialists in regions". 
While this observation had overtones of importance to nationality- 
policies, it was treated as an objective problem of educational organi­
zation.
In this regard, V. Elyutin, the RSFSR Minister of Education,
said:
The Central Committee pointed to grave shortcomings 
in training by economic regions, specializations, and 
excessive specializations. In the past four years, 40 
higher education institutions have been organized in 
the regions, and there is.a corresponding reduction in 
central cities to allow the increased enrollments in 
the east. Now, we must concentrate on production 
experience as well as general education.102
The concern for the distribution of schools within the regions was
echoed in Komsomolskaya pravda, ana the lack of specializations
among secondary graduates was noted. In particular, the articles
called on correspondence and evening programs for offering training
in new industrial fields.
Governmental response to these demands went through several
stages. First, there was a period up to 1955 when it seemed that the
greatest need was for skilled labor. First, from 1952, decrees
aimed at upgrading the qualifications of MTS and other workers in
agriculture, and a series of agricultural training programs were
established.^^ Then, there was a 1954 decree for improving the
distribution of higher education institutions and for better
105
distributing graduates^in their mandatory work assignments.
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In the second instance, the 1954 order followed on the heels of a
decision for decentralizing governmental decisionmaking, and
satisfying the short-term needs of regional government for qualified
personnel. Finally, there was attention to raising the educational
levels of management praktiki and for training leaders of cadres
recruited for Virgin Lands campaigns and other of the early Khrushchev
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development schemes. In this regard, factory-sponsored part-time
higher and secondary specialized education programs were common.
By the mid-1950s, most students attained a junior secondary
education or some equivalent number of years of education and
training through the Labor Reserve. However, still fewer than 50%
of students progressed to upper secondary levels, so that the
training burden on industry increased enormously. For example,
between 1946 and 1958, the numbers of new workers who received on-
the-job training were nearly 2.5 million per a n n u m . T h e  numbers
who were required to take courses to improve qualifications and to
get new skills also grew —  from 3.2 million in 1946 to 4.4 million 
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in 1958. Additionally, the Labor Reserve graduated over 300,000 
each year between 1951 and 1953, and nearly 700,000 thereafter until
1958. This reflected in part the increased emphasis on agricultural
109
training. Komsomol-sponsored campaigns in support of the Virgin
Lands development also placed additional burdens on local industry
as well as the Labor Reserve for training very large numbers of
110
recruits.
The fact that industry and technical training programs provided 
employment readiness for the majority of youth after the seventh
I
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grade caused some policymakers to question the value of academic 
education beyond the junior secondary level. Nonetheless, even in 
1956, there was no resolution to the question of the nature of 
polytechnic^education and pressures for devising some sort of 
balance between practical skills and academic opportunities led 
to a choice of the former over general studies.
Upper secondary education enrollments steadily increased 
throughout the 1950s, even as diminishing prospects for growth in 
the labor force appeared. In the 1950s, the emphasis on specialized 
secondary enrollments weakened, surprisingly, and after 1955 
general secondary education grew at a much faster pace. The graduates 
of specialized secondary programs, it is noted, had an immediate 
constituency for employment and the probability of a faster incor­
poration into productive labor. Taken together, technical training 
was a forceful counterweight to continued high levels of enrollments 
in general polytechnicaleducation, where the emphasis as late as 1958 
was academic training.
Reforms in Economic Management and Labor Law
The post-war governments issued development programs which
depended significantly on increased levels of worker productivity,
industrial output, lower per unit production costs, and expanded
industrial plant. In gaieral, the programs of the two post-Stalin
governments included regional development coupled with raised levels
111
of mechanisation and application of advanced technologies. Invest­
ment in agriculture was not a priority of Stalin, but G. Malenkov's 
economic program included new attention to investment in farm equipment
|
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manufacturing and changes in the agricultural tax laws. It was hoped
that changes in the agricultural taxes would facilitate achievement
of higher standards of living for rural workers without forcing price 
112
increases. Malenkov's economic program was to be implemented through 
strictly centralized industrial and sectoral ministries, and a 1953 
reform briefly amalgamated existing bureaucracies into a smaller num­
ber of very large administrations.^^
The Khrushchev leadership initiated changes in the structure of 
economic organization and the laws governing the labor force. There 
was movement away from the highly centralized decisionmaking peculiar 
to the 1953 .ministerial structures. The initial problems which 
Khrushchev's reforms attempted to address were conditions within 
agriculture , as the sector was in difficult circumstances from inade­
quate investment, poorly trained cadres, low commodity prices, and 
the extent of manual work. Reorganizations attempted to relieve 
the central authorities of many oversight functions which would be 
assumed by local and republican administrations.
Between 1954 and 1955, there were attempts to rationalize the 
use of natural and manpower resources and to streamline the material
supply system for industry. In 1954, the first of a series of efforts
114
was taken to decentralize economic planning. This first reorgani­
zation was undertaken with awareness that the decentralization would 
create new demands for management cadres —  cadres which were not 
immediately available. Khrushchev acknowledged the situation in a 
statement to the Supreme Soviet:
Breaking the central ministries into smaller units 
must be accomplished in such a way that the number
i
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of employees in the new system will not exceed the 
number of personnel in the former ministries. There 
is likely to be opposition to this approach from the 
new ministries. We must approach the situation with 
care. In particular, we must increase the responsi­
bilities for each official at all levels of plan 
fulfillment.
In the process of separating economic planning functions, it
was decided that existing personnel from both Gosplan and the central
industrial ministries would follow the functions into the regional 
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apparatus. Khrushchev viewed the opportunity to decentralize 
planning as a way of raising simultaneously the standard of industrial 
management. As a result, many administrators found themselves working 
on enterprise production p r o b l e m s . T h e s e  decentralization decisions 
generated demands for highly trained managers, for personnel trained in 
the economics of their technical disciplines, ana for improved regional 
educational and research facilities.
Pressures for developing educational and research programs as 
backup for industry were strengthened by similar demands from agri­
culture. It is not possible to state categorically that demands for 
training were more critical for the one sector than the other, but 
it is certain that the leadership recognized that the agricultural 
economy suffered from acute shortages of qualified managers. During 
this period, kolkhoz, MTS, and Party personnel were required to 
improve oversight and coordination of agriculture, and those personnel 
were encouraged to participate in programs for upgrading their 
technical skills.
Numerous articles appeared in the Soviet press exhorting changes 
in the availability of specialist training. In one such discussion, 
E'lyutin responded to the pressures, claiming that planning for manpower
I
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and the required training programs was most difficult. While desirable 
ratios of specialists with higher education to those with lesser levels 
of training had been established (theoretical models) in the 1930s, 
projections of manpower requirements even over a five or six year span 
could not be developed from estimated short-term needs. Further, 
numbers of personnel required in industrial employment and the rele­
vant pre-employment qualifications for identified slots remained un­
certain. That uncertainty, Elyutin said, impeded the progress of 
educational expansion. He also noted the need for providing short 
programs to general secondary graduate-S which would turn generalists 
into technical specialists.
If decentralization created pressures for the educational system, 
changes in labor laws generated more. Rationalization of the wage
structure according to work norms and industrial priorities was
120
promised from 1955. There were increases in wages, implemented
by economic sector, over a period of several years. The uneven
implementation of wage reforms produced additional instability in
the labor market. When in 1956 restrictions on job changes were
formally lifted, there were high levels of labor turnover and 
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migration. Feshbach, for instance, noted that the turnover was
calculated at 38% for industrial workers, but the estimate obscured
higher incidences of labor turnover for some industrial sectors and 
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regions. Voluntary labor turnover, of course, was limited to some 
extent by the numbers of jobs available in desirable situations 
(determined by wages, perks, and location), but the exodus from 
regional administrations and enterprises to urban centers clearly 




employment. But the 1956 law allowed job switches not only between 
enterprises and geographically, but in occupations. This type of 
turnover, presumably significant at the time, would have intensified 
problems for planners in calculating appropriate expansion of educa­
tion. Finally, changes in the hours of mandatory work obligation 
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started in 1956. Dewar quoted an article in Voprosy ekonomiki
which estimated that a reduction from the 48 hour work week to the
42 hour work week (even implemented over a five year period) would
yield J «^% reduction in available labor. She went on to say that
the plan for reducing the 4S hour week to 40 hours of work obligation
would equal a 16.6% reduction to the labor supply over the seven
125year period of its implementation.
There is also reason for believing that increased pension levels
for persons of retirement age may have encouraged many of the lower
paid workers to take retirement rather than to continue in employment.
Data in this regard are not plentiful. Of the approximately 2 million
workers who became eligible for retirement each year, Feshbach
indicated that one-third continued in the work force for some period 
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of time. D. Granick, an economist from the University of
, indicated that between 24 and 29% of retirement-aged
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men and women continued working for up to five years. Granick
regarded this as a relatively low rate of participation for persons
between the ages of 60 and 65, even though this apparently was a
consistent figure for the 1950s. Fewer pensioners in the labor
force would have caused immediate demand for additional skilled
workers, with corresponding pressures for expansion of the labor
training and education systems. There is no evidence that a major
%
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change in the rate of pensioners exiting the labor force occurred
in the 1950s, with the exception of the one time that there was a
significant change in the pension level.
Massive economic reorganizations were announced in 1957. A. Nove
cited the general reasons for reform in the structure of industrial
management and planning as (a) the lack of effective responsibility
for regional planning, (b) overly centralized industrial ministries
which threatened to become empires, (,c) inefficient use of resources
and delays in decisions between center and field authorities, and
129(d) the size of the economy and anticipated growth rates.
The Khrushchev proposals for economic reform were published
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in early 1957. Three key points were made:
Reforms must rationally distribute personnel to promote 
leading positions in economic councils and planning agencies.
Reforms depended on development of heavy industry, labor 
productivity increments and expansion of the technical base.
Reforms would reflect the Leninist principle of decentralized 
government by filling leading posts with specialists and experienced 
production organizers.
The reforms which emerged in May 1957 created 105 economic 
regions for controlling industrial planning, management, and 
production within their boundaries and within general goals set by 
regional branches 6f Gosplan and coordinated at national levels. 
Several centrally located committees, attached to the Council of 
Ministers, provided administrative backup to the regions for 
purposes of industrial planning, research and design, but these 
central agencies did not direct regional economic decisionmaking.
i
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Central Gosplan absorbed all the planning functions formerly held by
the industrial ministries, material allocation functions, and
continued the responsibilities for coordination of material balances,
132
labor, wages, and investment. A committee was established later
for providing information leading to wage and price reforms. This
entity effectively set the parameters of the labor condition, so
133
that very little flexibility was left to regional management.
The 1957 reforms were implemented under conditions of constrained 
labor resources. Several immediate effects were noted:
. Decentralization, as it was anticipated, caused very large 
numbers of personnel to relocate into regional apparatus. Such 
cadres were not stable additions to the regional work force, however, 
and from all accounts in the subsequent period, management turnover 
became a significant problem.
Decentralization of heavy industry and development of 
regional industrial resources required personnel of all levels of 
educational attainment, but the regional system of management 
reduced the likelihood that personnel shifts between similar 
occupations and enterprises in different regions would be generated 
by governmental authorities. Indeed, Khrushchev indicated his 
belief that competition for labor supplies, rather than central 
direction of personnel, would be a more efficient way to redistribute 
cadres.
Decentralization of heavy industry and regional economic 
administration had to compete with centrally determined projects 
for personnel. The Virgin Lands campaign, for instance, and 
expansion of projects of the magnitude of the hydroelectric schemes
I
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drew heavily on available trained manpower and may have caused adminis­
trators to reduce regional expectations for growth.
The 1957 economic reforms had several effects on expansion plans 
for education. In the first instance, the process of decentralization 
caused education programs which were attached to economic ministries 
to fall under the umbrellas of the new economic administrations. The 
reforms made good sense in this regard, as the regional requirements 
for education and training would vary considerably. However, at the 
same time, national manpower r e q u i r e m e n t s n o t  be met unless 
attention to the total slots available were matched to some total 
picture of nationally required specialists. With the reorganization, 
regional administrators were given the opportunity of influencing more 
strongly the direction of education within their regions, even though 
central direction over the programs continued.
In another way, the changes were less clearly linked to economic 
reforms. In the 1956/57 academic year, admissions to higher education 
programs continued to be granted on a preferential basis to persons 
having two years of prior work experience. In the previous period, 
significant percentages of admissions were directly from secondary 
programs, but in the 1957/58 academic year, pressures for meeting the 
admissions standard increased. It seems that the concept of prior 
work experience was based on the practical need for training praktiki 
to a higher standard, but alscvthe ideological notion that workers 
should be rewarded for their contributions to society. Regional 
economic expansion had to accommodate pressures for expanding 
regional educational opportunities without generating new demands 
for scientific, research, and teaching cadres. Admissions to programs
I
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located in European areas of the Soviet Union were reduced and pro- 
grams and students were encouraged to move to eastern locales.
The emphasis on prior work experience brought into the educa­
tional process students whose educations had been interrupted and 
whose preparation for aaademic work was often weak. In one analysis 
of the rules change, an atticle in Vestnik vysshei shkoly noted that 
the percentages, of students enrolled under the provision was quite 
different in the various institutions (indicating a lack of enthusiasm 
for the program by educators), the shifts in applications for admission 
was heavily toward engineering and polytechnic^courses, and the drop-out 
rates of the new students was very high. It was suggested that
preparatory courses of 8 to 10 months might facilitate the success of
135
these students.
Similar experiments were conducted for secondary programs. As 
Khrushchev noted, only a small number of general secondary graduates 
would be able to continue to higher studies, if only due to the slow 
pace of expansion at upper levels. Preparation for employment 
became an increasingly important objective for general secondary 
programs. For example, a major advance for secondary specialised 
education was the creation of short programs for secondary graduates. 
These were also developed within the Labor Reserve. Additionally, 
experiments were seen in a small number of RSFSR schools which added 
an 11th year to the general program. The additional year accommodated 
production training. The students worked six days every other week,, 
were paid at the rate of 155 rubles per month, and urban students
studied on the alternative week. Variations in the scheme were offered
136
in rural areas. The program was particularly difficult for upper
i
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secondary urban students since work requirements were based on the 
legalj age-defined, acceptable work day.
Economic reforms were also enacted in 1958 for the agricultural
sectoro In essence, the Machine Tractor Stations were abolished
138
and the equipment was sold to the farms. The collective farms
assumed full management of agriculture and many of the former MTS 
personnel were assigned to the kolkhozy. The reforms also established 
Repair and Technical Stations (RTS), whose responsibilities, included 
repairing and selling equipment to the kolkhozy and disseminating 
technical data. These changes were brought about by the multiple 
demands for qualified personnel for farms, MTS, and Party management 
cadres who oversaw farm production and deliveries to the State.
Clearly, duplicative cadres of equal competence could not be provided 
in the short-term for each of these systems. Other reasons for 
desolving the MTS were their overall poor record of performance, and 
the need for an immediate infusion of capital into agriculture 
which would be gained by the sale of MTS equipment to the kolkhozy. Of 
the economic reforms which were developed in the second half of the 
1950s, this one did not generate new demands for cadres. Moreover, 
it was suggested (although no evidence has shown it was implemented) 
that most of the 1.3 million MTS personnel were redistributed to 
kolkhozy most in need of experienced technical cadres.
There were other changes to labor laws which had implications 
for both education and the labor supply. In particular, the 1956 
revisions to the labor code restricted employment of children in 
industry to the age of 16 or older, while 15 year-old children who
i
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wished to work had to obtain special permission from both Party and 
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union officials. This statutory change was presented as a way of
ensuring the expansion of secondary education while avoiding undue
pressures on youth to seek employment. Indeed, relative to the
expansion of junior secondary education, restrictions on employment
were effective means for promoting compulsory attendance. At the
same time, however, little incentive existed for many industrial
leaders, union officials, or kolkhoz managers for restricting youth
employment in favor of their continued educations, and it seems many
youth did seek employment after completing junior secondary programs.
Under conditions of constrained labor supplies and high expectations of
production output, industry and agriculture would support early youth
employment and needed labor documents would be obtained with relative
ease by youth seeking exemptions to the age barrier.
In rural areas, the opportunities for schooling were significantly
dependent on the kolkhoz building program. The rural school building
initiatives, it has been shown by Noah, were especially dependent on
voluntary labor, and these work requirements had been reduced during
the early agricultural reforms. Especially in the late 1950s, there
were newspaper accounts of lagging progress in school construction,
unwillingness on the parts of rural administrators for enforcing
mandatory education, and of youth engaged in rural employment from 
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very early years.
Demographic factors have also been pointed out as offering some 
strong motivation for reforms in education. In particular, the con­
cern was obvious from the early 1950s, when school enrollments 
dropped and the compensatory enrollments came from adult students.
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By the 1959 census, it is certain that changed demography had severe 
implications for the formation of new labor cadres. The numbers of 
children born during and after the war were significantly below the 
usual. The 1959 census results showed that approximately 6 million 
fewer children were in the age bracket 10-15 than in the age group 
16-21, thus offering the prospect that for several years there would 
be a significant reduction in new labor entrants.
Thus, at the point of Khrushchev's education proposals, which are 
discussed in the next section, we find very strong reasons for reorgan­
izing technical secondary and higher education. Regional labor demands 
increased steadily, and as a result of economic measures, the absolute 
need for trained cadres grew. There were also very strong pressures 
against widespread expansion of education. Constrained labor supplies 
generally coupled with a program for rapid economic growth simply 
constricted opportunities for education by drawing individuals 
eligible for education into economic activities. Wage increments 
and other benefits associated with the need -for attracting and 
sustaining labor also worked against increased levels of participation 
in education. As a result, educators sought ways for improving the 
quality of the workforce without reducing manpower available for 
employment. These opposing considerations formed the parameters 
for discussions of Khrushchev's education proposals.
1958/1959 Eda&sa&ion Reforms
Across-the-board changes in education were debated and enacted 
into law during 1958 and 1959. The rapidity with which the changes 
were pursued seem at first glance to be somewhat precipitous. In
I
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the context of the impending manpower crunch, they may also have been 
somewhat overdue. This section presents a discussion of suggestions 
made in 1958 and 1959 and a resume of the reforms which were ultimately 
chosen. The political and ideological contexts of education are a 
unique aspect of the reforms.
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Khrushchev’s Speech to the Komsomol. At the 13th Komsomol 
Congress, Khrushchev announced that the organization and the content 
of Soviet education did not meet the needs of society for tra ined 
cadres or for enhancing the transition to communism. He stated that 
certain factors must be considered by educators —  in particular, most 
students did not continue education beyond the 8th year, sought 
employment, but required job training in order to be integrated into 
the work force. He claimed that secondary academic schooling left 
the majority of students ill-prepared for employment. He noted that 
the attitudes of some youth toward physical labor was not acceptable 
in that they considered it an undesirable alternative to education, 
leading in some cases to "voluntary unemployment", or parasitism.
Khrushchev suggested a series of actions for improving both 
secondary and higher education:
All students should receive job training during the course 
of their general education.
The part-time education option serving youth and adults 
with technical and general studies should be expanded.
Higher education should admit workers on a prefential 
basis for the majority of admissions, with few secondary students 
admitted directly from school.
i
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Trade unions and the Komsomol would choose students for the 
part-time programs.
Factory technical training programs could be revised to 
encourage praktiki to upgrade their credentials.
Part-time and correspondence students could have progress­
ively more time away from work responsibilities for study and the last 
year of their program could be without working.
Agricultural institutes could be moved into rural areas, at 
minimum, and possibly connected to kolkhoz or state farms so that 
students would have opportunities for hands-on experience .
Two of the proposals were new. The notion that the Labor 
Reserve might become the mainstream route for secondary education 
raised immediately the issue whether Khrushchev envisaged that all 
students would leave the general school network after the eighth 
year. In essence, it would have meant that all secondary students 
would become technicians, which Khrushchev regarded as a potential 
boon for industry. The proposals would have also required higher 
education to compensate’ for the narrower academic backgrounds of 
new cadres —  and this was already a problem of general concern.
Khrushchev's proposal also involved the trade unions and the 
Komsomol in the selection of students for part-time and correspondence 
studies. While the motivation for this recommendation seemingly was 
that some students attended part-time higher education programs 
without also being employed, there were political and ideological 
factors at play in the proposal. The trade unions and the Komsomol 
involvement would have restricted admissions to workers whose 
occupations required further technical training. The involvement
i
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of such forces in admissions decisions could have seriously impeded
the choices made by individuals as to their preferred field of study.
The extension of the power to the Komsomol and the trade unions
might have been an attempt to counter the luke-warm reception which
reforms in education had encountered hitherto. In theory, of course,
a collective decision was in keeping with the push toward communism.
Responses to Khrushchev's Suggestions. After the speech to the
Komsomol, there were numerous suggestions in the process for specific
changes which might take place. A. Tikhonov, from the K.D. Ushinsky
Institute for Pedagogical Studies, was the first to suggest that
universal general studies should be expanded to eight years, followed
by secondary technical training. His concept was that the additional
years would allow students to reach legally employable age, while
seconuary education would emerge as occupational training. He offered
a series of organizational frameworks as appropriate for upper
secondary/technical training combinations. These ranged from one
to two year programs in the Labor Reserve to three and four year
programs, under different auspices, which would be geared to meeting
manpower requirements of particular branches of the economy and
which would be preparatory to higher education. Tikhonov called for
a pedagogical conference to discuss the changes, and he argued for a
flexible approach in setting mandatory course requirements in the 
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various programsc
Other articles pointed out specific problems which might be
resolved during the reforms„ For example, one article in Kornsomol-
skaya pravda complained that in the existing setup, manpower planning
was inadequate. Problems which were enumerated included specialists
i
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who worked outside their fields of academic study, imbalance in
admissions relative to identifiable labor requirements, poor job
placement decisions, and inabilities of the economic councils in
resolving manpower requirements. In addition, it was charged that
some economic councils did not want new graduates to be assigned
143
within their annual labor contingents.
Parallel to the education discussions, there were adjustments
made to economic planning procedures. An article in Planovoe.
khozyaistvo pointed out that national economic planning would be a
process of filtering up information from the bottom, and that not
only would individual construction projects and enterprises be taken
into account, but the economic councils and the republics would have
a greater role in decisions for setting development priorities.
Greater responsibilities for capital investment coordination,
decisions regarding production, housing construction, and material
supplies were assigned to the republics and the economic councils.
Central authorities would "verify and coordinate" planning by
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industry and region. This procedure held open the possibilities
for rationalizing economic planning —  keeping goals in line with
manpower availability, for instance, and for development of necessary
social services.
In the summer of 1958, the head of the Labor Reserve emerged
as a leading figure in the discussions of reforms in education.
G.I. Zelenko picked up the notion that eight year education could
be the basic general education program, but he offered a series of
alternatives to structural options. First, he suggested that there
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might be schools for gifted children. He proposed that the
I
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purpose of secondary education might be to turn out skilled workers. 
Citing the inadequacies of the factory training system, and noting 
the existing inflexibility of the Labor Reserve schemes, he 
suggested that the economic regional councils develop a series of 
urban and rural technical training schools. The new schools would 
cater especially to newly automated industries, would form centers 
within the regions for the individual branches of industry and agri­
culture, but would rely on the enterprises and farms for production
_ . . 146training.
I. Kairov, from the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, took a 
somewhat different perspective. In essence, he accepted the notion 
of eight years of general polytechnics/schooling, but he declared 
that production training and general education were diametrically- 
opposed educational concepts. Even as experiments attempting 
to combine these elements were 'going'on,, the theoretical basis for 
the new system had not been established. He considered that 
specializations in the upper grades must include both theoretical 
and production training, and that the specializations offered in 
a given school should reflect the different regional manpower 
needs. He argued for gradual implementation of any reforms in 
education.
Zelenko inserted a note of realism about the employment picture. 
Specifically, there was enormous demand for skilled labor, and the 
demand would strengthen. Despite the existing systems for training, 
rational placement of graduatesand planning of the labor supply 
were also required. Even the expansion of secondary education, needed 
as it was for introducing advanced technologies, had to be planned in
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conjunction with projected available employment. It was very diffi­
cult, Zelenko said, to place graduates —  even those trained at the 
specific requests of industry. He argued that combining general 
education and production training in the secondary schools was a 
faulty concept —  it placed too heavy a burden on the students; 
the job-training burden would fall on industry; students would 
occupy places which might be more productively filled by full-time 
workers; and there was the possibility that general secondary 
schools would graduate too many for the available jobs and higher 
education slots (thereby causing dissatisfaction among those forced 
to accept work at lower levels than their education and training 
otherwise commanded) .
Zelenko argued that his proposal of urban/rural technical 
training centers would contribute to resolving labor shortages.
He suggested that the centers might form an interim step in the 
education system. Specialized secondary education, which did not 
give production experience, would be the next step. Then, educa­
tion would be followed by a period of mandatory employment prior 
to admission to higher education. Exceptions would be allowed 
in the cases of gifted children in relation to mandatory work,
and there would be flexible connections between evening and full
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time specialized secondary programs.
Higher education was also subjected to some criticism. In 
particular,^Elyutin, the USSR Minister of Higher Education, cited 
a need for greater practical experience during higher education.
He suggested that the students without prior work experience might 
work full-time during the first two years of study. Thus, many
i
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many students might participate in part-time or correspondence courses 
during the first two years. But these systems were weak, isolated 
from both academic institutions and from enterprises. Activities 
would have to be undertaken for strengthening these options —  e.g., 
developing independent correspondence centers and locating guidance 
facilities within the larger industrial enterprises. Elyutin insisted 
that the reforms woula require all teachers to be retrained so -that 
they could implement the new polytechnic*!and training emphases and 
so that they could improve their knowledge of scientific advances.
Khrushchev's Thesis. Following the public debates, Khrushchev 
elaborated his earlier talk at the.Komsomol Congress. In a Pravda 
article, in late September 1158, he noted that the reforms in education 
must (a) address attitudes toward work and (b) create specific 
employment training. Khrushchev suggested that employment after 
junior secondary education should be mandatory. Education should 
be restructured as grades 1-8 and 9-10, with due recognition -b-f 
male-female roles in life and regional/local labor requirements.
Khrushchev suggested several parallel structures might be 
appropriate. The first option would combine general education with 
labor and technical training, with the emphasis placed very heavily 
on work. A second route was that junior secondary graduates would 
be assigned to jobs (40% would have urban placements and 60% would 
have rural placements), and job training would be provided in 
factories, FZO or FZU programs of up to 2 years duration, and in 
correspondence programs. The schools for working and rural youth 
constituted another course, where students would work and study 
(accommodations being made to work schedules, depending on the
I
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level of study). The present school system, followed by labor 
training and mandatory employment, was a further option. Khrush­
chev also supported developing special schools for gifted children, 
and he stressed that implementing the changes should not interrupt 
the scheduled admissions into higher education.
With regard to higher education, Khrushchev continued stressing 
that specializations must include practical training* part-time and 
correspondence programs would be a primary vehicle for post-secondary 
education; and workers should be given preferential treatment in 
the admissions decisions and in the extent of their work obligations 
during study. The republics would carry the burden of decisions on 
structural reforms, leaving decentralized efforts to accommodate 
labor needs. Enterprises, further, had the obligation of hiring 
young graduates, inexperience notwithstanding.
Party-Government Thesis on School Reforms. While there was 
little new in the specific recommendations made by Khrushchev in 
view of the public comments, reliance on decentralized organizations 
reiterated his commitment to forms of education which would strength­
en recent Soviet economic changes. In November 1958, a joint state­
ment was released in the names of the Communist Party and the Council 
of Ministers which systematically treated the reforms for each 
stage of education. The joint statement toned down the previous 
discussions by suggesting that the existing system was "only some­
what divorced from life", and that it was "expedient" for all youth
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to be drawn into the work place from the ages of 15 or 16.
The new system would be based on 8 years of incomplete secondary 
schooling, stress communist upbringing, labor instruction, and poly­
i
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technics/labor training schools which included production training* 
and specialized secondary schools which would give a general educa­
tion, production training and a specialist classification. Schools 
would have production centers and output would support part of the 
costs of training. Accountability for mandatory education would be 
established, and schools would take into account the needs of region­
al development for specific labor resources. Further, in response to 
statements regarding placement of graduates, a new system of planning 
would be created for effecting long-term planning of both technical 
training and job placements. Specific jobs would be reserved for 
students and young granduates.
The thesis said that higher and specialized secondary education 
might increase their reliance on part-time and correspondence studies, 
would upgrade the production/training components of the courses, 
would admit increasing numbers of students with prior work experience, 
and would cater to regional needs for specializations. Teachers would 
be retrained. Research in higher education institutions would stress 
current economic and social problems. Academic staff would switch 
to industrial employment from time to time. Qualified staff would be 
drawn from industry and from agriculture in the capacities of technical 
instructors. Expansion of physical plant would emphasize new indus­
trial areas, such as the Far East and Siberia. Generally, the thesis 
said that the policy for expanding education would emphasize only 
gradual changes while producing additional graduates in the near-term.
Legal Reforms and Implications for the Economy. The legal
mandate for education was adopted on December 24, 1958 at the meeting
of the Supreme Soviet. Most of the directives duplicated those in
i
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the Joint Thesis, issued a month earlier. The system which was 
envisaged was as follows:
Primary and junior secondary education would add a year to 
accommodate limited labor training and polytechnics/instruction.
These years of schooling were mandatory for all children .
Secondary schooling from grade 9 to 11 was no longer obliga­
tory, but students from the ages of 15 or 16 were expected to (a) 
work, or (b) to be enrolled in an education/training program.
Secondary schooling would be offered under the Labor Reserve 
and through schools of the Ministry of Education in tihe republics. 
Secondary specialized education was also offered under the Ministry 
of Higher Education.
Forms of secondary schooling were part-time and correspondence 
studies for students who worked or who were enrolled in technical 
training programs. Alternative full-time programs were offered in 
the general school system, complemented with production training 
and labor practice of at least one-third of the program. Existing 
schools would continue, but with a heavier labor training content 
through 1965, accommodating admissions to higher schools and allowing 
students to finish programs for which they were already enrolled.
Labor Reserve programs would change into urban and rural 
technical colleges of one to three years duration (for urban 
programs) and one to two years duration (for rural settings). In 
addition, the Labor Reserve would take on the responsibility for 
technical training programs which were attached to economic councils 
and ministries, woulci supplement the activities of enterprises for 
training workers in the brigade method (providing in this instance
i
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suggestions for organization of the programs, as well as curricula, 
textbooks, and other materials).
Labor Reserve and the Ministry of Education schools would 
develop workshops and production units, where appropriate, while 
support for the Labor Reserve schools, particularly, would be 
partially funded by profits from school production work.
Higher education and specialized secondary education would 
be upgraded in relation to practical training. Higher education would 
have to rely heavily on part-time and correspondence programs, as 
students without practical work experience would be required to study 
part-time for two years before entering the full-time program. Avail­
ability of programs would be based on regional manpower needs. In­
dustries and other hiring authorities would be required to reserve 
slots for students in production training and for young graduates, 
and a plan to this effect would be developed parallel to the 
national economic plan.
Statutes on changes to the structure of education and to 
the content of programs were subject to approval by the USSR Council 
of Ministers.
Priinary and Junior Secondary Education. The major accomplish­
ment of the reforms was in extending mandatory education for both 
rural and urban students to eight years from the existing seven.
In addition, the requirement for administrative accountability 
for compliance with attendance rules was a step forward, especially 
with regard to the emphasis on ensuring that girls were among the 
attendees. On the other hand, implementing mandatory eight year 
education was regressive for urban students, who had been subject
i
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to a ten-year requirement for a decade.
Polytechnics/labor training in education was not to be very 
different from on-going experiments, although the total number of 
hours in such instruction tripled. The major change was that 
students would enter employment or some form of specialist train­
ing from the age of 15 or 16. The limitation of the requirement 
was the omission in statute of a method of ensuring compliance or 
of establishing a job placement system for facilitating entry of 
unskilled workers into the labor force. The net result, of course, 
was that all students would be retained outside the work force 
for an additional year —  a factor which complicated at least 
marginally the flows of unskilled wotkers into agriculture and 
industry.
Secondary Education. The major accomplishment of the reforms 
was in making available to all students some form of additional 
schooling or technical training, with the emphasis on equal stan­
dards in different program settings. The anticipated increase of 
skilled workers in the labor force, it was thought, would greatly 
facilitate implementation of technological advances through the 
economy. Attention to regional labor requirements and accommodation 
in both general education and the Labor Reserve programs to these 
needs was a direct response to manpower difficulties which had been 
expressed by economic councils and regional administrations. Further, 
the directive for planning manpower in relation to the availability 
of training programs and in anticipation of the increased flow of 
young skilled workers into employment was an answer to complaints
by many that youth were probably going to be unable to find employment 
. ion graduation.
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There were several problems generated by the reforms which might 
have been anticipated. First, the increased stress on education and 
training, especially the changes in the Labor Reserve system to a 
one-to-four year variant, would slow down the entry of youth into 
the job market. Secondly, while the reforms specifically addressed 
the qualifications of existing personnel, the reforms generated a 
huge demand for technical training specialists, and it was antici­
pated thac most such instructors would be drawn from active employ­
ment. Manpower shortages in industry would have constituted an 
automatic disincentive for industry to voluntarily release their 
skilled workers for instructional cadres, and the quality of instruc­
tion wouln be jeopardized by relying on instructors whose educations 
were inadequate in pedagogical theory and practice. Thirdly, 
material supports for technical training were clearly lacking, and 
while it was anticipated that these supports would be supplied by 
new industries, there was no clear incentive for economic councils 
to reorient development priorities to meet the needs of the education 
sector. Further, even while the Labor Reserve and other school net­
works might have production centers, eventually even these toere tied 
to the production targets of existing industries. Fourthly, technical 
schools under the auspices of the Labor Reserve and other such train­
ing schemes did not relieve industry of its own training burden, 
although it would allow the emphasis on factory-based training to 
turn to retraining existing cadres. The parallel programs for 
training, therefore, generated substantial requirements for additional 
qualified personnel, reducing (in effect) the availability of such 
persons for work in production.
i
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Secondary Specialized Education and Higher Education. In general, 
the reforms were not particularly significant for specialized second­
ary programs, although the requirements in the new law included a 
greater emphasis on production training. For higher eduqation, on
time and correspondence studies, prior work experience, production 
work during the course of higher studies, and compensating in the 
higher program for loss of general education preparation at the lower 
levels of schooling.
In the first instance, it was certain that part-time and corres­
pondence studies had already expanded enormously during the years 
prior to the reform, but that the expansion had not yet accommodated 
the quality and standard of the full-time programs. In one analysis, 
an educator pointed out that the standard of theoretical training
was much lower, students had too heavy a work burden, and staffing
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was inferior to the full-time programs. Expansion of these net­
works would require more materials, facilities, and staff, while 
accommodation would be required between the student's work responsi­
bilities and the demands of academic life.
Expansion of education was not only to increase enrollments, but 
to bring in working students who otherwise would have participated in 
full-time programs. In effect, the standard of higher education was 
likely to suffer in the near-term, until the basic infrastructure 
was sorted out. Further, even after work experience was accumulated 
for admissions purposes, the practical work requirements imposed
the other hand, the law was especially important.
expanding higher education s^d channelling students into part-
I
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on higher education students reduced even more the theoretical con­
tent of their educations. This meant that while higher education 
was supposed to broaden the educations of graduates, the institutions 
would be forced to produce even more narrow specialists, because they 
were also under the obligation to graduate greater numbers in the 
short term. Expansion of higher education also reduced flows of 
youth into the labor market, with the compensating factor only that 
future availability of highly trained specialists would enhance 
economic performance.
For the higher school, accommodation to the lower standard of 
youth entering higher education was likely from several perspectives. 
On the one hand, the law required that increased emphasis be placed 
on students who requested to study in their former fields of work 
specialization. On the other hand, admissions of workers and
correspondence students would be supervised in some way by union
and Komsomol representatives, who would likely influence admissions 
to technical programs. This established the potential for imbalance 
in future manpower availability for some fields. If education 
were to be designed for meeting "future" needs for specialists, 
accommodation to new disciplines would have to be made. Further, 
if educational standards were not to suffer, and if education 
programs were to compensate for lacking general education at the 
secondary level, and if education were to graduate theorists as 
well as production specialists, then it is likely that the duration 
of higher education had to be lengthened. The conflict in the
situation, however, arose with the requirement to graduate addi­
tional specialists in the near-term —  a requirement which could
*
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not be met through simply expanding correspondence studies and 
which was compromised by the likely inability to ensure a high 
quality graduate.
Conclusions
There was a mandate for change in post-war education which 
was in linking the educational experience to preparation for 
employment. In the short-term, post-war solutions were in offering 
between four and seven years of general education, followed by 
on-site job training. The growth of the Soviet economy, however, 
coupled with the war-time losses of specialists from the labor 
force encouraged educators toward adopting a program for technolo­
gical literacy during the general school process, expanding 
opportunities for education as well as the mandatory period of 
schooling, and to requiring practical work experience during 
schooling.
Basic infrastructure was lacking in the post-war period for 
both general studies and for technical preparation of students.
This condition was pervasive throughout the-Soviet Union geogra­
phically and at all levels of education. Infrastructure included 
teacher preparation, schools, equipment, materials, and adoption 
of curricula for technical studies. For some geographic areas 
and for the rural economy, in particular, special efforts were 
undertaken to extend the availability of the education programs 
and job training schemes. In the 1950s, economic reorganizations 
demonstrated clearly that manpower for many regions and for
agriculture remained numerically or qualitatively insufficient
i
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and that the spread of education was too slow.
Reforms were pursued gradually throughout the 1950s and the 
development of pedagogical theory moved from an insistence on general 
academic studies to polytechnics/instruction, but again to specific 
labor training for all students. These changes reflected the pace 
of (a) de-Stalinization, and (b) recognition of manpower-shortages, 
and (c) lowered birth rates, in the post-war period. Various manpower 
options were pursued in the interim, such as the de-mobilization of 
the military and reliance on women in employment. To some extent, 
new economic priorities of industrial and agricultural automation, as 
well as increased labor productivity (derived from new organizational 
practices) compensated for numerical declines in increments to the 
work force. However, in its ultimate form, the values reflected in 
policy decisions ware placed equally on academic preparation and 
technical preparedness, superceding the earlier insistence on near- 
term formation of cadres, especially at the unskilled levels.
Basic industrial infrastructure was uneven in the Soviet Union 
and geographical expansion of industry and agriculture appears to 
have diluted potential benefits of new technologies and increased 
availability of machinery. In some instances, the potential for 
labor productivity improvements due to changes in technology 
remained unrealized. Incentives for developing and sustaining 
cadres in new industrial regions were offered to workers in the 
forms of fewer working hours, mobility, housing, and wage incre­
ments, and improvements in social security. However, some areas 
had educations/infrastructure which was too weak for training
indigenous personnel and the very incentives attracting personnel
*
-150-
away from European Industrial areas served to draw personnel away
from the east. As V. Perevedentsev wrote for Voprosy ekonomikl:
The key factor in the expedient territorial redistribution 
of labor should be the planned equalization of living 
standards enjoyed by populations in different parts of 
the country..o Material incentives play no less a role 
when it comes to the territorial redistribution of man­
power resources. But incentives must not be interpreted 
in an oversimplified way to mean merely a raise in 
nominal pay. As experience shows an increase in wages, 
unless it is attended, by opportunities for the worker to 
spend his income to advantage, by no means promotes the 
formation of stable cadres. If the opportunities for 
spending are poor, above-normal wages lead to labor turn­
over, since workers gravitate to those parts of the country 
in which they can use their savings to best effect.154
Throughout the 1950s, efforts were made for remedying the problems
with opportunities for education in the new regions and for agriculture.
The lowest level of training was the mechanization of agriculture stUo/s
program^which was under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture
and later under the Labor Reserve. Secondary schools and specialized
technical training programs at the secondary and higher education
levels were nearly non-existent at the outset of the 1950s in many
regions and development of this level of education was seriously
impeded by lack of cadres suited to teaching and research in higher
education.
Reliance on part-time and correspondence studies was an increasingly 
important educational option during the entire post-war period. It is 
perhaps unfortunate that the material and personnel backups to these 
systems were so poorly established. Criticisms of the programs were 
common, drop-out rates were especially high, and the quality of the 
training frequently was not at current technological and scientific 
standard. In the 1958 reforms, these factors were addressed insofar 
as authorities were instructed to provide training for new cadres
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and to remedy material deficiencies. Nonetheless, despite some 
efforts to provide incentives for personnel to join these cadres 
and to decentralize higher education, the very fact that the 
reforms relied heavily on these systems of education put the 
reforms in jeopardy relative to graduation of highly qualified 
technical and scientific personnel.
In ideological terms, the reforms relied heavily on the ideals 
established for education shortly after the revolution. The reforms 
reiterated access to education for all students, regardless of class, 
nationality, or native language. They increased access to education 
by adding an additional year, to the period of mandatory education and 
by emphasizing decentralized programs. The insistence on labor train­
ing and "values associated with respect for working people", and 
preferential treatment of workers in admissions policies was also a 
move toward establishing an intellectual elite thoroughly grounded 
in working class ethics. Involvement of outside bodies (as trade 
unions, Party, and Komsomol representatives) in admissions decisions 
and examinations was a move toward collective decisionmaking. 
Similarly, the reliance on decentralized authorities to effect the 
expansion of education might be regarded as democratizing education.
It was part of the de-Stalinization process that the course and 
program offerings would move from commonality to diversified types 
of programs. As one educator expressed it, unity in the goals did 
not mean necessarily sameness in experiences. N. Goncharov and 
A. Leontyev wrote^
We share the view that school unity by no means signified 
uniformity, or unification, but is a democratic principle 
which simply guarantees the right of all strata of the
i
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population to receive a general education and mount 
unhampered all the rungs of the education ladder. We 
also believe differentiation is a flexible means of 
.channelling children’s proclivities... Unification of 
curricula in the senior grades, from our point of view, 
stands in direct contradiction to the needs of society, 
and the tasks of complete development of the aptitudes, 
gifts, and talents of the younger generation.155
As the general education reform would allow the differentiation in 
curricula to reflect the needs of society and the economy in various 
regions, the two authors.expressed the conclusion (enacted into the 
law) that special schools for gifted children would be unnecessary.
If the ideological picture was in keeping with Communist ideals, 
why did the political picture look so different? It must be pointed 
out that the reorganizations of economic and agricultural decision­
making which were undertaken in the second half of the 1950s were 
not well established. These reorganizations included the creation 
of regional economic authorities, the amalgamation of the MTS with 
the kolkhoz, and the increased role of decentralized authorities in 
economic decisionmaking. Decentralization of economic planning was 
not completed at the time of the reforms in education and there were 
indications that recentralization of some functions might occur.
This caused massive shifts of institutional and economic power blocs 
toward the republics and the economic councils in the first instance. 
These same entities —  not settled in their economic functions —  
were not required to tackle education changes on a massive scale.
Given that economic regions were charged with having "localist 
tendencies”, reforms in education which reinforced local and 
regional manpower needs seem inconsistent. Thus, reliance on 
increased planning for labor, including the placement of young 
graduates in industry and agriculture, still might be unsatisfactory.
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If a national perspective ware applied to planning for cadres, local 
investment in education might not result in cadres being assigned 
locally. If a local perspective ware taken, national priorities might 
be overlooked and there would be an imbalance in the interests of 
short-term needs in the types of training offered. Under the 
circumstances, it is understandable that the Khrushchev reforms 
were to be implemented only gradually, with existing schools and 
training programs continuing for several years.
It is at the point of the ^ 1959 reforms that this thesis stops. 
Clearly, there is another body of literature on Soviet education 
taking into account the reforms in the mid-1960s,- the 1970s, and 
the 1980s. Polytechnics/education remains a controversial issue in 
the Soviet Union and the most recent reforms again stress official 
interest in the subject.
i
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Numbers Serving in the Soviet Military










Sources, M. Matthews, Youth Employment in the USSR, 1946-1958, op cit, 




Workers Trained in Labor Reserve Schools 
(1941-1945)























Sources; Matthews, op cit, indicated that the differential between
intakes and graduations was largely due to youth who ran 
away from Labor Reserve schools. This was done at consider­
able personal risk as Labor Reserve regulations were 
comparable to military regulations on such matters. It 
is presumed that the failures were especially high among 
uchilishcha programs which operated for longer periods of 
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1*41-1945








1. Matthews, _op cit, said that 150,000 of the MB&D trainees went 
to machine building and the remainder to defense.










Higher Education Graduates 
(day and evening students)
Year Engineering Arts & Education Other Total
1937 34,600 31,700 38,500 104 800
1938 31,300 37,900 34,600 103 800
1939 28,400 39,600 30,300 98 300
1940 29,400 40,500 32,200 102 100
1941 27,500 47,600 29,600 104 700
1942 13,400 25,400 30,100 68 900
1943 9,700 5,900 12,200 27 800
1944 9,300 15,200 11,200 24 500
1945 9,900 28,500 10,800 49 200
1946 - - - 67 300
1947 - - - 86 300
1948 - - - 121 500
1949 - - - 138 300
1950 34,800 72,200 40*900 147 900
1952 - - - 175 800
1953 - - - 172 000
1954 52,900 75,500 36,000 174 400
1955 62,200 73,100 48,500 183 800
1956 - - - 191 000
1957 - - - 194 500
1958 - - - 213 300
1959 - - - 253 700
Sources^ N. DeWitt, Education and Professional Employment 
in the USSR, Washington, DC : National Science 
Foundation, 1961, pp. 608-611. Total graduations 
from Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958g, p. 837 for. 
years 1937, 1940, 1950, 1953, 1955-58. Total for 






































































Source^ NaSalenie SSSR 1973. statisticheskii s b o m i k , Moscow 1975, p. 7.
1. Population in millions.




Distribution of Men and Women
in the 
Soviet Population
















Source$ Naselenie SSSR 1973. statisticheskii sbornik. Moscow 1975, p. 8.
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